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This thesis presents a study of the provision of emotions for articial agents with the
ultimate aim of enhancing their autonomy, i.e. making them more exible, robust
and self-sucient. In recent years, the importance of emotions and their assistance
to cognition has been increasingly acknowledged. Emotions are no longer considered
undesirable or simply useless. Their role in various aspects of human and animal cog-
nition like perception, attention, memory, decision-making and social interaction has
been recognised as essential. The importance of emotions is much more evident in so-
cial interaction and therefore much of the emotions research done in articial systems
focuses on the expression and recognition of emotions. However, recent neurophysio-
logical research suggests that emotions also play a crucial part in cognition itself.
This thesis investigates ways in which articial emotions can improve autonomous
behaviour in the domain of a simple, but complete, solitary learning agent. For this
purpose, a non-symbolic emotion model was designed and implemented. It takes the
form of a recurrent articial neural network where emotions inuence the perception
of the state of the world, on which they ultimately depend. This is done through
a hormone system that acts as a persistence mechanism. This model is somewhat
more sophisticated than those usually found in equivalent non-symbolic systems, yet
the emotions themselves were restricted to a few simplied emotions that do not try
to mimic the complexity of the human counterparts, but are aorded by the agent's
interaction with the environment.
Several hypotheses were investigated of how the emotion model above could be inte-
grated in a reinforcement learning framework which, by itself, provides the base for the
adaptiveness necessary for autonomy. Experiments were carried out in a realistic robot
simulator that compared the performance of emotional with non-emotional agents in
a survival task that consists of maintaining adequate energy levels in an environment
with obstacles and energy sources. One of the most common roles attributed to emo-
tions is as source of reinforcement and was therefore examined rst. In experiments
with a controller that selects between primitive actions, the reinforcement provided by
emotions was found inappropriate because of the time scale discrepancies introduced
by the emotion model. The reinforcement provided by emotions proved to be much
more successful when used by a controller that selects between behaviours rather than
actions, achieving equivalent performance to that of a standard reinforcement function.
One of the crucial issues for ecient and productive learning, highlighted by the latter
experiments, is to determine exactly when the controller should re-evaluate its deci-
sion concerning which behaviour to activate. The emotions proved to be particularly
helpful in this role, enabling better performance with substantially less computational
eort than the best suited interruption mechanism using regular time intervals. The
modulation of learning parameters such as learning rate and the exploration vs. ex-
ploitation ratio was also explored. Experiments suggested that emotions might also be
useful for this purpose.
This research led to the conclusion that articial emotions are a useful construct to have
in the domain of behaviour-based autonomous agents, because they provide a unifying
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On account of its preoccupation with knowledge as the cause of intelligent behaviour,
Articial Intelligence today faces several problems. It has been said that Articial In-
telligence is having diculties in packaging common sense into knowledge systems by
the discovery of more sophisticated rules, because such a task is not possible (Varela,
1992), or that there are serious embodiment and grounding demands which have been
ignored (Brooks, 1986a; Harnad, 1989). What many seem to agree upon is that more
research should be made on self-referential systems that perceive the world in a contex-
tual way, strongly inuenced by their embodied and individual history (Varela et al.,
1991) .
It seems that trying to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying
autonomy might provide some of the necessary tools to overcome these diculties of
Articial Intelligence.
In the eld of robotics, the criteria used to dene whether a robot is autonomous or not
are not well established. In general, simply requiring that, once the robot is nished, it
does its task without human intervention is enough. The word's root meaning suggests
an alternative denition of autonomy that has stronger requirements: namely, a truly
autonomous robot should also develop the laws that govern its behaviour.
The design of truly autonomous systems is still a very open research subject, partic-
ularly if one requires the meaning of autonomy to include self-motivation, instead of
1
2
mere automaticity. However, there is much argument in its favour. Having autonomous
agents seems to be a clear advantage in several diverse elds, like for example robotics,
animal robotics1 (McFarland, 1994), agents theory (Ferguson, 1992) and interactive
virtual environments (Blumberg, 1995). Although, arguments against having fully au-
tonomous agents are easy to nd (in general, the robot is supposed to do something
useful and not whatever it wants, which might even be detrimental), it is generally
accepted that it is benecial to have autonomy, at least to a certain extent which is
still far from being achieved in today's systems. It is often dicult or even impossible
for the designer to anticipate all possible scenarios the robot will be confronted with,
and autonomy can help the robot to deal with the unexpected situations.
The way to accomplish true autonomy in a robot is by developing an adaptive con-
troller that improves its performance by unsupervised learning when interacting with
its environment. Such improvement of performance must be and is always grounded in
some kind of value scheme dened by the designer. Whether this scheme involves rein-
forcement values, instincts, credit systems, goals or heuristic rules the result is always
the same: to give the robot some guidance in its learning task. For an autonomous
agent, detecting the regularities in the environment by self-organisation is not enough
as a learning capability; it also needs some sort of internal motivation to decide what
to do. It is also necessary for it to have some way to establish its goals without the
aid of an external teacher. For this purpose it needs to be endowed with some innate
mechanisms that allow it to determine what are the crucial features of its interaction
with the environment and whether there are positive or negative connotations asso-
ciated with these features. These basic learning mechanisms have to be hard-wired
by evolution, if the agent is to learn anything useful during its lifetime. A generic
evaluation in terms of survival abilities can only be useful for natural selection through
genetic evolution.
The fact that emotions are considered to be essential to human reasoning suggests
that they might play an important role in achieving the self-motivation necessary to
support strong autonomy.
The present research focuses on how to use emotions in the control of an autonomous
1 Modelling of animal behaviour using robots.
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agent that adapts to its environment using reinforcement learning techniques. The
social connotations usually associated with emotions might suggest that this work also
addresses social robots, but this is not the case. Emotions were used solely in the
autonomous control of a single solitary agent.
A view shared by many researchers in the emergent eld of emotional agents is that
emotions serve a purpose in cognition and that it is this functional aspect of emotions
that should be taken into account when modelling emotional agents (Frijda and Swa-
german, 1987; Ca~namero, 1998). In particular, researchers should be careful to avoid
getting their attention caught by specic human emotions that probably do not even
make sense in terms of the articial agent-environment interaction. This is a view
akin to the Articial Life methodology (Langton, 1992) that does not consist of trying
to imitate biology by constructing realistic models, but of trying to abstract the fun-
damental principles underlying biological phenomena and recreate them in articial
systems.
This was the approach followed by the current work. Several functional roles of emo-
tions were tried out under an animat philosophy (Wilson, 1991), by building a complete
agent where emotions form an integral part of the whole. Furthermore, these functional
roles were tested in comparison with other non-emotional mechanisms. It was consid-
ered important not only to develop a fully functional agent that successfully performs
the task that it is devised for, but also to demonstrate that the introduced mechanisms
are advantageous when compared with more traditional mechanisms. More important
than designing an agent that solves an arbitrary task is to establish the utility of
mechanisms used.
In order to establish if there is an advantage in having emotions as the source of
self-motivation in an autonomous robot, experiments were carried out on a simulated
Khepera robot (Michel, 1996) in an animal-like adaptation task. The experiments focus
on how to use emotions in the control of the robot, and in particular in its adaptation
to the environment. The utility of dierent roles of emotions was explored in terms of
the adaptiveness of the robot's nal behaviour.
For this purpose an emotion model was designed and implemented. This is a simple
4
model based on a recurrent network, where perception and emotions inuence each
other. Through this mutual inuence some persistence of emotional state is achieved,
while maintaining reactiveness to new perceptual states. The model endows the agent
with emotional states that are coherent with its contextual interaction with the envi-
ronment by attributing value to the relevant features of this interaction. The robot's
possible emotional states were named after four basic human emotions | Happiness,
Fear, Sadness and Anger | but are much simpler than the human counterparts.
Apart from the inuence on perception imposed by the model used, emotions were used
in the reinforcement learning framework to fulll the following roles: reinforcement
specication, detection of signicant events, modulation of the learning parameters of
learning rate and the ratio of exploration/exploitation.
The results showed that emotions can be used successfully as a source of reinforcement
if, and only if, the controller architecture is selected with care. It was found necessary
to upgrade from an action-based to a behaviour-based architecture in order to have the
emotion-based reinforcement work properly. The intrinsic time scales of a behaviour-
based architecture were found more appropriate for the use of emotions. If the robot
has to select and evaluate a primitive action at each time step the emotions' persistence
in time becomes a severe hindrance for their successful use as reinforcement. The use
of emotions to modulate the learning parameters of the action-based controller proved
much more promising.
The behaviour decomposition of the controller introduced the need for determining
when to trigger control, i.e. when to re-evaluate the previously selected behaviour
and select a new one. It was found empirically that selecting the control triggering
mechanism correctly was a crucial step towards success in the learning task. Based on
the fact that the agent's emotional state always reects the occurrence of signicant
events, an event-detection mechanism was designed that consisted of triggering control
whenever a signicant change in emotional state was found. This emotion-driven event
detection mechanism was experimentally compared with triggering control at regular
intervals and proved to be helpful for the robot's learning.
The inuence of emotions in perception was also examined, but results failed to show
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any dierence between the performance of agents with emotion-inuenced perception
and non-emotional perception. However, these results are probably controller and task
dependent.
In essence, the reported research work shows how emotions can inuence control in
multiple ways. Although the \emotions" used were much simplied, they were still
named emotions as they tried to capture more functional aspects than those provided
by a traditional reinforcement function. Moreover, calling them emotions enables this
research to be identied with other emotion research so that developments in the
eld may be brought together and integrated to produce further richness of emotions
functionality and added complexity of articial agent's behaviour.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organised as the following chapters:
Autonomous and Learning Robots (Chapter 2)
Survey of autonomy's denitions in the eld of robotics and establishment of
a working denition, followed by an overview of robot control architectures
in general and reinforcement-learning techniques in particular. Review of a
reinforcement-learning architecture similar to the one used in the robot experi-
ments.
Natural and Articial Emotions (Chapter 3)
Literature review on emotions in natural and in articial systems. Presentation
of the emotion model used in the experiments.
Action-Based Control (Chapter 4)
Experiments employing an action-based learning controller. The emotions sys-
tem was integrated with the control system by inuencing perception, providing
reinforcement value and modulating learning parameters.
Behaviour-Based Control (Chapter 5)
Experiments employing a behaviour-based controller. Emotions were used within
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the behaviour based architecture in three dierent roles: inuencing perception,
providing reinforcement value and detecting events for control triggering.
Concluding Discussion (Chapter 6)
General discussion of the achievements attained through the integration of emo-
tions in the two dierent controllers and of the possible extensions and directions
of future research.
Recapitulation of the issues and problems inherent to autonomous robot research
that were found in course of this work.
Appendices
Presentation of further experimental details and of publications regarding the





This chapter will start by examining the meaning of autonomy when applied to robotics.
Autonomy is one of the most used words in robotics, yet there is no real consensus on
what it means. An autonomous system is by denition a self-governing system. This
denition has been given several interpretations in the eld of robotics ranging from
automatic (i.e. it works without human intervention) to self-motivated (i.e. it denes
the rules that govern its behaviour). Sometimes autonomy is even identied with self-
suciency and the robot is said to be autonomous if it is able to recharge itself without
assistance. In fact, most of the research that is said to be done in autonomous sys-
tems is more concerned with other issues, such as navigation, learning, adaptation and
self-suciency than autonomy itself. The autonomy denition adopted in this thesis
is that of complete self-government, i.e. not only following one's rules but also making
them. However, autonomy will not be dened as an all-or-nothing property but as one
of degree: the extent to which the agent is self-governing.
Within the discussion about autonomy in robotics, some considerations are presented
about the requirements and diculties of robot autonomy. This discussion is struc-
tured in terms of automaticity, self-suciency, self-referentiality, self-controlling, self-
motivation, autopoiesis and degrees of autonomy; concluding with the presentation of
some guidelines for autonomous robot design.
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Next in this chapter, some other issues relevant to autonomous robot design are pre-
sented, namely: the importance of reactivity and low level control in autonomous
robots; some of the diculties faced by the necessary decomposition of behaviour in
complex tasks; the appeal of generalisation and the advantages of specialisation; the
limitations of knowledge representation and the need for strong interaction between
perception and behaviour.
This is followed by a short overview of learning and adaptation mechanisms that pays
particular attention to reinforcement learning. The short review of reinforcement-
learning is a basic introduction which describes its advantages and presents some of its
problems and tentative solutions.
Finally, this chapter concludes with presentation of the basic controller architecture
that was selected for the present work. The description will focus on a reinforcement-
learning architecture that employs the basic mechanisms used in the two learning
controllers developed for the experimental work reported by this thesis.
2.2 Autonomy
2.2.1 Automaticity
Autonomous | f. Gr.  ooo& making or having one's own laws, independent
(f. o- self, own + oo& law) + -ous (The Oxford English dictionary, 1989)
Autonomy is a word formed by `autos' (self) and `nomos' (rule or law). This can mean
either making or having one's own laws. In robotics, autonomy is much more often
associated with having one's laws than with making them. Usually, autonomy is said
to have been achieved when the system can full its goal without human intervention
or intervention from any other system (e.g., Blidberg, 1989; Yavnai, 1989; Kirchho,
1989; Giralt et al., 1989). If, after being constructed and programmed, the robot is left
alone doing successfully whatever task it is meant to, then the robot is autonomous.
In nature, the denition of the behavioural rules of the simplest creatures' behaviour is
done mostly through evolution rather than by the creatures themselves. Nevertheless,
higher creatures do have the power to adapt during their lifetime by dening their own
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rules and can for that reason be considered more autonomous.
Besides being responsible for following the rules on its own, which can be considered
a weak form of autonomy, a denition of autonomous systems should also require the
system to develop its rules, which is a much stronger demand. However, this denition
should be regarded as the extreme of autonomy as examples of weaker autonomy can
be found that do not fully comply with it.
The greatest advantage of self-ruled systems over other systems is that they are able
to step outside the boundaries of what was foreseen by the designers (Steels, 1994b;
Reeke, Jr., 1996). This way, their capacity to deal with the innitely rich and dynam-
ically changing real world is increased.
2.2.2 Self-suciency
Autonomy is sometimes identied with self-suciency. Self-suciency can be seen as
a requirement if one is very strict about having a system able to keep going without
external assistance. If the agent can recharge itself without outside assistance then
it can carry out its task over a longer period of time, and therefore it will be more
independent, i.e., \autonomous".
However, as McFarland (1992) points out, autonomy and self-suciency are very
dierent concepts, that can easily be distinguished by a simple example: an over-
domesticated lap dog. Although it would probably not survive without the free meals
given by its owner, it is considered to be autonomous.
In robotics practice, the distinction between self-suciency and autonomy can also be
drawn with two simple examples: a robot with energy supplied by batteries that does
not recharge itself and a robot with energy supplied by an umbilical cord. The rst
robot is usually considered more self-sucient, but its life-span will be very short on
account of the small amount of energy available from the batteries. In a few hours
the robot will not have had enough learning experiences to be able to acquire complex
autonomous behaviour. Its autonomy will be seriously limited. This will not happen in
the case of the second example. That robot will not have time limitations to constrain
its behavioural complexity, but the robot will not be self-sucient. Nevertheless, if the
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vehicle is to be tethered to some place this will impose limitations on its movements.
For some types of goal this can also be a serious drawback. Sub-sea and space ex-
ploration are some good examples, because they imply unbounded environments. But
even in bounded environments wires can easily get tangled unless serious restrictions
are made to the environment in order to avoid the problem.
A self-sucient robot, in the sense that it is able to replenish its energy, maintaining
itself viable for long periods of time without human intervention, is something to seek
for. Nevertheless, the robot will be indirectly dependent upon humans, because it
was designed for a particular man-made niche where energy is provided by humans,
and will not survive outside that niche. It is not easy to achieve self-suciency in a
human-made ecosystem. Humans themselves depend too much on each other to be
considered self-sucient and yet no doubts are ever cast over human autonomy.
In general, too much emphasis is attributed to the importance of self-suciency of
autonomous robots. However, self-suciency is an excellent way to test autonomy
more in the sense that it provides a source for self-motivation than for independence.
2.2.3 Self-referentiality
Bourgine and Varela (1992) suggest two alternative ways of viewing a system regarding
autonomy:
 Heteronomous
It is addressed as an input and output device whose output is the result of some
internal processing of the input.
 Autonomous
The centre of attention is placed on emergent behaviours and internal self-
organising processes which dene what counts as relevant interactions.
In the case of an autonomous system, it is the nature of the internal dynamics of
the system that determines how the arriving interactions are interpreted, rather than
reacting to inputs in terms of externally supplied (by the designers) semantics.
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Autonomous systems are not dened by their inputs and outputs. They can be per-
turbed by independent events and undergo internal changes which compensate for these
perturbations. Whichever series of internal changes takes place, however, they are al-
ways subordinated to the maintenance of the system's organisation, i.e. the relations
that must exist among its components for it to be of a specic class. Autonomous
systems actively maintain an identity which is independent of their interactions with
an observer, by keeping their organisation as an invariant. The heteronomous systems'
identity depends on the observer, who species it by their inputs and outputs.
It can be argued that a system is more or less autonomous to the extent to which it
can be said to be a self-sucient cause. However, it should be noticed that much of the
dierence between an autonomous and a heteronomous system lies in the point of view.
For example, humans can be regarded as heteronomous vehicles of the \purposes" of
their \selsh" genes (Dawkins, 1976).
2.2.4 Self-controlling
Most present-day robots are automata, because their behaviour is entirely controlled by
an outside agent. When in a particular state, they obey a particular behavioural rule
that is externally imposed. The rules are inuenced both by environmental conditions
and by the robot's own behaviour, but do not depend upon the robot's history.
According to McFarland an autonomous system is self-controlling. It has the knowledge
and motivation to control its own behaviour. An important implication of autonomy is
that the autonomous agent cannot be completely controlled by an outside agent. This
happens because the system is not completely observable (McFarland, 1992).
Autonomous agents are self-interested and will choose their actions according to their
own motivations. Like dogs and cats, they are self-controlling and controllable only to
a limited extent by outside agents.
Nevertheless, a self-controlling robot can be made useful. The robot can actually want
to do the task it is needed for, or in the worst case it can be tamed to \like" it. If, on
the other hand, the robot only does exactly what it has been told then it will suer
from lack of opportunistic and improvisation capabilities. Being able to do more than
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what it is told explicitly or implicitly by the programmer can be a great advantage to
the autonomous robot by giving it the ability to deal with what was not anticipated
by the programmer.
2.2.5 Self-motivation
It is often stated that an autonomous agent should exhibit goal-directed behaviour
(Covrigaru and Lindsay, 1991). In particular, that it should have multiple goals from
which to select at any given time (Covrigaru and Lindsay, 1991; McFarland and Spier,
1997).
To emphasize the existence of a hierarchy of goals, the goals themselves are often
attributed a secondary role as the means to satisfy some internal motivations. An
example of this is the formal framework for the autonomy denition proposed by Luck
and d'Inverno (1995). In this framework, an autonomous agent is dened as an object
with goals and motivations and some potential means of evaluating behaviour in terms
of the environment and these motivations. Its motivations are desires or preferences
that can lead to the generation and adoption of goals, while its goals are simply states of
aairs to be achieved in the environment. Brustoloni (1991) asserts a similar partition,
but in terms of goals and drives. Again, goals are only attributed an instrumental
function, while the agent's actions are ultimately directed by its drives.
As Covrigaru and Lindsay (1991) point out, the ultimate goals of an autonomous agent,
or its motivations, should be of a homeostatic nature. The agent should not have a
bounded task of accomplishing some reachable goals, but its task should consist of
maintaining a few homeostatic goals.
A still greater degree of autonomy than the sole self-generation of the subgoals that
govern the agent's behaviour is motivational autonomy (Cariani, 1992a), i.e. the self-
generation of the performance evaluation mechanisms that guide the selection of the
agent's subgoals.
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2.2.6 Autopoiesis
Animals are the most distinctively autonomous entities that we know. They are goal-
oriented, adaptive, opportunistic, plastic and robust (Beer, 1990). Some eort should
be made in trying to understand what makes them autonomous without falling into the
temptation of trying to imitate everything, even those properties which are obviously
inadequate to model with the available technology.
When looking into animal autonomy, one cannot avoid looking into autopoiesis. Auto-
poiesis (Maturana, 1969; Maturana and Varela, 1973; Varela, 1979) is a concept that
was created to overcome the diculties in trying to dene a living being. A living being
is usually dened by a list of properties including chemical composition, capacity to
move or reproduce. However, this kind of approach to dening living beings has many
faults and seems always to be context dependent. Autopoiesis is what distinguishes the
living from the non-living: the fact that living entities are continually self-producing
and the producer cannot be separated from the product, i.e. the living entity is the
continuous producer of itself.
Autonomy is usually included among the properties of the list that attempts to dene
living beings; but, just like the other properties, it can been seen as a consequence of
autopoiesis. Animals produce themselves, and by doing so, they produce the rules by
which they act. Their behaviour is the result of the internal correlations between the
sensing and the action that they self-produced. Autopoiesis is a sucient property for
attaining a system's autonomy.
2.2.7 Degrees of autonomy
Some researchers (e.g., Luck and d'Inverno, 1995) take autonomy as an all-or-nothing
property: either a system is autonomous or it is not. Yet, if we try to appeal to
our common knowledge, we nd it very dicult to say whether some of the things
that surround us are autonomous or not. Usually, we have the tendency to say that
something is more or less autonomous. Even biologists do not agree among themselves
on which living beings are autonomous. Some endow every living thing with autonomy
(Maturana and Varela, 1987) while others are much more selective (McFarland, 1992).
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Boden (1993) defends the view that there are dierent degrees of autonomy and, fur-
thermore, that there are several dimensions to autonomy:
 The extent to which responses to the environment are direct or indirect (i.e.
mediated by inner mechanisms dependent on the creature's history).
 The extent to which the controlling mechanisms are self-generated rather than
externally imposed.
 The extent to which inner directing mechanisms can be reected upon and/or
selectively modied.
According to Boden the degree of autonomy of the system increases with the extent to
which the controlling mechanisms are self-generated rather than externally imposed.
Boden's view is supported by much of what has been discussed in the previous sections:
Autonomy is a multi-faceted concept with many gradations.
Yavnai (1989) proposes an alternative denition of degrees of autonomy which entails a
more practical point of view that reects the current development of robotic technology.
Some of the factors for measuring autonomy proposed by that author are:
 the degree of abstraction of the commands received by the system, i.e. the system
is more autonomous if it can deal with higher level commands instead of only
primitive actions;
 the duration for which the system can function without external intervention,
which is usually very short in the case of mobile robots whether due to short
battery life or frequent system breakdowns1;
 the amount of complexity and uncertainty that has to be dealt with by the
system.
1 These breakdowns often derive from software design problems, but are also associated with the need
for hardware maintainance or repair.
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2.2.8 Autonomous robots' design
The previous discussion presented several denitions of autonomy, showing how multi-
faceted this concept can be. For this reason, the design of a robot that exhibits a high
degree of autonomy has to consider the fullment of various abstract conditions which
can make the design process dicult. Looking at animals for concrete instances of
autonomy can provide some assistance to this process.
A few basic behavioural capabilities extracted from animal behaviour (Hallam and
Hayes, 1992) that can be taken into consideration in the design of an autonomous
robot are:
Perception | The robot should be sensor-rich, both in terms of types of sensors and
quantity of information provided by each sensor type. An important challenge to
the autonomous robot is being able to deal with a rich perception in a timely
fashion, namely by expeditious mechanisms of focusing attention.
Movement | The robot should be able to competently move around its environment
and perform more elaborated actions such as moving objects. The movement
repertoire of the agent should provide exibility of choice.
Homeostatic Goals | The robot should have a few internal variables to keep within
bounds, an example of such a variable being energy level. This can serve as the
basis for its internal motivation. Furthermore, it is important that the robot can
function unattended for long periods of time. For this reason some care should
be taken to avoid the robot life being shortened by lack of energy or the need for
assistance in recharging.
Reactions and Learning | The robot should be able to exhibit quick reactions to
some of the stimuli of its environment and still be plastic to learn the relevance
of the stimuli. The agent should have adaptive capabilities, but those should not
curtail its performance.
Navigation | The robot should have a home base to return to. Although it might
not be essential for an autonomous agent, the ability to return to some referential
points of its environment allows the agent to employ more complex behaviour.
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This list provides a useful compilation of simple guidelines that should be taken into
consideration in the design of an autonomous robot as they provide an adequate basis
for autonomous behaviour. These were therefore used in the current work for the
design of an autonomous agent controller and its task.
Learning is an important ability for an autonomous agent because it endows it with
the necessary plasticity to be independent. However, learning should not compro-
mise autonomy and therefore has specic requirements when applied to autonomous
agents. To begin with, the learning mechanism should be suciently plastic to deal
with the problems the agent faces without requiring much domain-dependent external
parametrisation. In particular, there should be no external adjustment of learning
parameters while the agent is performing its task. Finally, the agent should be able to
learn on-line by itself, and not by carefully chosen examples given by external assis-
tance. Furthermore, it should do so in a ecient and robust manner. Unfortunately,
these requirements are quite hard to obtain with the available learning algorithms and
in general some compromises have to be made.
People often propose a constructivist approach to the design of an autonomous sys-
tem. This consists of the design of a self-organising system made of small and simple
constructional blocks and simple self-organising rules moderated by some internal set
of motivations (Luck and d'Inverno, 1995). One of the major drawbacks of this ap-
proach is relying on uniformity for greater plasticity when living organisms themselves
benet from having dierent types of components and connections (Winograd and Flo-
res, 1986) and even specialised brain regions (Damasio, 1995). A uniform approach
will probably suer from lack of domain information to be able to cope with all the
complexity of the outside world at once.
2.3 Issues in Architecture Design
Several approaches have been proposed for mobile robot control which have inuenced
the selection of the control architecture used in the experiments reported in this dis-
sertation. This section briey presents some of the main issues involved.
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2.3.1 Reactiveness vs. deliberation
The classical Articial Intelligence approach2 to robotics relies on human-dened mod-
els of the world that the robot employs in its interaction with the world, assuming that
intelligence is based on the representation and manipulation of knowledge. However,
explicit deliberation about the eects of low-level actions is too expensive for the pro-
duction of real-time behaviour in robots (Russell and Norvig, 1995). It makes the
reactions of the robot to the external world slow and its performance very suscep-
tible to slight environmental changes. These are serious drawbacks to the robot's
autonomy. In general, the classical approach gives too much emphasis to methods for
representing and manipulating knowledge while it ignores the dynamic properties of
the robot-environment interaction (Verschure et al., 1992).
This approach has also been criticised for creating unnecessary symbolic abstractions
that make sense in the programmer's view point but are ungrounded by the robot-
environment interaction (Brooks, 1991). Instead of having the agent-environment in-
teraction obstructed by an externally imposed formal description of the environment,
systems should take advantage of a direct interaction. For instance, the physics of the
sensory systems can be exploited in the discrimination of relevant stimuli (Hallam and
Malcolm, 1993). This also supports the claim that the dynamic interactions between
agent and environment can only be properly studied by building complete real agents
(Smithers, 1992).
In recent years a new approach to the design of autonomous systems has been devel-
oped (Maes, 1991b). This approach tries to overcome some of the diculties that the
classical Articial Intelligence approach faces when applied to the eld of robotics. In
order to have a more robust real-time performance, the new solutions try to avoid the
use of knowledge-based rational choice and problem solving. Instead, they take ad-
vantage of a more direct coupling of perception to action which increases the system's
distributedness, decentralisation and dynamic interaction with the environment.
Synthetic design (Donnett, 1992) or empirical bottom-up synthesis of the agent is also
2 Also designated as Good Old Fashioned Articial Intelligence (Haugeland, 1985), or GOFAI for
short.
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used, replacing the need for an a priori formal mathematical analysis. As Braitenberg
(1984) defended and proved in theory, the basic organisation of living things underlying
all their complexity is not, of necessity, complex in itself. Understanding a device
that behaves in a complicated way is an uphill struggle, whereas actually building
it might be quite easy. There are many examples of complex articial behaviour
achieved by surprisingly simple means, starting with Grey Walter's learning tortoises
made of rudimentary electronic devices (Grey Walter, 1950, 1951). Simple solutions
can also often explain the behaviour of natural systems (Webb, 1994; Jamon, 1991).
On many occasions, it is preferable for animals to resort to simple approximations or
tricks that can be achieved within the limited resources available, than to construct
expensive abstract computations that provide the perfect solutions (Weher, 1987). The
need for three-dimensional representation of Newtonian space (Weher, 1987) or explicit
symbolic control (Liaw, 1995) can often be avoided. In the domain of collective robots
the same principles can be applied and research has shown the emergence of complex
group behaviour through the use of simple rules by individuals (Beckers et al., 1994;
Melhuish et al., 1998; Mataric, 1995).
An eective demonstration of how sound practical results can be achieved through this
approach was the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986b, 1989). In this architecture,
the mobile robot control system was decomposed into task achieving behaviours that
run in parallel, in opposition to the traditional decomposition of the control system into
functional modules. The behaviours themselves are organised into layers of competence
and have the ability to subsume behaviours in lower layers either by inhibition of
outputs or suppression of inputs.
This methodology provides a clear example of direct robot interaction without the need
of planning by means of an externally imposed model of the world. Nevertheless, there
is no real plasticity in the rigid behavioural architecture developed. The problems that
the robot has to face are once more transferred to the designers. The success of the
agent depends solely on the ability of the programmer to describe the complete task
domain (Verschure et al., 1992).
It can be right to defend (Brooks, 1986a) that the essence of being and reacting pro-
vides a necessary basis for the emergence of true intelligence, but it is not necessarily
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sucient. Simulating this basis by a rigid automaton probably does not provide the
necessary requirements for problem solving behaviour, language and expert knowledge.
There are serious doubts as to whether this architecture can scale up in complexity
towards full problem-solving (Russell and Norvig, 1995; Verschure et al., 1992).
Brooks' subsumption architecture was based on an evolutionary view of natural systems
where layers of expertise are incrementally constructed upon older layers (Brooks,
1989). The methodology implicitly attributes to evolution the responsibility for all
kinds of adaptation. In later research (Brooks, 1991), Brooks acknowledged the need
for runtime adaptation and incorporated some forms of self-calibration in his system.
In Maes and Brooks (1990), the exibility of the system is increased by learning the
preconditions list associated with activation of each behaviour. This solution also
tries to solve yet another problem with the subsumption architecture: the unnecessary
loss of valuable computation time that can be avoided by suppressing not only the
output value but also the computation of that value. Pebody (1995), on the other
hand, proposed an enhancement of the subsumption architecture in terms of its basic
units, the augmented nite-state machines, that allows on-line incorporation of complex
sensory input into the unit's activation condition by associative learning.
The architecture developed by Maes (1989) provides more potential for the design of
complex systems by having goals. In this architecture, the agent is also composed of a
collection of competence modules: the actions. The fundamental dierence consists of
the existence of a selection mechanism that is an emergent property of the activation
and inhibition dynamics among these modules. This modules are linked in a network
of predecessor and successor links that are used to spread activation. Although this
architecture has no global forms of control that might entail its robustness, it is goal-
oriented. The nal emergent behaviour is reactive, exible and opportunistic; but also
unpredictable (Maes, 1991a). How to achieve the desired global functionality is not
always straightforward. Some plasticity has been introduced in this architecture by
the introduction of the on-line learning of the links between modules (Maes, 1992).
The PDL language (Steels, 1994c) employs a dynamical systems approach where every
process is always active and all process results are added, avoiding the need for action
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selection. On account of every process being very simple, complex systems seem to be
dicult to design too. Nevertheless, several eorts have been made towards adding on-
line learning to the architecture (Steels, 1994d; Boer, 1994) and therefore some sort of
adaptation is provided by the system. Boer (1994) reported problems with instability
when too many processes were available. For this reason, he introduced a two level
hierarchy that groups several processes into a single behaviour. Only one behaviour is
active at a time, depending on certain imposed criteria which Boer suggests be learned
by genetic algorithms.
These architectures, where behaviour is an emergent property of the interaction of
simple components, raise the problem of inverse emergence or behaviour generation
(Prem, 1995). Finding the correct set of components and the right interaction dynamics
between them can be both dicult and time consuming.
In time, the shortcomings of pure reactiveness have become evident and people have
started to develop hybrid architectures. Hybrid architectures try to combine the
immediate responsiveness to the current situation of the reactive architectures with
the goal-oriented planning of the deliberative architectures. In general, this type of
architecture is structured in several layers with separate layers for the reactive and the
deliberative subsystems. This arrangement provides an elegant separation between the
high-level goals of the robot and the local problems faced by the robot while pursuing
these goals.
One straightforward example of how a hybrid architecture can be made useful is given
by Malcolm and Smithers (1989). The system presented has two layers: one of them
makes a sketchy plan and the other one intelligently executes it, simultaneously lling
in the details of the plan. This architecture relates to the work of Agre and Chapman
(1991) in that it transfers decision power from the planner to the executor. These
authors argue that the central role of the plan, that deals with all the details of the
task, should be reduced to a mnemonic device that the agent can resort to when
deciding what to do next.
The GLAIR architecture (Hexmoor et al., 1993; Lammens et al., 1993) is a hybrid
architecture with a three layer organisation. This architecture aims at consciousness,
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in the sense of being aware of one's environment. It has two dierent layers to address
unconscious (automatic) behaviour and one to address conscious (reasoned) behaviour.
One of the unconscious layers, named the perceptuo-motor level, consists of an automa-
ton that is initialised with a very small primitive number of actions and sensations.
The conscious layer notices and records the emergence of action sequences that make
improvements and adds them to the perceptuo-motor level. The aim of the other
unconscious layer is only to provide an extra level of abstraction by hiding away the
low-level sensory input and actuators output.
Another example of a three-layer hybrid architecture is the Touring Machine (Ferguson,
1992) that aims to solve the problem of achieving real-time competent behaviour using
limited resources. The lower layer provides reactive behaviour to deal with immediate
problems. It uses simple symbolic rules for this purpose. The higher layers provide
means to focus the agent's attention by changing those rules.
Another hybrid architecture that changes the dynamics of the reactive behaviour ac-
cording to higher level intentions was proposed by Michaud et al. (1996). This archi-
tecture is dierent in that it is not organised in layers but in interactive modules that
perform dierent roles. The behaviour-based module is in charge of producing actions
eciently. The motives module supervises the agent's performance by taking into con-
sideration the information provided by the three dierent recommendation modules:
the external situation, the internal needs and what the agent has learned about its
world.
The information available to an agent is widely distributed both in time and space,
requiring the agent to search for relevant information and recall past information. Op-
portunities and threads must be constantly monitored, although the global behaviour
should have coherence in order to be able to successfully complete a task described by
some, at least sketchy, planning done previously. For a system to achieve such aims
under bounded computational resources, Wright (1994) proposed an emotional agent
that has the ability to select between multiple goals, prioritise goals and decide on
the level of commitment towards current intentions. The reason why emotions were
suggested by Wright is that an important subset of emotional phenomena is closely
connected with the interruption of a resource-limited control mechanism.
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2.3.2 Behaviour decomposition
The need for behaviour decomposition has been illustrated before, by several exam-
ples. As the autonomous robot task becomes more complex it is usually necessary to
introduce some form of hierarchy of behaviour which can simply consist in the decom-
position of the task into a set of simpler skills, or behaviours. The re-combination of
these behaviours is not straightforward and there are various methods used. To start
with, the behaviours can be combined in parallel or in sequence. The behaviours can
run simultaneously and produce inuences on each other and dierent outputs. Or
the behaviours can take control of the nal overall agent behaviour one by one. An
example for each of these approaches are respectively the architectures by Brooks and
Malcolm described previously.
The selection of whether the behaviours should run in parallel or in sequence depends
mostly on the behaviour specication. If the behaviour is self-sucient and requires
total control over the robot's actuators in order to fulll its purposes correctly then
behaviour composition should be sequential. Architectures that rely on the emergence
of complex overall behaviour from simpler component behaviours may require parallel
behaviour composition.
As discussed previously, the design of these architectures composed of very simple
components is not easy. The sequential composition of behaviours is not easy either
and it is particularly dicult to learn3. Simple selection rules based on sensory input
are usually not enough. Some examples of the problems found with this approach and
the solutions proposed in the domain of non-learning architectures are presented next.
The problem most often reported is the need for the behaviour selection to have more
persistence in time than that given by a reactive coordination of behaviours.
The need to articially add persistence to the currently active behaviour to avoid
dithering between behaviours is reported by Blumberg (1994). However, the mech-
anism used there also ensures that opportunistic behaviour can take place and that
long-running behaviours are terminated by fatigue.
To solve the same problems, Correia and Steiger-Garc~ao (1995) and Correia (1995)
3 See Section 2.4 on learning for examples.
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suggest an architecture where the behaviours themselves determine their level of acti-
vation which acts as a priority value for their selection. This activation level depends
not only on the sensory input, but temporal rules of activation. These levels of activa-
tion are then taken into consideration by a structure of arbitration composed of simple
blockers. The blockers endow currently selected behaviours with a small selection
advantage that restrains behaviours with similar activations from being selected.
2.3.3 Generalisation vs. specialisation
The all-purpose robot has always been a human dream aimed at solving all our prob-
lems. In the design of autonomous robots such a dream is sometimes considered as
a condition, in the form of strong exibility demands. Nevertheless, everything that
we have very successfully made so far is highly specialised (e.g., Boeing 747, vending-
machines, washing-machines, vacuum-cleaners...). Evolution itself developed living
beings highly specialised to their particular niche.
In the eld of robotics, specialisation also seems to be a good answer to how to minimise
our problems (Steels, 1994a). The robot Polly (Horswill, 1993) is a good example of
a solution that, because of its specialisation, performs well and in a very cost-eective
way as long as conditions are appropriate.
Instead of trying to create the perfect robot that can understand and overcome all the
diculties posed by the world, one should take the world as it is and turn the problems
into advantages. Even the troublesome noise of real world sensors and actuators can
be helpful, as was shown by genetic algorithms experiments (Cli et al., 1992).
One can argue to some extent that an autonomous system should be very adaptable
and able to face the unexpected. Nevertheless, autonomy should not be totally iden-
tied with this kind of adaptation because solutions to specic environments can be
found that can be called autonomous. For example, there are species high in the hier-
archy that seem to be very adaptable and yet are only able to learn very constrained
generalisations about their environment. Their learning abilities are adapted specif-
ically to the ecological constraints typical of their normal way of life. This kind of
learning limitation is demonstrated in an experiment done with rats by Garcia and
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Koelling (reported in McFarland, 1993, page 362), which showed that rats are able to
associate the taste of food with sickness but not with electric shock and are able to as-
sociate visual and auditory stimuli with shock but not with sickness. Several examples
are also given by Gallistel et al. (1991) of how animals treat certain stimulus-reward,
stimulus-response and/or stimulus-stimulus pairings as privileged. These provide per-
suasive arguments in favour of domain-specic determinants in animal learning, and
for the authors' claim that, through evolution, the learning mechanisms of each species
have been shaped by their specic problems.
2.3.4 Enactive approaches
The theory of autopoiesis is very extensive and it is not the goal of this dissertation
to try to describe it in detail. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the stream of the
cognitive sciences of today that Varela et al. (1991) consider to be the most realistic
in terms of the theory of autopoiesis: enactment, which is analogous to the Articial
Intelligence stream commonly referred to as \behaviour-based". Varela et al. (1991)
divide current research in Articial Intelligence, Linguistics, Philosophy, Cognitive
Psychology and Neuroscience into three main streams:
Cognitivism | Also named as the symbolic or computational approach is the stream
that dominates present research. The central tool and guiding metaphor of cogni-
tivism is the digital computer. Cognition is seen as the manipulation of symbols
that are a mental representation of the environment.
Emergence | In this approach symbol processing is localised and only the physical
form of the symbols is used. A representation is not a function of particular
symbols, but consists in the correspondence between an emergent global state
and properties of the world. It is also called connectionism, because the systems
are made up of many simple components, which are connected by appropriate
rules that give rise to a global behaviour corresponding to the desired task.
Enactive | This approach questions the centrality of the notion that cognition is
fundamentally representation. More exactly, it questions the two following as-
sumptions:
CHAPTER 2: Autonomous and Learning Robots 25
 the world has particular properties;
 individuals internally represent these properties;
Cognition is not considered the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given
mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history
of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs.
The rst approach described | Cognitivism | was the rst to be seriously undertaken
by a large research community, but its limitations became obvious with time. In this
approach the information processing is sequential and localised. Therefore, it faces
dicult problems of bottlenecks and robustness (Varela et al., 1991).
The second approach | Emergence | tries to work out these problems by having
very simple and non-cognitive components with many connections to the other units.
The global cooperation between units gives place to a global coherence without the
need for a central unity to control the whole operation. The emergent approach also
abandons the form and meaning distinction and associates meaning with the system's
global state. This approach has had a few convincing results and has allowed us to
shorten the distance between the study of biological and articial beings.
In one way or another, both these approaches assume that there is a describable exter-
nal world and that cognition is the representation of this world. However, our everyday
experience reveals that the greatest ability of cognition is not to represent the world,
but to distinguish in the great diversity of properties of the world those that are rele-
vant. What counts as relevant is not pre-given, but is enacted or brought forth from
the background by our common sense, in a contextual way.
Varela (1992) defends the notion that common sense cannot be packaged into knowl-
edge by the discovery of more sophisticated rules. According to Varela, common sense
is rather a readiness-to-hand or know-how based on our lived experience which entails
an embodied history. Furthermore, Varela remarks that cognition cannot be properly
understood without common sense, also referred to by Varela as the subject's bodily
and social history, concluding that the knower and known stand in relation to each
other in mutual specication.
The enactive approach (Varela, 1992) gives perception a fundamental role in terms of
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cognition. The author gives examples of perception of the world (ibid.) that show how,
for example, colour and smell are always perceived in a contextual way that depends
on the individual history of the knower. Thus, colour can only be understood as a
visual experience of an embodied individual and in general cannot be identied with
local surface spectral reectance (Thompson et al., 1992). The colour perceived by
the individual is often dierent from the colour that the physical properties of the
light might lead to predict (Cytowic, 1993). The signicance of the external signals
depends on the individual who can share only similar experiences with individuals of
the same species. Perception is an integrated part of the individual's interaction with
the external world.
According to this theory, learning is the transformation through experience of the
behaviour of an individual in a manner that is directly or indirectly subservient to
the maintenance of its autopoiesis. What the observer calls memory is not a process
through which the individual confronts each new experience with a stored represen-
tation before making a decision, but the expression of a modied system capable of
synthesising a new behaviour relevant to its present state of activity.
The process of cognition then does not consist of the apprehension of the description of
an independent universe, but is the result of a certain internal correlation that is being
maintained between a sensory system capable of admitting certain perturbations and a
motor system capable of generating movement. The nervous system plays an important
role in cognition, because it expands the realm of possible states of the individual
and enhances the organism associations with interactions with many dierent internal
states.
2.3.5 Perception
It is often said that one of the essential abilities of autonomous agents, and animals
in particular, is their ability to make sense of their input streams by recognising what
is relevant. In nature, even the sensors themselves are selected during the genetic
evolution of the species and, on a smaller scale, during the ontogeny of the individual
living beings themselves. This allows for the selection of those sensors that make
the discriminations important for survival. This ability endows animals with semantic
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adaptiveness (Cariani, 1992b), i.e. the ability to modify the relationship between their
internal state and the external world in order to enhance survival. In particular, they
can develop new sensory distinctions when in presence of ill-dened real world problems
(Cariani, 1992b).
As far as living beings are concerned, this is not very dicult, because they are au-
topoietic (Maturana and Varela, 1980). The fact that they are producer and product
in one allows them much freedom of choice. In robots such freedom is not possible
with current technology: the most the agent can do is to calibrate the sensors it has
available.
Active exploration of the environment can be considered an essential ability for au-
tonomous systems which must operate in rich unstructured environments. Passively
accepting measurements of the world is often not acceptable, because it only produces
incomplete data from which only inferences full of uncertainties can be reached (Whaite
and Ferrie, 1993). However, a model of uncertainty can be eectively used to direct
perception to maximise knowledge acquisition (e.g., Whaite and Ferrie, 1993). The
work reported by Scheier and Pfeifer (1995) is one example of active perception where
the agent manages to solve the perceptual aliasing problem4 by active exploration.
Another example of active perception is the work of Walker et al. (1998) in which ear
movement is used to enhance the extraction of auditory cues for target localisation.
Perception should not be an end in itself; behaviours or the current intentional state
of the agent should be responsible for determining what perceptual information is
necessary at any one time. In the eld of vision, animate vision (Ballard, 1991) showed
how computation can be enormously reduced, and often be done in real time, if vision
does not try to extract a three-dimensional representation of the world but operates
in the context of behaviour. In particular, perceptual \objects" should be emergent
entities of the agent's interaction with the environment and should not be confused
with the objects that exist in the environment independently of the agent (Stewart,
1995).
4 Derives from the fact that the sensory input of the same object can vary a lot dependent on ambiance
conditions, distance, orientation, etc.
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2.4 Learning and Adaptation
2.4.1 Introduction
There are three basic adaptation mechanisms available in natural systems (see for
example Baldwin, 1896):
Phylogeny | the adaptation from generation to generation that results from natural
selection through evolution;
Ontogeny | the adaptation provided by the system's learning during its life;
Heredity | The adaptation transmitted between individuals; social heredity, in par-
ticular, allows adaptation capabilities to be secured by the use of imitation from
generation to generation.
Although heredity is often left out of development theories it also plays a very impor-
tant role in the preservation of signicant adaptive traits. Imitation, in particular, is
very important for the transmission of complex behaviour as it has a clear advantage
over learning by trial and error for the learning of complex sequences of actions. It
can also have useful practical applications in the domain of robotics, by allowing the
robot to learn its task by demonstration instead of being programmed by detailed in-
structions (Demiris et al., 1997; Kuniyoshi et al., 1994). However, in the domain of
autonomous agents, imitation should have a critical element associated with it, i.e. the
agent should be able to assess the intrinsic value of what it imitates in terms of its
internal motivations.
Another important social factor is the help provided by the parents in guiding their
children's learning through fruitful experiences (Rutkowska, 1995). Some researchers
use similar techniques in robot learning (Lin, 1993) by giving their robots examples
of how they can correctly accomplish their task. Other robotic researchers developed
training methods where a human tutor provides frequent rewards or punishments to
the robot in order to make the learning task easier (Nehmzow, 1994; Dorigo and Colom-
betti, 1993), a technique designated as robot shaping (Dorigo and Colombetti, 1993)
by its analogy with shaping experiments in animals.
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Nowadays, it is trendy to use evolutionary techniques in robotics, although their ap-
plication to robots is objectionable to some (Mataric and Cli, 1996), mostly due
to the time consuming nature of the experiments. This is aggravated in autonomous
robots research where on-line adaptation is a requirement (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
The use of evolutionary techniques requires numerous evaluations of dierent adaptive
agents each requiring a signicant amount of time for a proper evaluation of their
adaptation capabilities. In practice, waiting for the emergence of truly autonomous
agents by evolution may require innite patience (Toda, 1994).
Evolutionary techniques are suitable for solving problems where the tness of any
particular solution can be assessed eciently. This does not mean that they are
totally inadequate for autonomous agent research, but implies that they should not be
expected to nd the solution to autonomous behaviour from scratch.
Evolutionary techniques can be useful for testing alternative learning techniques or
exploring the value of dierent learning parameters. There are several examples of the
use of genetic algorithms for this purpose in dierent domains. Floreano and Mondada
(1996) describe experiments where both phylogeny and ontogeny are used simulta-
neously in robots endowed with associative learning. Almassy and Verschure (1992)
report the evolution of parameters in the domain of a model of classical conditioning.
Kitano (1995) reports the genetic evolution of a genetic reaction-network and an evalu-
ation network. The latter tries to model the role of hormones in learning and provides
both a reinforcement function for on-line policy acquisition and a focus of attention to
discriminate the more important features of the environment. The detection of rele-
vant features during on-line learning leads to an increase in the learning rate and the
number of mental rehearsals. The experimental results (ibid.) showed that the use of
both reinforcement and focus contributed to the agent's adaptation. However, Kitano
states that the slow learning of these agents would lead them to extinction if they were
to co-evolve with purely reactive agents.
Another alternative to the use of genetic algorithms in autonomous robots research
is their use in the learning algorithm itself. An example are the robotic applications
(Reeke, Jr. and Sporns, 1993) of Edelman's neuronal group selection theory which
states that neurons compete for survival as the embryonic brain is developing and
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that, only after birth, amplication and attenuation of synaptic connections strengths
between neurons takes primacy. Other examples include the use of genetic algorithms
in a schema-based architecture as a basis for unsupervised learning (Ram et al., 1994)
and their application to classier systems (Patel and Schnepf, 1992; Dorigo, 1995).
Furthermore, the interaction between learning and evolution can be exploited in the
engineering of autonomous robots (Floreano and Urzelai, 1998). Apart from evolution
being a powerful mechanism to select the most helpful learning mechanisms, learning
during life can also help evolution to select the most adaptive traits. The individuals
that are closer to the optimal solution are also the ones that will reach that solution
faster through learning. This way, learning helps to discriminate the individuals which
are closer to the solution, even when being near the solution, by itself, does not increase
the measure of tness of the individual. The fact that these individuals are the ones
preferred also implies that there will be a gradual genetic assimilation of the features
learned during life, even though learning does not have the capacity to directly modify
the genotype. This indirect genetic assimilation of learned traits, dened as Baldwin's
eect (Baldwin, 1896), which can lead to faster and more ecient evolution, has been
supported by scientic evidence (Floreano and Urzelai, 1998).
Learning is also important to provide adaptation for local and relatively fast environ-
mental changes that cannot be captured by the evolution process (Nol and Parisi,
1996).
Some learning techniques were mentioned in Section 2.3.1 in the context of specic ar-
chitectures but, in fact, there are many architectures specically designed for learning.
Reinforcement-learning is the most common technique for learning in the domain of
robotics and is therefore treated separately in the next section.
There are other learning techniques, like for instance the ones based on classical condi-
tioning as dened by Pavlov (1927). An example of this is the robotic application of an
unsupervised learning mechanism reported by Verschure et al. (1992). Their approach
does not use external reinforcement and relies solely on the a priori stimulus-response
associations. Learning here consists of the association of new stimuli, called the condi-
tioned stimulus, with the behavioural responses to other, unconditioned, stimuli which
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occur simultaneously. One disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a high
degree of architectural complexity in terms of the number of connections (Grossberg,
1971), because it imposes direct connections between all the unconditioned and con-
ditioned stimuli and this can become very expensive with a high number of stimuli.
Another problem with this approach is that learning cannot be explained only in
terms of stimulus substitution (Mowrer, 1960), learning also involves substitution of
behaviours which become inappropriate | a feature that is not modelled in classical
conditioning. The two factor position defended by Mowrer overcomes the dichotomy
between stimuli association (sign learning) and behaviour substitution (solution learn-
ing) by attributing a fundamental role to emotions. According to his view, stimuli
are primarily associated with emotions which then drive the behaviour associations.
This view substantiates the reinforcement learning approach if emotions are used as
reinforcement.
2.4.2 Reinforcement learning
The short review that follows is not supposed to be an exhaustive survey (e.g., Sutton
and Barto, 1998; Kaelbling et al., 1996, oer more complete surveys) and comprises
only a few examples.
Reinforcement-learning is a technique that allows an agent to adapt to its environment
through the development of a policy, which determines which action it should take in
each environmental state in order to maximise reinforcement. Depending on whether
the reinforcement is computed internally or attributed by an external entity this can
be considered unsupervised learning or not.
Reinforcement denes the desirability of a state and can be expressed both in terms of
rewards and punishments. These are usually formalised in terms of the positive and
negative values, respectively, of a reinforcement function that attributes a value to each
learning iteration. This value can also be zero meaning that no reward or punishment
was attributed and that evaluation is neutral.
The a priori domain knowledge incorporated by the designer in the learning system
is minimal and is mostly encapsulated in the reinforcement function. This can be a
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limitation as some tasks might be dicult to describe in terms of rewards and pun-
ishments. The design of a reward function in robotic domains can be a problem when
there are multiple goals and immediate reinforcement is not always available. In this
case, it is often impossible to have a direct translation to a traditional monolithic
reward function (Mataric, 1994).
An alternative reinforcement learning mechanism proposed by Bozinovski (1982) takes
its inspiration from emotions. It starts with a priori associations of pleasant and/or
unpleasant emotional states with specic context states. These emotional states will
then be propagated through the rest of the robot state space while the robot explores
its environment by trying out the dierent actions available. On account of being
equipped with an initial rudimentary policy, presumably provided by genetics, the
agent does not need any extra reinforcement and its learning will rely solely on reward
propagation.
In opposition to other techniques (e.g., Maes and Brooks, 1990; Maes, 1992; Nehmzow,
1994) reinforcement learning assumes the existence of delayed reinforcement. The
reinforcement can be the consequence of a sequence of actions instead of a single
action. This is important if the robot has to perform elaborate behaviour and possibly
receive negative reinforcement in the course of achieving its task, because otherwise
the robot will not have the necessary look-ahead to overcome the deterrents that it
nds in the way of accomplishing its task. This means that reinforcement-learning
algorithms usually have some form of credit assignment propagation so that value can
be attributed to the states that lead to the goal state which produces reward.
The reinforcement learning algorithms in general are usually restricted to Markov
decision processes, i.e. they assume that each environmental state can be entirely
identied by the input representation dened by the designer as they do not explicitly
deal with hidden state. An example of the hidden state is to have to decide upon the
contents of a closed box without any input other than the vision of the closed box
itself. If, for instance, the fact that the previous action had been to put a specic
object inside the box was taken as a discriminatory element, then the hidden state
problem would disappear. Hidden state is a problem which is usually present in robotic
applications, because robots in general have very limited sensory capabilities making
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the dierentiation between distinct states dicult.
Another issue present in the case of autonomous robot applications is that unlike
traditional reinforcement learning tasks, the task of an autonomous robot is mainly one
of continuously executing a task for as long as necessary in opposition to successfully
completing a task and nishing. The goal-oriented nature of the problems usually
used to test reinforcement learning techniques is not really applicable to autonomous
agents. The autonomous robot should have multiple homeostatic goals that have to be
prioritised according to circumstances and should not simply nish when it reaches a
goal state. Another major dierence in reinforcement learning applied to autonomous
agents is that the distinction between a learning phase and a performing phase has to
be eliminated, because an autonomous robot is supposed to continuously adapt to its
environment.
Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) is the usually preferred reinforcement-learning technique
because it provides good experimental results in terms of learning speed.
Although reinforcement-learning agents can be quite reactive and decide in real time
the next action to take, their learning is quite slow particularly if the task is very
complex. Slowness is usually pointed out as the major problem of reinforcement-
learning techniques and is a particularly serious problem in robot domains where the
life expectancy of the robot is usually short.
For more complex tasks skill decomposition is advisable as it can reduce signicantly
the learning time or even making the task feasible. Researchers report that a monolithic
approach can fail to solve the long-term temporal credit assignment (Mahadevan and
Connell, 1992). One of the reasons pointed out is the loss in accuracy of the propagation
of credit assignment with long action sequences (Lin, 1992).
By task decomposition, the robot can learn behaviours that tackle each task individ-
ually and then learn the high-level coordination of the behavioural solutions found
(examples in Lin, 1993). This requires the introduction of domain specic knowledge
that might not be very easy to obtain and might limit the robot's nal performance.
Furthermore, task decomposition is a non-trivial problem, namely designing the sub-
tasks' reinforcement functions may be hard (Mahadevan and Connell, 1992).
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Behavioural decomposition usually consists of learning some predened behaviours in a
rst phase and then nding the high-level coordination of these behaviours. Although
the behaviours themselves are often learned successfully (Mahadevan and Connell,
1992; Lin, 1993), behaviour coordination is much more dicult and is usually hard-
wired to some extent (Mahadevan and Connell, 1992; Lin, 1993; Mataric, 1994).
One problem in particular which is quite dicult and task dependent is deciding when
to change behaviour. This is not a problem in traditional reinforcement learning where
agents live in grid worlds and state transition is perfectly determined. However, in
robotics, agent states change asynchronously in response to internal and external events
and actions take variable amounts of time to execute (Mataric, 1994). As a solution
to this problem, some researchers extend the duration of the current action according
to some domain specic conditions of goal achievement or applicability of the action.
Others will interrupt the action when there is a change in the input state (Rodriguez
and Muller, 1995; Asada, 1996). Rodriguez and Muller (1995) argue that new deci-
sions should only be taken when there is a change in the input state, on the basis
that otherwise the choice is uniquely determined by the current state of knowledge.
However, this may not be a very straightforward solution when the robot is equipped
with multiple continuous sensors that are vulnerable to noise.
Generalisation over the input space can also be a useful technique to accelerate the
learning process (Lin, 1993). One of the major problems responsible for the slowness
of reinforcement learning is the slow iterative process of spreading the rewards and
punishments through the input space, which can be greatly minimised if the algorithm
has added mechanisms to spread the reinforcements to similar input states.
One solution is to use neural networks to learn the utility values of each action (Lin,
1993). This way similar inputs are automatically updated when the network is being
trained for the current input. Apart from accelerating the learning process, it also
minimises the memory space needed to store the policy, which is often stored in the
form of a look-up table with one value for each action and sensor state combination.
This system, which has still other methods to overcome the slowness of the learning
process, is described in detail in the next section as it is very similar to the one used
in the experimental work reported in this thesis.
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Another reinforcement learning algorithm using neural networks is the complementary
reinforcement back-propagation algorithm (Ackley and Littman, 1990). In this case
the output units of the networks encode the value of the action to be chosen in binary
format. The values of the bits that represent the action to be taken are determined
probabilistically from the activation value of each of the output nodes of the network.
There are several examples of robotic application of this algorithm (Meeden et al.,
1993; Kitano, 1995). This approach has an advantage over the one proposed by Lin
(1993) of accommodating a greater number of possible actions with equivalent neural
networks.
A dierent solution to the generalisation of input problem consists of the use of a
Kohonen network to build a self-organising map of the sensory domain by exploration
(Krose and Eecen, 1994). In this approach, the neighbourhood relations between dif-
ferent states were imposed by the elementary actions.
The G Algorithm is yet another solution to the generalisation of input problem (Chap-
man and Kaelbling, 1991). The Q-table is represented by a tree that ramies on
the binary inputs. The tree is constructed as the agent explores its environment and
groups the input space according to reinforcement. A split of the input space is made
whenever a bit of the input space is determined to be statistically relevant in terms
of the immediate reinforcement or discounted future reinforcement. The tree must be
constructed before the learning action value phase. Another example of a tree-based
algorithm (McCallum, 1996) addresses both the problems of input generalisation and
hidden state, by adding information about previous states when there is a need to
discriminate between otherwise indistinguishable input states.
One of the disadvantages of Q-learning is that it usually reduces the number of actions
available to the agent to a small set. Having such a small and non-continuous space
of possible actions is not very satisfactory in terms of achieving robotic autonomy.
However, more important than allowing the robot more freedom of movement is to
allow the robot freedom of choice. In reinforcement learning, the action the robot takes
at each point is not predened by the designer, but is selected by the robot according
to what it has learned so far. Furthermore, if the set of actions is varied enough, the
robot can still have a large repertoire of dierent behaviours by sequentially selecting
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the appropriate actions at each time step.
Some researchers have found that, in complex domains, straightforward reinforcement
learning converges to local minima instead of learning a good policy (Lin, 1991; Chap-
man and Kaelbling, 1990). This problem can be overcome in part by an external
teacher that shows the robot how to obtain reward (e.g., Lin, 1993), by indicating the
relevant actions that can be taken in the environment or forcing it out of local minima.
The problem of local minima is strongly inuenced by the exploration vs. exploitation
strategy selected. When learning, the agent has to trade-o between acting to get
more information about the world and acting on the information it already has to get
more reinforcement. If the agent does not actively explore its environment then it can
easily become stuck in local minima.
The simplest solution to the exploration vs. exploitation problem is to use the -greedy
strategy (dened in Sutton and Barto, 1998). This consists in taking the best ranked
action most of the time and making a random action selection with a small probability
. Usually,  takes the value of 0.1. A more reasonable approach to the problem is to
keep track of how much knowledge the agent has gathered in each context so that it
can select to explore sub-optimal behaviours only in the situations where it has not
tried them before. An example is the interval estimation algorithm (Kaelbling, 1990),
that explores only if it has insucient information.
The evaluation of the performance of the reinforcement-learning controllers can also
be a dicult problem (Wyatt et al., 1998). Researchers are often tempted to use the
reinforcement received by the controller to analyse how the performance of the agent
is improving in time. In fact, an increase of reinforcement value is usually associated
with an improvement of performance of the agent in its task. However, exceptions can
be found even for well-designed reinforcement functions. Usually, the reinforcement
function is internally computed by the agent which means that it is subject to the lim-
itations of its perception. Inaccurate perception can make the reinforcement function
misleading in the evaluation of the robot's true performance level (Wyatt et al., 1998).
Nevertheless, an evaluation provided by an external observer is typically correct and
can be useful to point out possible deciencies of the internal evaluation. Moreover,
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because there is often a stochastic element associated with the learning process |
introduced by the exploration algorithm, for example | a one-trial test of the con-
troller can be misleading by showing a one-o performance instead of the expected
performance of the learning algorithm.
2.5 Selected Architecture
The basic learning controllers used in the experiments reported in this dissertation are
very similar to the learning architecture proposed by Lin (1993). This architecture
is the main topic of the current section. To begin with, a short description of Lin's
architecture is given. This is followed by a short discussion of its advantages and
disadvantages. Finally, the domain-specic mechanisms of this architecture, which
will be lled in later in this dissertation, are highlighted.
2.5.1 Description
A sketch of the architecture presented in Lin (1993) is shown in Figure 2.1. As was
stated before, the main feature that characterises this architecture is that it solves the
input generalisation problem by using neural networks to learn the utility function,



















Figure 2.1: Lin's learning architecture.
This approach employs feed-forward neural networks with one hidden layer that use






For training the neural networks it uses the back-propagation algorithm with a learn-
ing rate of 0:3 and a momentum of 0:9. Although this is not a very good network
training method when compared with other batch-oriented training methods, it allows
the incremental learning required for on-line learning.
The approach is based on the Q-learning algorithm for policy acquisition. The input
of the neural-networks consists of the world state and the single output of each neural-
network models the following function for one of the actions a:
util(sn; a) = Rn+1 +  eval(sn+1) (2.2)
This function represents the expected discounted cumulative reinforcement that an
agent will receive after executing action a in response to the world state sn. The
immediate reinforcement received in the next state (sn+1) is Rn+1. The utility of the
state sn+1, or eval(sn+1), is its expected discounted cumulative reinforcement if the












Figure 2.2: Learning iteration of the reinforcement-learning algorithm.
In each learning step of the algorithm (see Figure 2.2), the neural-network associated
with the last action a taken is updated for the previous state sn 1. An iteration of the
back-propagation algorithm is made using as target value Tn(sn 1; a). The calculation
of this target value depends on the current estimative Qn(sn; k) for each action k
provided by the outputs of the networks when using as input the current state (sn).
Tn(sn 1; a) = Rn +  maxfQn(sn; k) j k 2 actionsg (2.3)
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For action selection, Lin uses probabilistic action selection based on the Boltzmann-











The temperature value is increased if the robot is within the same small area for a
long period of time and reduced to zero in the testing phases, i.e. during the tests the
action with the highest utility value is always selected.
Lin (1993) proposes three other dierent neural-network-based solutions that provide
the robot with some memory to deal with hidden state. The solutions use recurrent
networks or time windows as the input of normal networks. He also uses some extra
techniques to enhance and accelerate the learning process:
Experience replay | replay a sequence of experiences in temporally backward order
to speed up the credit assignment problem.
Action Model | have a model of the world that permits the agent to experience
the consequence of its actions without having to try them out in the real world.
Teaching | Guide the robot through signicant exploration.
These dierent network-based solutions and extra techniques were not used in the work
carried out for this thesis.
In the experiments reported by Lin (1993) the robot's task is decomposed into three
simple behaviours: wall-following, going through doors and docking on the charger. For
learning these behaviours, the learning algorithm has sixteen dierent available actions
to chose from and twenty-four sonar and light sensors dened as network inputs. The
behaviours are learned separately with success. The learning is done in simulation,
but Lin (1991) reports only small drops in performance when the controllers are tested
directly in a real robot without any further adaptation.
In a second stage, after the simple behaviours have been learned, Lin uses the same
learning algorithm to learn the coordination of these behaviours, i.e. he considers the
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behaviours themselves as the system's available actions. However, in order to learn
the behaviour coordination successfully, he has to introduce simplications into the
learning task. To start with, each behaviour is associated with pre-dened conditions
of activation. For example, the behaviour of door-passing can only be selected if a
door is nearby. Furthermore, the introduction of a persistence rule proved essential
for good results. This rule ensures that the same behaviour is kept until the goal
of the behaviour has been achieved or a previously inapplicable behaviour becomes
applicable.
2.5.2 Pros and cons
Since the focus of this research is emotions' inuence in control and not control itself, in
the selection of the learning architecture the simpler techniques that have been proven
successful in the past were preferred. This philosophy was carried out even in the
selection of the architecture's various arbitrary parameters that were chosen without
much regard for optimal behaviour. For this reason the selection is far from perfect
and presents several disadvantages:
 The learning abilities of the robot are not suciently sophisticated to allow great
degrees of autonomy. Namely, the agent is essentially reactive and cannot deal
with hidden states. Furthermore, a high degree of autonomy would probably
require some form of autonomous decomposition of behaviour.
 The solution for dealing with generalisation over the input state has some prob-
lems. The neural networks have a tendency to be overwhelmed by the large
quantity of training data provided by on-line learning and forget the rare rele-
vant experiences. Filtering the available data in such a way that relevant training
data has more weight in the learning process can help to prevent this problem.
 The agent has available only a restricted number of discrete actions, which may
limit its behavioural capabilities. In this architecture, the selection of more or
less general actions and inputs determines how specialised the agent is.
 The exploration vs. exploitation solution is very simple, yet, it has some ad-
vantages. First, it does not force the division between a learning phase and a
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performance phase, which is obviously undesirable for autonomous learning, be-
cause it allows more or less exploration dependent on the previous dierences
in performance registered for the dierent actions. And secondly, it does not
implicitly assume an optimal action at each point, allowing for a more exible
policy.
 The fact that the policy acquisition is indistinguishable from world modelling has
the disadvantage to require new policy acquisition from scratch every time the
goal of the agent is changed.
 The navigation abilities provided by the architecture are poor because the agent
does not have any notion of its location in space.
In traditional experiments with reinforcement-learning architectures the agent does not
have homeostatic goals as required for autonomous agents, yet no problems were found
in using this architecture in the pursuit of that kind of goal.
The positive points of the selected architecture are that it endows the agent with fast
reactions, while still allowing it to learn its policy to act in the environment. This policy
can be quite exible as long as an adequate action set is chosen. The generalisation
over the input state allows a greater richness of sensory input than usual and provides
an acceleration of the learning process.
2.5.3 Open specications






 Meta-control variable values:
{ back-propagation learning rate;
{ action selection temperature.
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In the design of the nal autonomous agent all these open specications must be lled
in a priori. This does not mean that the specications have to be rigid, but simply
that the agent should not receive further external assistance once it starts its learning
task. For example, the learning parameters should not be changed by an external
entity after the learning process has started.
The reinforcement function must specify the correct behaviour of the agent by giving it
rewards when it is performing well and punishments when its behaviour is inadequate.
For this reason it implicitly species the agents' goals or motivations or its task. In
autonomous agents, the selection of the reinforcement must take into consideration the
fact that these implicit goals should be of a homeostatic nature.
The denition of the input space implicitly informs the robot which elements of its
environment are important for achieving its task. The generalisation mechanisms pro-
vided by the neural networks allow the agent to discriminate which inputs are more
adequate for the selection of its behaviour, but ultimately the designer has to dene
correctly all the possible inputs the agent might need.
Unfortunately the output space is reduced to a nite number of actions. This means
that the action set should be selected with care, allowing enough exibility of move-
ment, namely in giving the robot enough freedom of movement to perform its task
correctly. The actions can either be very primitive or consist of more elaborate be-
haviours. This dierence in control strategy is actually what dierentiates the experi-
mental Chapters 4 and 5 from each other.
The state transitions are very important because they specify when the agent should
evaluate the previously selected action and select a new one. A state transition is usu-
ally dened by a change of input state which simply consists of a change of the input
values when discrete input is used. If continuous and noisy sensors are used to dene
the input space then the denition of state transition is not so simple. The problem be-
comes more dicult if behaviours are used instead of actions making a state transition
at every step inappropriate. The denition of the state transition in this case is often
associated with domain-specic conditions, yet this seems to represent an unnecessary
stipulation of arbitrary rules that restrain the agent's exibility. A solution based on
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determining signicant changes in the input state seems more adequate. The problem
of state-transition determination is closely related to the diculties in determining
when to change behaviour found in sequential behaviour decomposition. The duration
of behaviours must be long enough to allow them to manifest themselves, and short
enough so that they do not become inappropriate (due to changing circumstances) long
before being interrupted.
The learning parameters mentioned above are often changed during learning to enhance
the agent's abilities. This can be useful but should not be done by an external agent.
In particular, the learning and exploration should not be stopped by an external entity
that decides when the agent is suciently competent at its task. The agent itself
should determine the value of these parameters as far as possible.
All these specications left open by the learning architecture invoke the need for some
kind of motivational system that can exert some form of meta-control over the learning
algorithm. Later in this thesis, it is discussed and empirically explored how emotions
can fulll this role. For instance, emotions are usually associated with reinforcement
and will therefore be used as its main source during the experiments. Furthermore,
emotions can help to dene the occurrence of state transitions when behaviours are
used as the elementary actions of the learning architecture. Finally, emotions can also
be used for varying on-line the value of the meta-control variables.
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Chapter 3
Natural and Articial Emotions
3.1 Introduction
In their quest for true intelligence, people usually have a Cartesian approach that
regards emotions as a hindrance carried over from their early evolutionary development,
at odds with their aspiration to high rationality. Psychologists, too, tend to concur with
this popular view of emotions as useless or even disruptive to rationality (Toda, 1993).
Interestingly, such natural distrust towards emotions can be substantiated if we take
the opposite view, i.e. that emotions are indeed central to reasoning. Several reasons
for the disruption caused by emotions, which are a direct consequence of considering
emotions essential, are pointed out throughout this chapter. In fact, this view that
emotions are an integral part of rational behaviour is receiving increasing support from
brain research studies (LeDoux, 1998; Damasio, 1994; Cytowic, 1993).
Emotions play an important role in our lives, inuencing our every day life decisions.
As Goleman (1995) defends, the power of the emotional mind in everyday decision-
making is greater than the power of the rational mind. He convincingly argues that it is
more advantageous for success in life for humans to have a good emotional development
than a high intelligence quotient.
Studies show that human decisions are not always rational (Grossberg and Gutowski,
1987). Pure logic is not enough and shows serious faults when used to model human
intelligence in Articial Intelligence systems (Dreyfus, 1992). Furthermore, emotions
have been suggested in the eld of Articial Intelligence as the ultimate source of
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intelligence that might provide robots with the autonomy they need (Toda, 1994).
Doubts have even been posed on whether machines can exhibit intelligent behaviour
without emotions (Minsky, 1986; Charland, 1995).
Next in this chapter, several views of the inuence of emotions in cognition are pre-
sented in terms of dierent cognitive mechanisms like memory, attention and reasoning.
This will be followed by a description of the dierent emotions' functionalities in nat-
ural systems that can be and have been transfered to the articial systems' domain.
The chapter will nish with the proposal and analysis of the emotion model that was
used in the experimental work carried out for this thesis.
3.2 Natural Emotions
3.2.1 Emotions and memory
One of the basic reasoning processes that is inuenced by emotions is memory (see
Blaney, 1986, for an extensive review on the subject). Blaney (1986) presents two
alternative ways in which emotions can inuence memory:
Mood dependence1 | What one remembers during a given mood is determined
in part by what one learned previously in that mood. Aective valence of the
material, i.e. the type of emotions associated with material itself, is irrelevant.
Mood congruence | Some material, by virtue of its aective content, is more likely
to be stored and/or recalled when one is a congruent mood. Concordance between
mood at exposure and at recall is not required or relevant.
Others (Schwartz and Reisberg, 1991) claim that emotions independent of valence
can contribute to better memorisation, i.e. that the events that are the most vividly
remembered are also the most emotional or even traumatic, while emotionally neutral
events are easily forgotten. Studies of the human brain support the view that emotions
might be responsible for enhancing memorisation (LeDoux, 1998).
1 State dependence in the original work.
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In his experiments, Bower (1981) showed mood-dependence eects and claims that
through their inuence on memory, emotions have the power of biasing our decisions.
Depending on their current mood, people are more likely to recall events that are
congruent with that mood. These will make the probabilities of possible outcomes for
each choice available at any one time subjective. Under these conditions, it is clear
that the combination of the utilities of prospective outcomes and their probabilities for
each choice will not lead to the selection of an objective optimal choice. When people
are happy they are also more optimistic, because they raise the estimate of positive
future events and reduce estimate of negative future events (Bower and Cohen, 1982).
If, on the contrary, people are sad they will selectively remember more negative events
which in extreme cases, can contribute to the vicious cycle of deepening depression
(Blaney, 1986).
Later experiments (Bower and Mayer, 1985) demonstrated that mood-dependence ef-
fects are unreliable phenomena in laboratory experiments and found mood-congruence
eects instead. Nevertheless, it is usually believed that an event is remembered best
when people are in a situation or state similar to the one when the learning took place
(LeDoux, 1998).
3.2.2 Emotions and attention
The mood-dependent recall can also be seen as an adaptive trait that allows the indi-
vidual to recall only events that occurred previously in similar contexts and not to be
distracted by irrelevant information. In general this can be seen as advantageous.
Many emotions theorists agree that emotions are most helpful for focusing attention on
the relevant features of the problem at hand (LeDoux, 1998; De Sousa, 1987; Tomkins,
1984; Plutchick, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Panksepp, 1982) and, in particular, for determin-
ing the salience of the perceptual information (Cytowic, 1993). However, this can also
provide a way for certain emotions to disturb the thinking process, because it makes
it more dicult to pay attention to all aspects of a complex problem. In particu-
lar, long-term consequences can be ignored (Loewenstein, 1996) which for a wild-life
environment is adequate but can be a serious disadvantage in a highly organised tech-
nological society like our recent man-made society, where the repercussions of decisions
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can spread out over a wide space and are very slow in dying out (Toda, 1982).
Emotions are also often pointed to as essential mechanisms for autonomous agents with
multiple goals and limited resources in uncertain environments (Oatley, 1987; Frijda
and Swagerman, 1987; Moat et al., 1993). Their role is associated with the process of
interrupting the agent's ongoing activities to deal with new and unexpected situations
that need to be attended to (Sloman and Croucher, 1981; Simon, 1967) while protecting
the resource-limited activities from unnecessary interruption and computation (Wright,
1994). These interruptions are particularly important when urgency of response is
essential for survival, but in extreme, mostly pathological, cases can also be disruptive
when the generated interruptions become frequent and inappropriate or undesired.
Apart from switching attention away from the task at hand, emotions are also usually
held responsible for bringing to conscious awareness the emotion-inducing event and
preparing the motor system for a reaction (Ortony et al., 1988).
3.2.3 Emotions and reasoning
One of the simplest ways emotions are considered to inuence reasoning is by providing
an evaluation value of the subjects' situation. It is often assumed that human decision
making consists of the maximization of positive emotions and minimisation of negative
emotions (e.g., Tomkins, 1984).
Recently the role of emotions has been enlarged. Some researchers have proposed
that the human brain is divided in two major independent and interacting systems:
an aective and a cognitive one (Zajonc et al., 1982; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998).
Both systems are responsible for behaviour, and their intensive cooperation attributes
a primary role to emotions in reasoning.
On the one hand, to the emotional mind is attributed the responsibility for the faster
responses by providing the system with an ecient mechanism to spring into action
without pausing to think and only attend to the most striking aspects of its perception.
On the other hand, the cognitive system makes a more extensive and careful evaluation
of the situation and might eventually decide to bring the emotional response to a stop
(LeDoux, 1997).
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Furthermore, recent neurophysiological research suggests that our thinking is not so
detached and ungrounded as we might believe and that emotions also assist the cog-
nitive system. According to this research, with the help of the emotions, the feelings
provided by our body play an important role in reasoning. This is the central claim of
the somatic-marker hypothesis2 (Damasio, 1994).
Damasio makes a clear distinction between the concepts of emotion and feeling. Feeling
designates the process of monitoring the body. Feelings oer us the cognition of our
visceral and musculoskeletal state. Emotion is a combination of a mental evaluative
process with dispositional responses to that process, mostly toward the body proper
but also toward the brain itself. According to Damasio, all emotions generate feelings,
but only some feelings generate emotions. If feelings are associated with emotions then
the body signals will move from the background to the foreground of our attention.
Somatic markers are special instances of body feelings, generated by emotions, which
are acquired by experience based on internal preference systems and external events and
which help to predict future outcomes of certain scenarios. They will force attention on
the negative or positive outcome of certain options that can be immediately defeated,
leaving fewer alternatives, or can be immediately followed. Through the estimation of
long term-costs and benets, the somatic markers provide humans with a reasoning
system that is free from many of the faults of formal logic, namely the need for much
computational and memory power for having every option thoroughly evaluated.
Damasio provides compelling evidence for his hypothesis, by showing examples of how
emotionally impaired people have major problems making decisions. However, the
boldness of his hypothesis has also created some skepticism. Sloman (1998) claims that
the evidence only shows that global central mechanisms are necessary to ensure that
the more specic mechanisms are deployed correctly; and that these mechanisms used
for redirecting attention, and therefore essential to intelligence, may also be necessary
for emotion production. He goes on to say that Damasio's heuristic control can occur
without emotional mechanisms, because problems with massive search can easily be
solved by humans with a context-addressable memory of slightly generalised special




Recently, Damasio's group has produced further results (Bechara et al., 1997) that
provide stronger support for the somatic-marker hypothesis. Their experiments show
that people reach the right decisions before the cognitive system has access to the
necessary data to make informed decisions. This suggests that there is an independent
process which is quickly attributing value to each decision. Apart from providing
biases that assist the reasoning system in a cooperative manner, the emotional system
is also credited with generating the overt recall of the pertinent facts necessary for the
cognitive evaluation (Bechara et al., 1997). This way the emotion system contributes
to the eciency of the decision process.
3.3 Articial Emotions
In this thesis, the approach followed towards emotions is an engineering approach
(Wehrle, 1998). The primary criterion is one of performance of the robot, more specif-
ically the enhancement of its autonomy, and not to improve our knowledge about the
nature of emotions themselves, although the eective use of emotions might hopefully
contribute some clues to their understanding.
As such, the aim of this work will not be to try to replicate the experience of human
emotions as reported by the individuals' subjective cognitive observations, but to try
to capture the underlying mechanisms which have an adaptive value that can be trans-
posed to articial creatures. Some properties of emotions that might be useful to an
autonomous articial creature are:
 Source of motivation, where motivation means anything that controls the focus
of attention and orients the current reasoning of the agent. Emotions have been
considered a fundamental source of motivation in psychology (e.g., Beck, 1983)
and have been used as a source of motivation in articial creatures (Morignot
and Hayes-Roth, 1995).
 Control of attention. Emotions inuence perception by focusing the agent's at-
tention on the most relevant features to solve its immediate problem. In partic-
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ular, they have been attributed the role of interrupting the agent from what it
is doing when new problems arise that need to be attended to (Sloman et al.,
1994; Beaudoin and Sloman, 1993, describe an application within a nurse-maid
scenario).
 Source of reinforcement. Emotions are usually associated with either pleasant
or unpleasant feelings that can act as reinforcement. This allows emotions to
motivate the agent to approach or avoid certain emotional scenarios. This is the
most usual role attributed to emotions in the functionality of an articial agent3
(e.g., Wright, 1996; Albus, 1990, or McCauley and Franklin (1998) in the domain
of Pandemonium Theory).
 Emotion dependent memory. Bower and Cohen (1982) proposed a blackboard
control system to model mood dependency. In their system, the subject's mood
when learning is associated with what is learned. Later, moods act as selective
lters in the retrieval process, admitting retrieval of events stored in memory
that were originally learned in moods that are congruent with the current mood.
Mood-congruence eects have also been modelled (Araujo, 1994) but using a
system composed by two independent but interactive neural-network subsystems,
one cognitive and one aective. The reinforcement-learning system developed by
El-Nasr et al. (1998) models emotion dependent recall by making the agent more
or less optimistic when it is respectively more happy or sad.
 Assistance in reasoning. Based on the ideas of Damasio (1994), Ventura et al.
(1998) propose an emotion-based agent that simultaneously processes stimuli by
an aective and a cognitive system. The agent's aective system quickly attains
perceptual images that are used to directly access the cognitive images relevant
for the cognitive system's deliberation.
 Behaviour tendencies or even stereotyped responses are usually associated with
particular emotional scenarios. These built-in responses allow for appropriate be-
haviour to be automatically triggered in emergency situations, avoiding spending
3 There are also some researchers (e.g., Michaud et al., 1996; Shibata et al., 1996) who give emotions
the somehow more sophisticated role of monitoring the robot's performance so that the robot's plans
or actions can be changed if necessary.
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unavailable time on elaborate reasoning. A typical example is the fear emotion
where the source of fear is quickly located and avoidance behaviour is imme-
diately activated. In the architecture proposed by Botelho and Coelho (1997),
emotions are associated with simple procedure responses whose execution directs
the agent to the identication of the emotion's cause so that immediate action
can be taken.
 Physiological arousal of the body. A strong emotion is usually associated with
a general release of energy in anticipation of demanding action response. The
importance of this feature in biological systems is clear: it provides the way to
mobilise extra energy to cope with emergency situations in a complex chemical
entity. However, the translation of this feature to an articial system is not
clear, because in general articial systems are not endowed with dierent states
for overall performance. Nevertheless emotions can be used to modulate simple
system parameters (Ca~namero, 1997; Bates et al., 1992a), e.g. level of behavioural
activity or speed, that are directly relevant to the overall performance of the
system.
There are many other properties left out, the more pertinent being those of a social
nature, which were left out on purpose. It is clear that emotions play an essential role
in social interaction. The expression of emotions allows the individuals to transmit
to others messages that are often crucial to their survival and therefore have great
adaptiveness value (Darwin, 1965). This is a very interesting dimension of emotions
that has received some attention in Articial Intelligence research. The expression of
emotions can be useful in several domains. It can:
 Enable articial creatures to generate empathy emotions in people, by creat-
ing an illusion of life necessary for believable characters (Bates, 1994). This is
particularly important in entertainment oriented systems.
 Regulate the intensity of the interaction between a learning robot and a teacher
(Breazeal, 1998). The robot's emotional reactions can provide cues to whether
it is being over-stimulated or getting bored. Taking those into consideration,
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the teacher can maintain a suitable learning environment that will enhance the
learning performance of the robot.
 Make articial systems more responsive to human emotions and thus more user
friendly by implementing mechanisms to recognise human emotional expressions.
This can be advantageous in both entertainment and educational applications
(see Picard, 1995, 1997, for numerous suggestions). An example is the simulation
of empathy feelings in computer interfaces in order to help the relief of frustration
in human users (Klein, 1996).
 Allow for new communication mechanisms between articial creatures. For in-
stance, Shibata et al. (1996) use emotions as a communication mechanism that
allows the robot to report to others its internal state, or more specically, its
level of task achievement.
 Help establishing and securing commitments between social agents, so that ar-
ticial agents can benet from interaction and cooperation with others without
being totally open to exploitation by enemies and proteers (Aube, 1998a).
These ideas are beyond the scope of the work reported here and will not be explored
further in the current work, which is concerned with more basic mechanisms of simple
survival by a solitary agent.
Some people argue that emotions are mostly important in the realm of social interaction
and that it is in this dimension that they serve a real purpose. Some go as far as to
argue that only social emotions are truly emotions (Aube, 1998b). And it is quite true
that in humans emotions of a social nature are among the most numerous, complex and
rened. Nevertheless, it is also true that the complexity of social interaction present
in human societies is quite recent in an evolutionary time scale (Papez, 1937) and that
basic emotional mechanisms and their brain structures are much older. This by itself
suggests that there are some basic emotions on top of which social emotions develop.
Instead of denying that those innate emotions are emotions, one can instead name
them primary emotions (Damasio, 1994) in contradistinction to the more sophisticated
secondary emotions. These primary emotions are usually associated with basic survival
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instincts. As such, they often look misplaced in highly structured and articial human
societies (Toda, 1982, 1993), where social emotions are often more useful.
Another issue studied in Articial Intelligence is how emotions can help in the cre-
ative process. Articial systems are typically very predictable, because they follow
rigid sets of rules or commands that do to not leave much room for the generation
of new spontaneous behaviour. This is annoying in entertainment applications, but
it is particularly serious in applications where creativity is essential, for instance mu-
sical composition. Some solutions to this problem have been proposed that resort to
emotions (e.g. Riecken, 1998). These rely on the fact that memory retrieval is a key
activity for the free associations necessary in creative work, and that memory retrieval
itself is largely dependent upon emotions. Even the automatic generation of musical
performance can prot from emotions, by adding emotional expressiveness taken from




A large subset of theories of emotions is based on elaborate cognitive appraisal theories
(e.g., Lazarus, 1982; Power and Dalgleish, 1997; Ortony et al., 1988) that stress the role
of conscious reasoning in the generation and denition of emotions, in spite of emotions
also being aroused by crude subconscious experiences involving simple information
processing without the need for high level reasoning processes (Zajonc, 1984; Izard,
1993).
Following the psychologists' main stream, most Articial Intelligence models of emo-
tions are based on an analytic and symbolic approach (Sloman et al., 1994; Frijda and
Swagerman, 1987; Dyer, 1987; Pfeifer, 1982; Pfeifer and Nicholas, 1985; Bates et al.,
1992b) that tries to endow the model with the full complexity of human emotions as
perceived from an observer's point of view. However, in both ontological development
and evolution the full richness of emotions is only achieved at a nal stage. In the
early stages of these processes only certain basic emotions are present and, presumably
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later, other more complex emotions develop on top of these.
In opposition to the traditional approach, a synthetic bottom-up approach based on
the animat approach (Wilson, 1991) was preferred for the current work. This made the
existing models inadequate, because they are over-designed and too complex (Pfeifer,
1994), leaving no other alternative than designing yet another emotion model.
Recently, models have been suggested that also follow a bottom-up approach (Velasquez,
1998; Ca~namero, 1997; Foliot and Michel, 1998; Wright, 1996) and it is interesting to
see that they often agree with the present work in the treatment given to the most rel-
evant issues. The problem with reproducing most of these models is that they usually
provide so little architectural specication that they allow almost total freedom of im-
plementation. Furthermore, the evaluation of their practical implementations is often
dicult, because in general they are presented as an end result, i.e. the adaptiveness
value of the presence of emotions is not evaluated, but only presented as fact. In these
conditions, unless an objective and accurate description of the end product is given,
only its direct observation can make any kind of evaluation possible.
The most signicant emotion features that the designed model tries to capture are:
 Emotions have valence, i.e., they provide a positive or negative hedonic value.
 Emotions have some persistence in time, i.e. sudden unrealistic swings between
dierent emotions should not be allowed, particularly when the emotions in ques-
tion dier a lot.
 The occurrence of a certain emotion depends not only on direct sensory input,
but also on the agent's recent emotional history.
 Emotions colour perception in that what is perceived is biased by the current
emotional state.
 Emotional state can be neutral or dominated by an emotion. This implies the
existence of a mechanism to decide which emotion, if any, is dominant at any one
time.
The model that was developed | Figure 3.1 | is based on four basic emotions (E):
56
Happiness, Sadness, Fear and Anger. These emotions were selected because they are
believed to be the most universally expressed emotions along with Disgust (Ekman,
1992) and are adequate and useful for the robot{environment interaction aorded by
the experiments. Others might prove too sophisticated or out of place. For instance,
there seems to be no situation where it is appropriate for the robot to feel disgust.
However, if, for instance, toxic food were added to the environment, disgust would
become useful to keep the robot away from it.
E = fHappiness, Sadness, Fear, Angerg4 (3.1)
The emotions chosen are also usually included in the denitions of basic or primary
emotions5 (see, for example Shaver et al., 1987; Power and Dalgleish, 1997; Goleman,
1995), which is a good indicator of their relevance and need. Other emotions, like love
and hate, which some authors like to suggest as primary emotions, were not included
because they do not seem very basic6 and the present work does not have, for the
moment, any social aims.
The model determines the intensity of each emotion based on the robot's current
internal feelings (F). The intensity of each emotion is calculated through simple linear
weighted dependencies from feelings. The nature of the feelings depends on the robot
and its task, but might, for example, include Hunger, Pain and Temperature. The set
used in the rst experiments is given in Equation 3.2.
F = fHunger, Pain, Restlessness, Temperature, Eatingg (3.2)
Furthermore, the emotion state also inuences the robot's feelings, or body state. The
body reactions that give rise to an emotion are also the ones aroused by the emotion.
This way, each emotion tries to inuence the body state in such a way that the resulting
4 A dierent typeface is used for the model's emotions to distinguish them from natural emotions.
5 It should be noted that the paradigm of primary emotions is not undisputed, yet most of the
arguments against it are marginal to the present usage. These arguments refer to the plausibility of
translating all emotions in terms of graduations of primary emotions. The point here is that these
emotions are more universal and fundamental than others and therefore more adequate to animats
with low reasoning capabilities in a simplied environment.
6 There are even arguments against considering them as emotions (e.g., Sloman, 1987).








































Figure 3.1: Emotions model.
body state matches the state that gives rise to that particular emotion. An emotion
only inuences the body if its intensity value is signicantly large, i.e. its value is above
an activation threshold. In this case, the emotion is considered active.
The emotions inuence the body through a hormone system, by producing appropriate
hormones. The hormone system in the model is a very simplied one. It consists of
having one hormone associated with each feeling. A feeling intensity is not a value
directly obtained from the value of the body sensation that gives rise to it, but from
the sum of the sensation and hormone value. The hormone values can be (positively or
negatively) high enough to totally hide the real sensations from the robot's perception
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of its body. The hormone quantities produced by each emotion are directly related to its
intensity and its dependencies on the associated feelings. The stronger the dependency
on a certain feeling, the greater quantity of the associated hormone is produced by an
emotion.
On the one hand, the hormone mechanism introduces a sort of ght between the
emotions to gain control over the body which is ultimately what selects which emotion
will be dominant. On the other hand, the robot feelings are not only dependent on
its sensations but are also dependent on its emotional state, i.e. the intensity of its
emotions.
A formal description of the model's functions is given by Equations 3.3 to 3.8. The






if x < b
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b+ if x > b+
x otherwise
(3.3)
Equation 3.4 shows how the intensity value of emotion e at step n (Ien) is calculated
from the intensity of the feelings (Ifn) at that step. This calculation involves an emotion
bias (Be) and coupling coecients (Cef ) between the emotion e and the feelings f .




The calculation of the feeling's intensity has to take into account both the inuences
provided by the hormone system (Hfn), which are dependent on a coecient param-
eter (Ch), and the value of the respective sensation (Sfn). The sensations' values are
directly derived from the sensory data. The hormone values are responsible for the
memory of the emotion system, and depend both on their previous values and the
emotion inuences (Afn). Note that these emotion inuences are calculated using the
same coupling coecients (Cef ) that were used to calculate the emotions themselves.
Emotions only inuence the hormone values if their intensity is above the activation
threshold (Itha). To calculate the value of the hormones (Hfn), two dierent system
parameters are used, the attack gain (up) and the decay gain (dn). The rst one
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is used when the emotions and their inuences are increasing and the other when the
emotion's intensities are fading away. In general, the attack gain is much higher than
the decay gain. This way the decay of emotions is slow while the emergence of new
emotions is much faster. The values of these parameters and all the other used in the
model are in Appendix A (which also points out some value restrictions).
8f 2 F ;8n 2 N;




0 if n = 1









up if jAfn j > jHfn j
dn otherwise
(3.8)
The hormones' values can increase quite rapidly, allowing for the quick build up of a
new emotional state, and decrease slowly allowing for the persistence of an emotional
state even when the cause that gave rise to it is gone | another of the characteristic
features of emotions.
Figure 3.2 shows the response of an emotion e to a sensation on which it has a depen-
dency (Cef ) of 0:8 weight. This dependency is actually indirect, through the respective
feeling f . Assuming that the hormone feedback is initially zero, then when the sen-
sation value (Sf ) is 1:0, the emotion intensity (Ie) is 0:8 which is the highest value
possible in this example. The inuence of the hormone (Hf ) is only noticeable after
the sensation returns to value zero. Before that, the feeling intensity (If ) is saturated
by the stimulus itself. When the stimulus disappears, the emotion intensity has a sud-
den drop in value because it becomes dependent solely on the total value of hormone
(Hf ) that accumulated while the sensation was on. The values of hormone and emo-
tion gradually decay to zero without the presence of the sensation. When the emotion
intensity decays to values below the activation threshold, the emotion's inuence on
the hormone ceases and the values' decay rate increases.
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Sensation value (Sf )
Feeling intensity (If )
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Activation threshold (Itha)
Figure 3.2: Emotional response to a sensation.
As a concrete example of the dynamics of the model in terms of robot-environment
interactions consider the situation of the robot colliding with an obstacle. The collision
itself produces a pain sensation that will be captured by the pain feeling. Assuming
that fear has a strong dependency on pain7, then the fear intensity will rise. If
this intensity is high enough to make the fear emotion active then fear will produce
hormones. In particular, the hormone associated with pain will quickly build up during
the collision. This will make the fear emotion grow stronger and possibly overtake
other existing emotions. When the robot nally manages to cease the collision, it will
still have pain not because the pain sensation is still there, but because the hormone
associated with pain has a high value. So the fear emotion will persist while the
hormone gradually decreases in value. This means that while the robot is gaining
distance from the obstacle, the fear will still be there. Nevertheless, it will usually
fade away as soon as a short distance is gained and the risk of further collisions has
diminished.
It should be noted that the time scales involved in the persistence of an emotion after
the stimulus is gone, particularly when in the presence of a new stimulus that favours
another emotion, are quite small. This allows for what is perceived as quick changes
of emotions, in opposition to the much slower process of changes in mood. One can
only talk of moods when talking of the residual hormone values that might exist in the
system and are not strong enough to stimulate the existence of a dominant emotion.
7 Although this dependency is used in the experiments, aversive stimulation such as pain is more
usually connected to anger in humans (e.g., Izard, 1993).
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That would be consistent with the theory that moods are dierentiated from emotions
in terms of level of arousal (Panksepp, 1995). These residual hormone values can act
as moods in the sense that they might favour the appearance of certain emotions, but
the short time scales involved in the persistence of the residual values in the model
probably make even this interpretation uncomfortable.
The dominant emotion is the one with the highest intensity, unless no emotion intensity
exceeds a selection threshold8(Iths). In this case, there will not be a dominant emotion
and emotional state will be neutral.
Emotions were divided into two categories: positive and negative. The ones that are
considered \pleasant" are positive (only happiness, in the set of emotions used), the
others are considered negative. This way a value judgement can easily be obtained
from the emotion model by considering the intensity of the current dominant emotion
and whether it is positive or negative.
In summary, the model of emotions described provides not only an emotional state,
based on simple feelings, that is coherent with the current situation, but also inuences
the body perception.
Side issues associated with emotions as moods and temperaments were not directly
built into the architecture and are only exhibited as a by-product. Dierent temper-
aments, for instance, can be achieved by having dierent emotion dependencies on
feelings or changing other parameters of the system.
3.4.2 Discussion
Like many other psychological terms (e.g. intelligence, consciousness), emotion is dif-
cult to dene and the existing emotion models employ mostly working denitions
that tend to conict with each other. There are even those who defend that emotions
are emergent properties of complete agents and should not be engineered in the agent
(Pfeifer, 1994).
On the one hand, emotions are essentially a private internal experience not subject
8 This threshold is independent of the activation threshold, but should probably not be lower to ensure
that the dominant emotions are always active.
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to direct observation by others than the individual experiencing them, making proper
scientic analysis extremely dicult. A behaviourist approach in particular would
eliminate the emotions themselves. On the other hand, emotions are intrinsically
related to other psychological processes (e.g. cognition) and the articial separation
from them created by the traditional scientic approach together with the articiality
of the experimental setups often hide away the true nature of real emotional experiences
(Kaiser and Wehrle, 1996).
Research on the emotions eld (James, 1890) started by emphasising the role of physi-
ological arousal and emotional behaviour as primary and considering the awareness of
the emotional state as the perception of these responses to the situation.
In opposition, recent emotions models usually take for granted that cognition has
a fundamental part in the mechanism of emotions, namely that the phenomenon of
rational appraisal of the stimuli is essential (e.g., Lazarus, 1982). Most of the them use
as evidence for their position the experiment reported by Schachter (1964) which gives
some evidence for the need of cognition to label body arousal with particular emotions.
However, there are some fundamental problems with this experiment (De Sousa, 1987;
Zajonc, 1984). One is that it relies mostly on verbal reports of the subjects and some
deceit has even been discovered in their reports after the experiment was nished.
Second, it relies on very simplied arousal mechanisms and meanwhile research has
shown that emotional arousal is much more dierentiated than was previously thought.
It is well known that the reasons people give for their actions are not necessarily
the real reasons. This has been particularly well demonstrated by experiments with
patients who have the right and left brain hemispheres disconnected, in which the
patient would with one of the hemispheres invent a posteriori an arbitrary reason for
an action commanded by the other hemisphere for a totally dierent reason (Gazzaniga
and LeDoux, 1978). In particular, these experiments showed that emotional outcomes
can be transmitted from one hemisphere to the other without the knowledge of their
causes being transmitted, demonstrating a dissociation between the emotional reaction
and its cause. The mechanisms that lead us to do what we do, and in particular to
our emotional reactions, are not necessarily knowable to the conscious self, which can
rationalise them to give us the delusion that we act rationally (LeDoux, 1998; Cytowic,
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1993). So apart from the deceit involved in reporting an experience to a third party
there is also an element of self-deceit by the rational mind.
Emotions in particular are often associated with situations of time pressure where
rational decision making similar to the one traditional Articial Intelligence space
search tries to mimic is inadequate. This suggests that emotion mechanisms should
rely to some extent on simple associations of stimuli.
This latter view was accepted as important in denition of emotions and of utility in
robotics applications when designing the proposed model of emotions. The decision
of taking this stance reects a background in the eld of behaviour-oriented Articial
Intelligence, where similar issues are discussed under dierent denominations.
While most of the computational models of emotions rely on distinct entities that
are labelled after human emotions, many researchers, particularly those looking into
bottom-up approaches, would prefer the total dismissal of emotion labels. This is a
valid approach in that emotions' categorisation is unnecessary to their existence and
it can even be argued that the categorisation process is only done at a conscious, and
therefore higher, level than the one required by the initial stages of a bottom-up sys-
tem. The problem is how to take into consideration the dierent distinctions between
emotions. In particular, an approach that reduces emotions to a simple unidimensional
pleasure/displeasure vector (e.g., Kitano, 1995; Foliot and Michel, 1998) loses much
of the richness provided by emotions.
There are basically two views for the process of categorising emotions with dierent
labels (Wehrle, 1998): emotions can either be considered emergent labels for the eval-
uation of prototypical situations or events (modal emotions) or evolutionarily achieved
response programs (basic emotions). Either way their richness cannot be reduced to a
one dimensional vector (Ekman, 1992).
Nevertheless, using existing emotion labels is not always an elegant solution. At times
the need for the emotions to be in tune with the agent-environment interaction will
make their meaning farfetched from their human counterpart (Wehrle, 1998) . However,
labelling them often allows a quick grasp of what they stand for.
From a more practical view, using dierent emotions can be useful by providing a way to
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separate the dierent problems the robot is confronted with into dierent categories.
This will, for instance, permit a modular multi-dimensional reinforcement function
when emotions are used as reinforcement (which can be useful, for example, to allow
the agent to concentrate on danger and ignore hunger when under threat); or allow for
each problem to be solved separately, if emotions are used to divide the problem space
into smaller sub-problems.
The proposed model is full of simplications and ignores many of the features expressed
in current denitions of emotions. Furthermore, because the robot's environment is
very simple, emotions themselves will also be very simplied | simplied, perhaps,
to the point where their distinction from simpler mechanisms as drives or motivation
systems becomes diuse. However, features that are characteristic of emotions alone
(e.g. persistence and valence) were reproduced to give them more authenticity.
Emotions have evolved from rigid adaptive systems as reexes and physiological drives,
but are more exible mechanisms because they involve an appraisal of signicance of
the events in terms of the survival of the individual and action tendencies instead
of a direct coupling from events to action (Staller and Petta, 1998). In the model
presented here this exibility is achieved in that events are not directly transformed
in actions but are subjectively evaluated as emotion value. Instead of proposing rigid
behavioural solutions, emotions provide guidance for behaviour by attributing this
value as reinforcement to the performance of the robot's behaviour in terms of its nal
goals.
One of the simplications consists in the fact that the model only incorporates simple
linear dependencies of feelings in the denition of emotion arousal. This has some lim-
itations. For instance, the distress caused by hunger should be much more noticeable
when hunger reaches dangerous levels (Balkenius, 1995) which suggests that the de-
pendence between the two should perhaps be exponential. Moreover, the dependency
should probably not be monotonic. The distress level should possibly rise if the agent
is consuming too much food. In general, stimuli are not minimised or maximised but
kept within comfort values. Nevertheless, this process that we perceive as homeostasis,
i.e. keeping a value within bounds, is often made with the aid of certain environmental
conditions (Bolles, 1980). Furthermore, emotions are modelled as simple response to
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events, without any anticipatory power attached to them. However, unexpectedness
can aect emotion intensity (Ortony et al., 1988) and certain emotions can be asso-
ciated with the notion of expected reward (Balkenius, 1995). For example, anger is
often triggered when an expected reward is not obtained and fear can be seen as a
reaction to an expected negative reward.
The hormone system developed is also very simplied and does not try to mimic bio-
logical hormone systems and the naming might be misleading by suggesting dierent
functions than those modelled in the system. Hormone discharges are usually associ-
ated with transformations in the functioning of the nervous system induced by emo-
tions, but rather at the level of behavioral output (Kravitz, 1988) than at the level of
perception. Nevertheless, emotions are responsible for moving certain body sensations
from the background to the foreground of our attention (Damasio, 1994). Moreover,
there is evidence to suggest that sensations are not produced only by stimuli but also
by brain processes. Melzack (1997) defends that sensory input only modulates the
experience of the body generated by the brain, they do not directly cause it. Pain is
referred by Melzack as a demonstrative example: only if a local anaesthetic is deliv-
ered to a person in time to prevent the early pain response does the later pain totally
disappear.
There is no reason to claim that the developed model provides the robot with the
ability to feel emotions in the sense the humans do. To start with, the body plays
a crucial role in human emotional experience (LeDoux, 1998). A robot's underlying
composition is very dierent from human physiology and the sensors of its physical
state that might dene its emotional feelings would also have to be very dierent
(Picard, 1997). Furthermore, its lack of consciousness (Frijda and Swagerman, 1987;
Ortony et al., 1988) together with the fact that its emotions are far from the complexity
of true emotions as experienced by humans makes such an assumption ludicrous. In
reality, it was considered more important to design emotions that could be aorded by
the robot-environment interaction than to equip the robot with human-like emotions
(Ca~namero, 1998). However, language will be used that might, implicitly, attribute
emotional feelings to the robot. This kind of language is used only because it is




The model of emotions behaves appropriately when tested on the robot, in the sense
that the robot consistently displays plausible contextual emotional states during the
process of interacting with the environment. Furthermore, because its emotions are
grounded in subjective body \feelings", and not direct sensory input or \sensations",
it manages to avoid sudden changes of emotional state, from one extreme emotion to a
completely dierent one. The more dierent the two emotions are, the more dicult
it is to change from one to the other. The physiological arousal caused by emotions
was repeatedly left out of cognitive theories of emotions, because it was not considered
cognitively interesting, yet without it emotions lack their characteristic inertia (Moat
et al., 1993). Nevertheless, recent articial emotion models based in a sub-symbolic
approach do often try to model this feature (Picard, 1997; Velasquez, 1998; Breazeal,
1998).
The developed model does not endow the robot with the feeling of emotions, in the sense
that it has a conscious and subjective experience of emotions (Frijda and Swagerman,
1987), but more importantly it endows it with an emotional state that can be used to
aect its behaviour.
In order to evaluate the functional role of emotions in reasoning, the emotional state
should be used for the actual control of a complete agent, determining its behaviour
(Albus, 1990; Wright, 1996; Moat et al., 1993). Furthermore, it is important to show
empirically that endowing the robot with emotions has adaptive value by comparing
the developed emotional robot with other non-emotional robots. Although emotions
research in biological systems can be a source of inspiration to guide robot design, it is
not by itself a valid proof of the adaptive value of articial emotions for articial systems
(Ca~namero, 1998). In the next chapters, examples will be given of its use in robot
experiments. In particular, emotions will be used to ll in much of the specications




In this chapter, a description is given of a rst attempt at integrating an emotional
system with the control of an autonomous robot. To start with, emotions were allowed
to inuence control by providing an evaluation of the context.
To investigate the validity of this approach, several experiments were carried out using
a robot simulation. The robot was given a simple survival task that requires learning.
A reinforcement learning controller was developed to solve the task. This controller
makes use of well-known techniques: a Q-learning algorithm to learn its policy and
neural networks for storing the utility values.
Unfortunately, experiments showed that, contrary to expectations, the emotion-based
evaluation was inadequate as a reinforcement signal for policy acquisition by Q-learning.
The problem was investigated and further experiments were done to nd other ways
in which emotions could be more helpful to the action-based controller. The use of
emotions as modulators of learning system parameters proved much more fruitful.
A detailed description of the experimental setup is presented in the next section, Sec-
tion 4.2, covering the robot's task, emotional system, controller, and experimental
evaluation. This is followed by a report of the experiments done and the results ob-
tained in Section 4.3. Apart from the main experiments, other experiments were done
to determine why the emotion reinforcement was unsuccessful and to explore other
ways in which emotions can inuence control. The results for these experiments can
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be found in Sections 4.4 and 4.6, respectively. In between these two sections, the results
achieved until that point and the problems found with emotion-dependent reinforce-
ment are summarised. The conclusions reached at that point are later summarised,
together with the conclusions for the alternative emotion roles experiments, in the
section at end of this chapter. For further implementation details consult Appendix C.
4.2 Experimental Setup
4.2.1 Robot, environment and task
Figure 4.1: The Khepera robot.
All the experiments were carried out in a simulator (Michel, 1996) of a Khepera robot
(Mondada et al., 1994) | a small robot with a left and a right wheel motor, and eight
infrared sensors that allow it to detect object proximity and ambient light. Six of the
sensors are located at the front of the robot and two at the rear. Figure 4.1 shows
the original robot. The experiments were done with the simulated robot within the
environment shown by Figure 4.2, which is a closed environment with some walls and
three lights surrounded by bricks1. Figure 4.3 gives an idea of the sensor capabilities
of the simulated robot. Figure 4.3(b) shows the values for the infrared distance sensors
1 The lights had to be surrounded by bricks to avoid the robot becoming permanently stuck in their
concavities. The lights can still be perceived by the robot as the bricks are transparent to light.
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Figure 4.2: The simulated robot and its environment.
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obtained for situation 4.3(a). The maximum distance sensor range is in between the
distance to the front brick, which is barely detected, and that to the rear brick, which
is not detected at all. The third brick, on the right side, shows how obstacles can be
very close to the robot without being detected.
(a) Robot in environ-
ment.
(b) Sensor values.
Figure 4.3: The infrared sensor readings of proximity for situation 4.3(a) is given in
4.3(b). It should be noticed that these readings can vary between 0 and 1023 and that
the very low values, e.g. 5, are due to noise.
The ultimate goal of the research reported in this dissertation is to develop a fully
autonomous real robot. This was one reason why self-suciency was considered a
useful property to include in the system. Another reason for this choice was that it is
easier to conceptually ground emotions in the context of an animal-like creature with
self-maintenance needs. Simulated feeding needs were therefore added to the robot.
The robot is always losing energy: the more it uses its motors the more energy is used
up. It can recover its energy from light. More exactly, the amount of energy that the
robot acquires at each step depends on whether enough light is being received by the
two front sensors and on how much light is being received by those sensors. The main
reason for having lights as food sources is to allow the robot to distinguish its food
sources with its poor perception capabilities. Apart from feeding itself by standing
next to the lights, the robot is supposed to wander around and avoid walls.
4.2.2 Emotion system
An emotion system was developed based on the emotion model presented previously
in Chapter 3.4 and using the following feelings (F): Hunger, Pain, Temperature, Rest-
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lessness and Eating. The sensations that give rise to these feelings are2:
Hunger | is directly related to its current energy decit.
Pain | is active if the robot is bumping into obstacles.
Temperature | depends upon the usage of the motors; as long as high velocity is
being demanded of the motors, the temperature will rise3.
Restlessness | increases if the robot does not move.
Eating | depends on the amount of energy the robot is acquiring at the moment.
Its value is high when the hunger sensation is decreasing.
The values of the emotions' dependencies on feelings and biases (see Table 4.1) were
carefully chosen by hand to provide adequate emotions for the possible body states.
The process of selecting these values consisted in rst deciding which combination of
feelings should lead to an emotional reaction taking into consideration the robot task,
and then selecting some initial dependencies accordingly. These were afterwards cor-
rected if the observation of the robot's emotional reactions while running showed any
unexpected deciencies. This did not involve many adjustments and mostly consisted
in balancing the dierent emotions so that the right emotion would be dominant in
each specic emotional context. Some initial tentative dependencies had the drawback
of allowing the saturation of the emotional system but simple restrictions on the de-
pendencies values were found that eliminated this problem (details in Appendix A).
The emotions are such that:
 The robot is happy if there is nothing wrong with the present situation. It will
be particularly happy if it has been using its motors a lot or is in the process of
getting new energy at the moment.
 If the robot is restless, has very low energy and it is not acquiring energy, then
its state will be sad.
2 Further details in Appendix C.1.
3 The real robot's velocity does not matter, in fact; the robot can be demanding high speed from its
motors while heading motionless against a wall.
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 If the robot bumps into the walls then the pain will make it fearful.
 If the robot is hungry, restless and with pain it will get angry.
Hunger Pain Restlessness Temperature Eating Bias
Happiness -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sadness 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Fear -0.4 0.8 -0.2 0.15 0.0 0.0
Anger 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0
Table 4.1: The emotions' dependencies on feelings.
4.2.3 Basic controller
The role of the basic learning controller is to produce actions that maximise the ex-
pected evaluation received. To achieve this purpose the controller can select one of six
possible discrete actions which are specied in detail in Appendix C.3:
 move slowly forward;




 move slowly backwards with a slight twist to the right.
The controller | Figure 4.4 | implements a Q-learning algorithm using neural net-
works very similar to the one reported by Lin (1992), which was presented in Section
2.5.1. It will be dened next in terms of two separate modules:
Associative Memory Module |This plastic module associates the sensor readings
and feelings with the current expected value of each of the actions that the robot
can take.
Action Selection Module | Based on the information provided by the previous
module, this module makes a stochastic selection of the action to take at each
step.















Figure 4.4: Basic controller for action-based control.
Associative Memory Module
The associative memory consists of six neural networks that each try to predict the
outcome of selecting each one of the six available actions. Each network is a three layer
feed-forward network with:
 22 input units: one for each distance(8) and light(8) sensor4, one for each feel-
ing(5) and a bias;
 5 hidden units;
 1 output unit that represents the expected outcome if the action associated with
this net is selected in the situation represented by the input units.
The activation functions used were the hyperbolic tangent5 in the hidden layer and
the identity function in the output layer. This allows the output nodes of the neural
networks to have values outside the interval between minus one and one. The weights
between the hidden layer and the output layer are initialised with random values, and
the weights between the input layer and the hidden layer are set to zero. This way all
the networks will provide an initial neutral evaluation. The learning algorithm used to
4 The values of IR sensors were converted to values varying between zero and one, with one repre-
senting maximum intensity, before being given as input to the networks.
5 More specically: tanh(x) = 1 e
 2x
1+e 2x
,  = 0:25.
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train the networks was back-propagation (see, for example, Hertz et al., 1991, for a
full description).
First attempts that used the networks to associate the received evaluation, i.e. the
reinforcement R, with the network inputs were a failure because the robot's learning
was very poor. Learning from delayed rewards with Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) proved
to be much more successful. The networks were used to learn utility functions that
model util(sn; a):
util(sn; a) = Rn+1 +  eval(sn+1) (4.1)
The discount factor () was set to 0:9. The function eval(sn+1) is the expected cumu-
lative discounted reinforcement starting from the state sn+1 reached by doing action
a in state sn. The value Rn+1 is the immediate reinforcement in iteration n+ 1. For
each iteration, the target value Tn(sn 1; a) will be given to the network whose action
was used in the previous iteration:
Tn(sn 1; a) = Rn +  maxfQn(sn; k) j k 2 actionsg (4.2)
After an action a has been evaluated its network state for situation sn 1 is saved.
The network state is dened by the current value of each one of its units, i.e. by
the input values, the hidden units values and the output values of the network. The
new estimative of the utility value (Qn(sn; k)) of each action k for the new state sn
is calculated. The maximum is obtained and used in the previous formula to update
the weights of the network associated with action a and the previous situation. Just
before learning by back-propagation takes place, the network's saved state for situation
sn 1 is restored. After the learning has taken place, the utility value for action a is
recalculated for state sn.
This way, apart from updating the network's prediction with the experience provided
by the last action taken, new predictions are calculated for the present situation. Those
will be used by the Action Selection Module, described below, to decide which action
to take next.
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Action Selection Module
The utility values provided by the associative memory are used for the stochastic
selection of the next action to take. The higher the value provided by the associated
net, the higher the probability of an action to be selected.
The function used to calculate the probability of each action is based on the Boltzmann-












The selection of a new action is not made every cycle; there is a certain inertia of the
current action that is directly correlated with its probability. The reason for this is to
have a more coherent behaviour. Otherwise, the robot would spend most of its time
trembling, because it would be selecting dierent actions at each step.
An action is only evaluated, and eventually a new one selected, every second step,
unless there is a signicant change in the emotional state, i.e., a change from one of
the following states to another:
 a positive emotion is dominant;
 a negative emotion is dominant;
 no emotion is dominant.
Even if an evaluation takes place, the probability of not choosing an action based on





This way the probability of an action being selected at a given step is extended to a
probability of its being consecutively selected in the following next ten steps.
6 The selection temperature is not related at all to the robot's temperature feeling.
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Both the mechanisms described attempt to give a more coherent behaviour to the
robot, yet care was taken not to do this at the expense of:
 Preventing the controller from taking notice of sudden changes in the emotional
state;
 Giving preference to the previous action independently of how well rated that
action is;
 Giving preference to the previous action even when the conditions have changed
signicantly, making it inappropriate to do so.
Summary of one control iteration
% Action a was taken previously in state sn 1
% State sn reached and reinforcement Rn received
PreviousState  network[a].state;
For k 2 Actions do
network[k].update(sn);
Qn(sn; k)  network[k].output;
end;




Qt(sn; a)  network[a].output;
if there is a change in emotional state or
random number 2 [0; 1) > 10pPn(sn; a) then
Select new action using the probabilities provided by Equation 4.3;
else
Select action a again;
end;
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4.2.4 Experimental procedure
All experiments consisted in having the robot learn for two thousand steps followed by
an evaluation of its performance, for another two thousand steps, with learning turned
o. In total, the robot takes one hundred and twenty thousand learning steps and sixty
one evaluation tests, one test after each learning period plus one extra test before any
learning takes place. Tests were made transparent to the experiment: when continuing
with its learning the robot's state is restored to the state just after its last learning
step and previous to the test.
The robot's evaluation was based on the reinforcement values it received in its testing
period. There were two evaluations, each based on a dierent reinforcement function.
One was the mean of the emotion-dependent reinforcement values and the other
was the mean of the sensation-dependent reinforcement values obtained during its
test period (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 give a detailed description of the two reinforcement
functions). The higher the value, the better is the evaluation. Good robot behaviour
(i.e. task-adapted behaviour) is usually associated with positive reinforcement and bad
behaviour with negative reinforcement. Nevertheless, positive reinforcement is usually
sporadic so mean reinforcements are not expected to take very high values. Qualitative
evaluations made by an external observer are also reported which show this association
of higher reinforcement values with better overall performance of the robot in its task.
For each experiment, this whole procedure was performed fty times so that an average
of the evaluations over several trials could be obtained. Each trial had a new robot with
all state values reset and placed in a randomly selected starting position. There are
twenty possible starting positions, shown in Figure 4.5, that were chosen to maximise
the dierences in starting conditions, but were otherwise arbitrary.
The experimental data shown in the result graphs are the means of the reinforcement
values obtained during the sixty-one testing phases in each of the fty runs. The error
bars show the 95% condence intervals7.
The robot was designed to learn continuously, as any autonomous robot should, and
therefore it might seem strange to have a distinction between a learning phase and
7 See Appendix B for detailed calculations.
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Figure 4.5: The robot's starting positions.
a performance phase. The idea behind having a testing phase with no learning is
that each step in a test represents a snapshot situation that the controller has to deal
with. If the robot was allowed to learn while under evaluation the resulting evaluation
would be the mean performance of consecutive controller learning stages and not the
instantaneous evaluation of the controller's current learning stage.
4.3 Experimental Results
The purpose of the experiments reported in this section was to test whether an emotion-
based evaluation of the context is adequate as a reinforcement signal for policy acqui-
sition by Q-learning8.
The results of an experiment that uses emotions as a source of reinforcement are given
and compared to those of a control experiment that uses a more traditional reinforce-
ment function based on raw sensations. The controllers used in each experiment are:
 Emotion-driven Controller | The basic learning controller using emotion-
dependent reinforcement.
8 This and other specic experimental hypotheses to be tested are highlighted in italics in the course
of this dissertation.
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 Sensation-driven Controller | The same basic learning controller but using
sensation-dependent reinforcement instead.
To give a clear idea of the learning algorithm's performance the experimental results
for two other controllers are also presented:
 Random Controller | Shows how the basic controller would perform if it did
not learn at all.
 Hand-crafted Controller | Shows how well a competent controller can per-
form in practice.
The results for each of the four dierent controllers will be given next, one by one.
4.3.1 Emotion-driven controller: Emotion-dependent reinforcement
The rst controller tested, the emotion-driven controller, uses an emotion-dependent
reinforcement (Rn = Ren) which is dened in Equation 4.6. The reinforcement magni-
tude was set to be the intensity of the current dominant emotion or zero if there was
no dominant emotion. If the dominant emotion was negative then its positive intensity
value would be negated.
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0 if 8e 2 E ; Ien < Iths




Experimental results are shown in Figure 4.6. The right graph shows the values for the
reinforcement function used in this experiment. The left graph shows the reinforcement
function based on direct sensations which was only calculated and shown for direct
comparison with the results of the controller presented next.
The initial analysis of the results suggested the existence of two quite dierentiated
populations, one that manages to learn the task and another that does not. For this
80












































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.6: Emotion-driven controller: Reinforcement values registered while the robot
was learning with emotion-dependent reinforcement (right graph). The sensation-
dependent reinforcement values (left graph) were calculated for comparison with other
experiments.
reason, in the presentation of the results, two populations were distinguished based
on the emotion-dependent reinforcement obtained at the last ten evaluation points.
The trials that had quite negative reinforcement for these testing points formed one
population which amounted to 38% of the total. The remaining trials were included
in the \successful" population.
It should be noticed that the robot's adaptation task must be achieved in a limited
amount of time. If the robot takes too long to adapt, the reinforcement will lose mean-
ing and the task will become impossible. The reason for this is that if the robot does
not learn to feed itself, it will get increasingly hungry. It will eventually arrive at a
state where it will keep getting low reinforcement on account of its hunger, indepen-
dently of what it does. This is why two very dierent populations can co-exist: only
one managed to learn the task before being dominated by hunger.
An alternative partition of populations was made based on the robot's nal behaviour.
This new partition is consistent with the previous in that good behaviour is usually
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associated with good reinforcement and bad behaviour with low reinforcement. A total
of 58% of the robots managed to converge to a suitable behaviour, namely circling
near a light or just wandering near a light in such a way that they receive plenty
of light and never get hungry. Two of these robots made use of the fast-forward
action, with dierent levels of success, to achieve a higher reinforcement through the
increase in temperature. However, the remaining 42% end up behaving in a totally
inappropriate way (e.g. bumping into walls or lights). If the robot ends circling in an
open space getting increasingly hungry because it was not near any light, its behaviour
was also considered inappropriate. This would happen frequently enough to hint that
the circling behaviour near a light was not a robust behaviour, but a sort of accidental
behaviour. In fact, if the robot were moved away from the light to a open space, it
would just remain with its circling behaviour as if nothing had happened. In time, after
hunger begins to be noticeable, it will learn to behave dierently. However, this change
of behaviour will be mostly due to new learning and not to any previous learning.
4.3.2 Sensation-driven controller: Sensation-dependent reinforcement
At this point, the use of emotions to provide reinforcement was re-evaluated. The
reason for the poor results obtained in the previous experiment appears to be that
the controller is not receiving the kind of reinforcement it needs. The controller needs
a good evaluation of the situation as it stands at the moment and not the mixed
evaluation of present and recent past situations that the emotions provide.
The reinforcement provided by emotions can thus be quite misleading. Even when a
good action selection is made, the robot may still receive negative reinforcement (and
vice versa). An example will make this problem clear. Imagine that the robot bumps
into a wall. It will feel pain and therefore become fearful. During the time that it
is close to the wall it will be fearful but even if it nally manages to go away, by
taking a move-backwards action for example, it will still receive negative reinforcement
because the fear emotion will persist for a while even when the wall is out of reach.
So, although the fear intensity will get smaller, it will still be providing inappropriate
negative reinforcement.
It looks as if the reason for the emotion-dependent evaluation failure is the recurrent
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and lateral inuences of emotions in the model. To test this hypothesis, a control
test was made that consisted in using a controller, the sensation-driven controller,
with a putatively more adequate reinforcement signal (Rn = Rsn). This new signal
was based on the previous one but without any temporal or lateral side eects. The
sensations were used instead of the feelings to calculate the value of each emotion
and the highest of these values was selected to be the reinforcement value. Figure
4.7 illustrates this modication and Equation 4.7 shows the resulting reinforcement
function. As in the previous experiment, the value of negative emotions was negated.
























Figure 4.7: Truncated emotion model used to obtain the sensation-dependent rein-
forcement.
The results obtained in this experiment are shown in Figure 4.8 in terms of the mean
sensation-dependent reinforcement and the mean emotion-dependent reinforcement.
The emotion-dependent reinforcement value graph is given for comparison with previ-
ous results while the sensation-dependent reinforcement is the reinforcement actually
received by the robot. They are a considerable improvement on the results obtained
with the previous experiment which used emotion-dependent reinforcement.
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Figure 4.8: Sensation-driven controller: Reinforcement values registered while the
robot was learning with sensation-dependent reinforcement (left graph). The emotion-
dependent reinforcement values (right graph) are shown for comparison with other
experiments.
Qualitatively, most of the nal behaviours of the robot were quite successful. Many
would converge to the circling behaviour near a light or wandering near a light. These
behaviours tend to be much more robust than the ones of the previous experiment, in
that in general there was not so much preference for just one action. Instead, the nal
behaviours would use a small subset of actions involving both forward and backward
turning movements much more often, which made them withstand better being placed
away from the light. Another group, about 40%, were wandering about using the
fast-forward action a lot. This kind of behaviour gets them very good reinforcement,
because this action raises the temperature, which is considered benecial. However,
because these robots do not always keep within reach of one light, their reinforcement
is unstable. The reinforcement may suer substantial drops, if the robot becomes
signicantly hungry because of being away from a light source for a while. Although
this kind of behaviour has better reinforcement in general, it was only learned once
in the emotion-dependent reinforcement experiment. There was another case in that
experiment where the same sort of behaviour was found, but the robot would bump
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into lights and walls all the time. This led to the suspicion that this kind of behaviour
under emotion-dependent reinforcement might degenerate into some sort of bumping
behaviour. To test this hypothesis, a small experiment was run that consisted in
starting the emotion-dependent reinforcement learning experiment with robots that
had converged to this wandering behaviour. Two out of the ten robots tested converged
to crashing behaviour. When the same experiment was done with sensation-dependent
reinforcement all robots maintained their wandering behaviour.
In the evaluation of the behaviours just described, the restrictive short range of the
robot's sensors and the fact that the inputs of the networks provide only a view of the
current situation should be taken into consideration. So one cannot expect from the
robot some kind of complex behaviour that depends on previous actions or sensings or
some sort of global map of the environment.
4.3.3 Random controller: No learning
The results obtained with both emotion-dependent and sensation-dependent reinforce-
ment do not seem very impressive in terms of nal reinforcement obtained. Even the
most successful robots do not seem to do much more than to maintain their average
reinforcement. However, it should be clear that even just maintaining reinforcement is
quite good. A controller selecting randomly between all available actions will actually
have decreasing reinforcement, because of increasing hunger, throughout the entire
experiment.
Figure 4.9 shows how the robot performs over time without any adaptation, just with
a random action selection controller. The left graph of Figure 4.9 shows the values of
the reinforcement function based on direct sensations and the right graph shows the
reinforcement function based on emotions. The immediate sensations provide a steady
and gradual decrease of reinforcement over time, that reects the decrease in energy
level, while emotions suer a much more signicant drop right at the start due to the
recurrent nature of the emotions model.
The experimental setup provides temporal constraints that add complexity to the prob-
lem. As observed previously in the emotion-driven controller section, the time the robot
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Figure 4.9: Random controller: Reinforcement values registered with a non-learning
robot.
takes to learn its task is crucial to its successful adaptation. If it takes too long, the
reinforcement will lose meaning before any adaptation can be achieved. It should be
noted that this does not make the problem unsolvable, but is an added diculty that
is successfully overcome by the sensation-driven controller.
4.3.4 Hand-crafted controller: Competent initial state
The fact that the reinforcement received by the robots can theoretically reach the
value of 1:0 is misleading in suggesting that a successful learning controller should,
in time, reach and maintain such a reinforcement. In practice this is not possible,
because maximum reinforcement can only be achieved during short periods of time
widely separated from each other.
In order to have a better understanding of the level of performance of the learning
controllers, a controller was designed to take full advantage of its environment and
achieve high reinforcement, by carefully selecting the initial weights of the networks.
There were two main reasons to hand-craft this controller:
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 to determine how much reinforcement a reasonably successful behaviour might
receive in practice;
 to check if a successful behaviour is stable under the learning algorithm.
To simplify the process of design of this controller, the set of actions from which the
controller makes its selection was slightly modied. In the new set of actions, the
backward movement is done in a straight line instead of with a twist to the right.
The designed behaviour consisted in having the robot, oriented towards a light, se-
lecting between fast forward movement and backward movement, depending on how
far from the light it was at each point. This would give rise to a kind of interleaved
attraction-and-repulsion-to-light behaviour. The robot's reinforcement would be opti-
mal because its temperature would reach its maximum value, the robot would eat a lot
and would not have any hunger, pain or restlessness. The networks' initial weights were
pre-dened in such a way that the result behaviour would be the one just described.
Some minor settings of the weights were made in order to give it a little of avoiding
behaviour, although this was not very successful: the avoidance behaviour the robot
exhibited due to this last procedure was quite ineective.
Three new experiments were made with the robot starting o with this human crafted
behaviour, each one of them corresponding to one of the experiments reported pre-
viously: no learning, emotion-dependent learning and sensation-dependent learning.
Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show the results.
Without learning, this behaviour would end up receiving a mean emotion-dependent
reinforcement of 0:54 and a mean sensation-dependent reinforcement of 0:30. When
the robot was allowed to learn either with sensation-dependent or emotion-dependent
reinforcement, it maintained the initial behaviour and kept similar reinforcement val-
ues, apart from a small increase in variance due to the exploration characteristic of
learning.
In the experiments reported previously (Figures 4.6 and 4.8), the robots learning from
emotion-dependent and sensation-dependent reinforcement would sometimes reach re-
inforcement levels similar to these. However, the algorithm does not always manage to
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Figure 4.10: Hand-crafted controller with no learning.








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.11: Hand-crafted controller learning with emotion-dependent reinforcement
(right graph). The sensation-dependent values (left graph) are for comparison.
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.12: Hand-crafted controller learning with sensation-dependent reinforce-
ment(left graph). The emotion-dependent values (right graph) are for comparison.
converge to such good solutions and in the case of some previous emotion-dependent
reinforcement trials it converged to receiving very bad reinforcements. It should be
noticed that the exact behaviour that was designed cannot be achieved with the set
of actions normally used. Nevertheless, slightly more sophisticated behaviours were
learned in these previous experiments that achieved the same kind of reinforcement for
long periods of time. These learned behaviours were less stable, because it is more
dicult for the controller to keep track of a light with an action set with non-invertible
actions. This might suggest that if the robot was equipped with the new set of ac-
tions then its performance in the learning task would improve. However, experiments
showed the opposite (Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 show the results of using the new set
of actions with the rst three controllers of this section). The reason for this worse
performance is probably the fact that it is easier to avoid further encounters with an
obstacle that appears in front of the vehicle if the backward movement is not done in
a straight line. The results with this new set of actions agree, however, with those
previously obtained in that emotions provide an inadequate reinforcement signal for
this task.
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Figure 4.13: Random controller employing the second set of actions.












































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.14: Emotion-driven controller employing the second set of actions. The rein-
forcement received by the controller is on the right graph and the sensation-dependent
values (left graph) are for comparison.
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.15: Sensation-driven controller employing the second set of actions. The
reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent
values (right graph) are for comparison.
4.4 Further Experiments for Analysis of Results
Given the results presented, one has to conclude that the emotions were quite un-
successful in providing a good reinforcement value, but still the question remains of
whether its failure was not due to some hidden experimental feature. A number of
possible causes were investigated experimentally. Alongside, two other issues were also
explored: emotion inuence on perception and learning during evaluations. The results
obtained are presented next.
4.4.1 Reinforcement dependent upon rate of change
It was noticed previously that one of the problems of emotions might be that they con-
tinue giving a negative (or positive) reinforcement even when the situation is improving
(or deteriorating). An attempt to minimise this problem was to have the reinforcement
value be the dierence between the previous and the current emotional value. In other
words, the new reinforcement value (R0) would reect the improvement or worsening
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.16: Emotion-driven controller with rate-of-change-dependent reinforcement.
The reinforcement received by the controller is on the right graph and the sensation-
dependent values (left graph) are for comparison.








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.17: Sensation-driven controller with rate-of-change-dependent reinforcement.
The reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-
dependent values (right graph) are for comparison.
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of the robot's situation.
R0
n
= Rn  Rn 1 (4.8)
The value of this kind of reinforcement is in general smaller; for this reason, the selection
temperature used by the Action Selection Module was decreased to a more suitable
value of 0.02.
Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show the results for using rate of change for both the emotion-
dependent and sensation-dependent reinforcements. Once again, the robot performs
much better with the sensation-dependent reinforcement. The use of rate of change
proved to be unsuccessful in improving learning with emotion-dependent reinforcement.
4.4.2 Emotion selection threshold in sensation-dependent reinforce-
ment
The main unexplored dierence between sensation-dependent and emotion-dependent
reinforcement is the selection threshold (Iths) used in process of selecting a dominant
emotion. If the intensity of the emotions is too small, then there will be no dominant
emotion selected and the emotion-dependent reinforcement will be zero. This thresh-
olding implies that the emotion-dependent reinforcement provides less information than
the sensation-dependent reinforcement, because small emotion intensity values are dis-
carded and replaced by zero. The selection threshold used in the previous experiments
was 0:2; an experiment was run applying this same threshold to sensation-dependent
reinforcement. No signicant dierences arise from the use of the threshold in the
sensation-dependent reinforcement | the result graphs (see Figure 4.18) are similar
to those previously obtained (see Figure 4.8). Apparently, the Q-learning mechanism
seems to solve the threshold-added diculty easily.
The results of this experiment show that the selection threshold by itself is not respon-
sible for the low performance of the emotion-driven controller.
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Figure 4.18: Sensation-driven controller with reinforcement subject to thresholding.
The reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-
dependent values (right graph) are for comparison.
4.4.3 Simple action selection
In the basic controller used in the experiments, extensions were made to the \vanilla"
Q-learning algorithm in terms of the action selection mechanism. This algorithm is
usually associated with an action selection at every step, but in order to have the
current action changed less often, some mechanisms were added that prevent an ac-
tion selection at every step by maintaining the current action. This could also have
inuenced the performance of the emotion-dependent reinforcement controllers.
A new set of experiments was made with traditional action selection at every step.
The main dierences found in the new results when compared with the previous ones
are the following:
 as expected, the robot's nal behaviour is much more hesitant, i.e. less able to
keep an action for a meaningful amount of time;
 new types of behaviours emerged (e.g. circling near a light using the fast-forward
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action in conjunction with other actions);
 the robot is more successful at avoiding collisions;
 in general, the area covered by the robot is smaller;
 energy maintenance improved substantially in the case of emotion-dependent
reinforcement, and declined slightly in the case of the sensation-dependent rein-
forcement;
 the results of the experiment with no learning develop an increase in reinforce-
ment, before the reinforcement begins to drop due to hunger (it was found that
with a random action selection the temperature sensation has a strong tendency
to rise, which makes the robot happier);
 the experiment with sensation-dependent reinforcement received similar rein-
forcements.
 the experiment with emotion-dependent reinforcement received much higher re-
inforcements, although it still performed considerably worse than the experiment
with sensation-dependent reinforcement.
The use of a simpler action selection mechanism has advantages and disadvantages.
Although the task becomes easier to learn (probably due to the reduction in bumping),
the nal behaviour is not very impressive.
These results might suggest that the problems of the \vanilla" controller could be easily
overcome if the action selection temperature were lowered, yet this is not the case. The
experiment was repeated with a temperature of 0.07 instead of the usual 0.1 and the
results in terms of reinforcements were worse.
4.4.4 Dierent networks
Contrary to what might be suggested by the poor results, the networks used are actually
somewhat over-complex for the task in hand, because using only one neuron in the
hidden layer showed similar results (see Figure 4.19).
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.19: Sensation-driven controller using networks with only one hidden unit. The
reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent
values (right graph) are for comparison.








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.20: Sensation-driven controller using networks with initial random values in
all weights. The reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the
emotion-dependent values (right graph) are for comparison.
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.21: Sensation-driven controller with faithful perception. The reinforcement
received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent values (right
graph) are for comparison.
In opposition to traditional experiments with learning neural-networks, the weights
between the input layer and the hidden layer were initially set to zero instead of
randomised. Not using random initialisations for all the network weights might seem
strange and prone to failure, but results of experiments that use random initialisations
of all weights show that this has not negatively inuenced the learning performance
(compare Figures 4.20 and 4.8).
4.4.5 Non-emotional perception
The value of the feelings given as input to the neural networks are not the robot's
raw sensations, but are inuenced by the emotions through the hormone system: the
robot has a false image of its body sensations. Does this inuence the learning task?
A brief analysis of the networks' weights showed that the feelings had an active role in
inuencing the controllers' preferences in the selection of actions.
Figure 4.21 shows the results for a learning experiment where the controller neural
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networks (see Figure 4.4) input sensations (Sf ) instead of feelings (If ). There were no
signicant changes in the reinforcement rewards.
Even if the robot learns with the networks' feelings inputs totally removed and only
the sensor readings' inputs are kept (i.e. the feelings' input values are replaced by a
constant number) the results are still similar to those previously reported: performance
for both sensation-dependent and emotion-dependent reinforcement does not suer any
signicant change.
4.4.6 Learning during tests
The robot's controller is designed to learn continuously, yet learning is turned o
during the evaluation period9. The reason for this is simply to have an instantaneous
evaluation of the same controller in two thousand dierent scenarios provided by the
steps of the evaluation period. The problem is that these are not arbitrarily chosen
random scenarios, but are the scenarios consecutively reached by the robot due to its
action selections. Therefore, a test's individual evaluations are not always a fair sample
of the evaluations the robot can get. The behaviour of the robot in the earlier steps of
the evaluation period will bias its evaluation in later steps. Extreme behaviours may
cause long runs of good or bad reinforcement. For instance, if the controller is not
aware of certain features of the environment it might repeatedly perform a misplaced
action that will keep it in this situation and the evaluation will be biased. For example,
it might be running into a wall for the whole of a test. If the space localisation of each
individual evaluation were made independent, the nal evaluation would be improved
by evaluations done in dierent places in space (e.g. near a light).
The main problem with any testing approach for this experiment is that each evaluation
can not be dissociated from the robot's previous experiences and it is intimately related
with the previous step situation both in terms of the robot's spatial location and
internal state. There are few alternatives for how the test may be done, because the
robot's location and internal state cannot be arbitrarily chosen. These are always the
result of the robot's history.
9 For details on the experimental procedure consult Section 4.2.4.
98








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.22: Sensation-driven controller learning during tests. The reinforcement re-
ceived by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent values (right
graph) are for comparison.
One possible alternative would be to have several smaller learning test periods instead
of one, at each testing phase. After each one of these test periods the robot state
would be restored to the state prior to the test phase. Executing several tests starting
from the same point would result in dierent evaluations due to the randomness of
the controller. However, following this evaluation method would result in a signicant
increase in the complexity of the evaluation process that would probably not be justied
by the evaluation improvements obtained.
A more radical alternative would be to allow learning during the test period. The
previously described test problems would not happen if the robot were allowed to
learn, because the robot would learn to go away from the obstacles. This alternative
is also not devoid of faults. If the two thousand step test is kept, then it will not
be same controller under test during the period, but a controller that is constantly
changing. Furthermore, it will be impossible to dierentiate what the controller has
actually learned from what it learns and unlearns as situations change. However, this
is probably a more adequate evaluation procedure, because the robot is supposed to
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learn continuously anyway; and possibly the evaluation procedure in use is actually
providing a worse evaluation than the one deserved by the robot's performance.
To test whether performance would be better, an experiment was run that employed
learning while evaluating the robot's performance. Results are shown in Figure 4.22.
The robot seems to perform a bit better, although not signicantly better, when learn-
ing all the time. It is also interesting to notice that the variance of the sensation-
dependent reinforcements is much smaller, which can be easily explained by the eval-
uations not favouring extremes as much as before.
4.5 Summary
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the results obtained in the experiments carried out
with the four dierent controllers both in terms of emotion-dependent and sensation-
dependent reinforcement value. Results show that emotions were unsuccessful in pro-
viding a competitive reinforcement function when compared with a more traditional
reinforcement function based on sensations. Although not presented here, results con-
sistent with this nding were obtained even with slightly dierent emotion models (an
example is given in Appendix C.5). The main dierence between the reinforcement
functions, and the only identied cause for the emotions' failure, was the existence of
recurrent and lateral inuences in the emotions model.
In Section 4.4, several other causes were tested, but no other suitable explanations were
Emotion-dependent Sensation-dependent
Controllers Section Figure reinforcement reinforcement
Emotion-driven group 1 x4.3.1 4.6  0:04  0:10 0:04  0:06
group 2 x4.3.1 4.6  0:91  0:07  0:78 0:12
Sensation-driven x4.3.2 4.8 0:07  0:09 0:07  0:05
Random x4.3.3 4.9  0:80  0:07  0:32 0:06
Hand-crafted no learning x4.3.4 4.10 0:54  0:00 0:30  0:00
with learning x4.3.4 4.11 & 4.12 0:53  0:01 0:29  0:00
Table 4.2: Comparison of the emotion-driven, the sensation-driven, the random and
the hand-crafted controllers. The means of the emotion-dependent and sensation-
dependent reinforcement values and their 95% condence interval obtained in the last
ten testing points of the trials are presented.
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found. In each case, no signicant change in results was observed when the possible
cause was eliminated or controlled for. In particular:
 The use of rate-of-change-dependent reinforcement instead of absolute value re-
inforcement does not aect results | emotion-dependent reinforcement still per-
forms worse than sensation-dependent reinforcement.
 The emotion selection threshold is not responsible for the dierences in perfor-
mance between the emotion-dependent and the sensation-dependent reinforce-
ment. The same threshold can be applied to the sensation-dependent reinforce-
ment with no detrimental eect.
 The use of traditional action selection at every step produces equivalent results.
The main dierences found in those results when compared with the ones shown
here are that it is easier for the agent to reach higher reinforcement values, but
the nal behaviour observed by external visual inspection is less impressive. As
expected, the robot's nal behaviour is much more hesitant and in general, the
area covered by the robot is smaller. However, the robot seems more successful
at avoiding collisions which probably makes the learning task easier.
 Networks with dierent numbers of hidden units and networks with all their
weights initialised with random values were also tested and found to make no
signicant dierence.
Another issue relevant to the model used is whether using feelings or sensations for
the robot's perception makes a dierence in terms of its nal performance. In general,
the values given as input to the neural networks are not the robot's raw sensations,
but feelings that are inuenced by the emotions through the hormone system. In the
particular task tested, the inuence of emotions on perception is unnoticeable in terms
of nal behaviour.
As a side issue, a dierent evaluation mechanism was also attempted. The question
of whether the robot should be allowed to learn while being evaluated was raised.
Arguments for and against such procedure were presented. In practice, results show
that there is not much dierence in terms of nal evaluation whether the robot is
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learning or not. This result will be used in next chapter to reduce the experiments'
computational eort by evaluating the robot while it is learning its task.
4.6 Exploring Alternative Uses of Emotions
The experiments reported previously have repeatedly shown that using emotions as
reinforcement in the present controller is detrimental. However, other uses of emotions
might be more fruitful. The fact that emotions performed poorly as reinforcement
value should not discourage their use in articial systems: the importance of emotions
in human reasoning is widely acknowledged and there are many other possible roles
for them that should be considered.
In this section two alternative uses are suggested and tested. In both cases, emotions
modulate the learning process instead of directly attributing value to the situations
the robot experiences10.
4.6.1 Emotions modulating learning rate
Human learning abilities are strongly dependent on the person's emotional state. For
instance, strong emotions often give rise to vivid memories, while lack of emotion is
often associated with disinterest and diculties in learning (Schwartz and Reisberg,
1991). Along this line, experiments were made using emotions to modulate the learning
rate. In these experiments, the robot would have a higher learning rate | directly
proportional to the intensity of the current dominant emotion | if under a dominant
emotion, be this positive or negative, than if there were no dominant emotion.
The use of reinforcement value to modulate learning rate is not new in the domain
of robotic research, experiments using a similar modulation have been reported that
showed an increase of learning performance in terms of robustness (Verschure et al.,
1995).
This experiment explores the use of emotions as a sort of learning gain. This learning
gain (G) is used to inuence the learning rate () in the following way:
10 Sensation-dependent reinforcement will be used in these experiments.
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 = 2G(Emotion) default (4.9)
To obtain the normal results with xed learning rate, we should have a constant learn-
ing gain (G) of 0:5.
First of all and before starting the actual experiments, dierent values of learning rates
were tried out. Figure 4.23 shows the results, including the use of the learning rate
default value of 0:1 used by all previous experiments (same as in Figure 4.8).
Next some experiments were done using a variable learning rate dependent on the
robot's emotional state. In these experiments (results in Figures 4.24 and 4.25) the
learning gain was set to the intensity of the present emotion which varies between the




Ie if there is is a dominant emotion e
0 otherwise
(4.10)
The learning rate itself was calculated through Equation 4.9 and took values between
0:04 and 0:2 or was zero. This means that if a dominant emotion is not present the
robot will not learn at all. It is quite surprising how the robot still manages to maintain
its high rate of success in the learning task (although the learning is a bit slower) if one
takes into consideration that neutral states are not being learned at all by the neural
networks. If the weights of all network layers are initialised with random values (see
Figure 4.25), some (64%) of the robots present severe diculties in learning (although
they do manage to learn in the end). This is the result of the initial preferences of the
system not being neutral. If these initial preferences happen to favour the wrong kind
of actions, the robot will rst have to unlearn these. Since the robot is not learning all
the time, this can result in a high performance cost.
It is possible to conclude that the robot does not need to waste computing time on
learning if there is no emotion present. This will not compromise its performance,
unless the robot's initial preferences are very misleading. Even in this case, the drop
in performance is only temporary.
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Figure 4.23: Dierent learning rates.
104








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.24: Learning rate dependent on current emotion. The reinforcement received
by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent values (right graph)
are for comparison.












































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.25: Learning rate dependent on current emotion. Random initial weights. The
reinforcement received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent
values (right graph) are for comparison.
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4.6.2 Variable emotion-dependent selection temperature
Emotions were also used to modulate the action selection temperature with success.
In these experiments, the xed exploration versus exploitation ratio was upgraded to
a more sophisticated selection algorithm that takes into consideration the deadlock
situations in which the robot gets trapped. In these situations, there is an option that
is by far better ranked than the others and therefore always gets selected although its
practical utility turns out to be very low and it is not able to change the situation at all.
The solution used to circumvent this problem was increasing the selection temperature
when the robot was in a negative emotional state and thus triggering more exploration
than usual.
To begin with, some experiments were run to discover how well the robot would perform
with dierent xed temperatures. See Figure 4.26 for results. Previous experiments
used an action selection temperature of 0:1. Consult Figure 4.8 for comparison.
Next, emotions were used to modulate the exploration versus exploitation ratio, by
directly inuencing the temperature parameter of the action selection module. Two
emotion-dependent functions (F1 and F2) were designed to yield values in the range
0:05 and 0:25. This is a suitable selection temperature range because it includes values
for which the learning controller performs well, but is slightly extended towards the










Ie=4:0 if there is is a negative dominant emotion e
0:05 otherwise
(4.12)
The results for using the function F1 and F2 to determine selection temperature (T)
are presented in Figures 4.27 and 4.28, respectively.
Apparently, the results for function F2 (see Figure 4.28) are an improvement over the
results previously achieved. The use of this function allows the robot to explore new
solutions when it is in a bad situation. The function F1, increases the temperature
independently of whether the robot's emotional state is positive or negative. Disrupting
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Figure 4.26: Dierent action selection temperatures.
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Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.27: Selection temperature inuenced by emotions: F1. The reinforcement
received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent values (right
graph) are for comparison.








































































Sensation-dep. reinforcement value Emotion-dep. reinforcement value
Figure 4.28: Selection temperature inuenced by emotions: F2. The reinforcement
received by the controller is on the left graph and the emotion-dependent values (right
graph) are for comparison.
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behaviour that is being successful does not seem to be such a good idea, although no
signicant changes can be found in using F1 (see Figure 4.27) when compared with
the standard experiment (Figure 4.8). Table 4.3 summarises the results.
Emotion-dependent Sensation-dependent
Sensation-driven controllers Figure reinforcement reinforcement
Selection temperature = 0.1 4.8 0:07 0:09 0:07  0:05
Selection temperature = F1 4.27 0:05 0:09 0:08  0:05
Selection temperature = F2 4.28 0:17 0:09 0:13  0:04
Table 4.3: Comparison of experiments with dierent selection temperature. The table
presents the means of reinforcement values and 95% condence interval in the last ten
testing points of each experiment.
4.7 Conclusions
Unfortunately, the experiments reported in this chapter failed to show that emotions
can be used for reinforcement in robot learning. More importantly, the results do
show that the role of emotions is more intricate than often assumed and that a simple
approach to the use of emotions as context judgement values suitable for direct use as
reinforcement is not very successful when a more than usually realistic emotion model
is used. This suggests that more attention should be given to the role attributed to
emotions in adaptation.
The emotions do not really provide a good evaluation of what is going on at any
one moment, but are a sort of mixed evaluation the robot has acquired from its past
experiences. This may be good for modulating its behaviour, but should not be taken
at face value when trying to predict the outcome of each one of its primitive actions.
In Section 4.6 preliminary results were presented that suggest that emotions can be
successfully used in modulating the learning rate and the exploration versus exploita-
tion ratio. Although these alternative approaches to the use of emotions appeared
to be successful in improving performance, no solid conclusions could be drawn with
the data obtained, the problem being that the simpler sensation-dependent controllers
are already quite good at their task, making it dicult to demonstrate clearly any
signicant improvement provided by more sophisticated controllers. For a thorough
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examination of these mechanisms the complexity of the robot's task must be increased,





The task described in the previous chapter was extended to provide a more challeng-
ing robot-environment interaction. This prompted an upgrade of the basic learning
controller. The new controller is based on the action-based one described in Section
4.2.3, but the actions were replaced by behaviours that add extra competence to the
controller. As is demonstrated in this chapter, the higher level of abstraction of this
controller makes it more suitable for the use of emotions.
Once more, emotions were used to inuence control, but this time with more success.
Three possible forms of emotional inuence were examined:
Control triggering | One of the most dicult problems faced when employing re-
inforcement learning techniques in robotics applications is to determine when a
discrete state transition occurs. This transition can be triggered by some internal
or external event and must be identied by the designer, because it determines
when the controller needs to re-evaluate its previous decision and make a new
one. An incorrect state transition design can be fatal to the success of the learn-
ing agent. In fact, this was the reason why it was found necessary to tackle this
problem rst.
Experiments were done to test whether emotions can successfully fulll the role




 there was a change of dominant emotion;
 the current dominant emotion intensity value was statistically dierent from
the values recorded since a state transition was last made.
Reinforcement | In the initial experiments with behaviour-based control, emotion-
dependent reinforcement was set aside and sensation-dependent reinforcement
used instead1. The poor results obtained with the earlier task suggested that
emotion-dependent reinforcement might compromise the experiments' results.
Once the event-detection mechanism was settled, emotions were tested again as
source of reinforcement.
Perception | Another mechanism re-evaluated was the inuence of emotions on
the robot's perception. When the robot learns associations between states and
rewards through its neural networks, it is using feelings to represent state by
using the feelings as network inputs. In the emotion model developed, feelings
are inuenced by emotions through the hormone system. So the represented
robot state is emotion-dependent: the state which the robot learns to associate
with rewards is actually being biased by emotions. It is being changed to be
more compatible with the active emotions, thus making the relevant features of
the environment more salient because those are usually the ones associated with
emotional value. The question is, what is the impact of this on the robot's nal
performance.
To start with, the next section provides a detailed description of the testbed used for the
experiments. A description is given of the extended task, emotion system and learning
controller, stressing the dierences from the previous experimental setup. In addition,
this chapter's experiments beneted from a more elaborate experimental procedure
that is also described within that section. Three sections follow, each reporting on
experiments that explore one of the roles of emotion mentioned above. This is followed
by a global analysis of the nal emotional controller in Section 5.6, and some conclusions
on the overall accomplishments of emotions in the last section of the chapter. Some of
the specic implementation details of the experiments are relegated to Appendix D.
1 Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 provide a full description of each of these reinforcement functions.
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5.2 Experimental Setup
5.2.1 Robot, environment and task
As before, the robot's task consists in collecting energy from food sources scattered
throughout the environment, but the survival problem was made more dicult by
making energy harder to obtain. This was accomplished by two dierent means:
 The robot has to perform elaborate behaviour to receive energy. To gain energy
from a food source, the robot has to bump into it. This will make energy available
for a short period of time. At the same time an odour will be released that can
be sensed by the robot. It is important that the agent is able to discriminate
this state through its sensors, because the agent can only get energy during this
period. This energy is obtained by receiving high values of light in its rear light
sensors, which means that the robot must quickly turn its back to the food source
as soon as it senses that energy is available. To receive further energy the robot
has to restart the whole process by hitting the light again so that a new time
window of released energy is started.
 The robot can only extract a limited amount of energy from each food source. A
food source can only release energy a few times before it is exhausted. In time,
the food source will recover its ability to provide energy again, but meanwhile
the robot is forced to look for other sources of energy in order to survive. The
robot cannot be successful by relying on a single food source for energy, i.e. the
time it takes for new energy to be available in a single food source is longer than
the time it takes for the robot to use it.
When a food source has no energy, the light associated with it is turned o. This
was done in order to avoid the robot staying around the same food source, even when
that source has no more energy left. When the light is turned o, the food source
becomes an obstacle like any other and the robot can look for a new food source with
its light sensors again. A light is on when it has energy available to release and during
the periods it is releasing energy. This last point is important, because otherwise the
robot would not be able to extract the energy through its light sensors. Although it was
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felt necessary to use the mechanism of turning the lights o in the experiments to make
the task a bit easier for the robot, experiments a posteriori with emotion-dependent
event detection proved this mechanism superuous. The robot would exhibit a slightly
worse performance, but still managed to successfully learn the task.
The task can be translated into multiple goals: moving around the environment in order
to nd dierent food sources and, if a food source is found, extracting energy from it.
Furthermore, the robot should not keep still in the same place for long durations of
time or collide with obstacles.
All the experiments were carried out with the same Khepera simulated robot, but
placed in the environment shown in Figure 5.2. There are a few exceptions in which
the environment pictured in Figure 5.1 is used instead. This is a more demanding
environment that is used to distinguish between controllers that exhibit similar per-
formances in the normal environment. The new environments are more corridor-like
than the previous, allowing the robot to travel from one light to another by wall fol-
lowing. The length of the corridors an agent must travel to go from one light to
another measures the diculty of the environment, because longer corridors demand
more persistence from the robot.
Figure 5.1: The robot in its more demanding environment.
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Figure 5.2: The simulated robot and its normal environment.
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5.2.2 Emotion system
A new instantiation of the emotions model was made. On account of the added com-
plexity of the task, three new sensations were added to the emotion system: Smell,
Warmth and Proximity.
F = f Hunger, Pain, Restlessness, Temperature, Eating, Smell, Warmth,
Proximity g (5.1)
In addition, slight changes were introduced in the calculation of the previously existing
sensations. For details consult Appendix D.1. The sensations used were:
 Hunger: The robot's energy decit;
 Pain: High if the robot is bumping into obstacles;
 Restlessness: Increases if the robot does not move and it is reset whenever a
behaviour is selected;
 Temperature: Rises with high motor usage and returns to zero with low motor
usage;
 Eating: High when the robot is acquiring energy;
 Smell: Active when there is energy available;
 Warmth: Directly dependent on the intensity of light perceived by the robot's
light sensors;
 Proximity: Reects the proximity of the nearest obstacle perceived by the
distance sensors.
In order to have the robot's emotional state compatible with its new task, the emotions'
dependencies on feelings are such that:
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 The robot is happy if there is nothing wrong with the present situation. It will
be particularly happy if it has been using its motors a lot or is in the process
of getting new energy at the moment. Even just the smell of food can make it
happy.
 If the robot has very low energy and it is not acquiring energy, then its state will
be sad. It will be more sad if it cannot sense any light.
 If the robot bumps into obstacles then the pain will make it fearful. It will be
less fearful if it is hungry or restless.
 If the robot stays in the same place too long it will start to get restless. This will
make it angry. The anger will persist for as long as the robot does not move
away or change its current action. A hungry robot will tend to be more angry.
Table 5.1 presents the actual values for each of the emotion dependencies on feelings.
Again nding the adequate dependencies values was a simple process of trial and
error, requiring few adjustments. One example was the need to adjust the fear and
happiness dependencies so that when the agent bumps into an obstacle around a light
to obtain food, the happiness generated is larger than the fear generated by the
pain. No emotion dependencies were created for the feeling of Proximity; this feeling
is used only to determine state within the learning controller.
Hunger Pain Restlessness Temperature Eating Smelling Warmth Bias
Happiness  0:2  0:3  0:2 0:2 0:4 0:3 0:0 0:1
Sadness 0:7 0:0 0:1  0:2  0:4 0:0  0:2  0:1
Fear  0:2 0:7  0:2 0:1  0:2  0:2 0:0 0:0
Anger 0:2 0:1 0:7  0:2  0:2 0:0 0:0 0:0
Table 5.1: The emotions' dependencies on feelings.
5.2.3 Basic controller
The main improvement that was introduced with the new learning controller | Figure
5.3 | was the replacement of the primitive actions by behaviours. Taking into account
the current robot feelings, and the previously received evaluations, this controller tries
to maximise the evaluation received by selecting between one of the three possible
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behaviours. These three primitive behaviours were hand-designed and consist of the
following:
Avoid obstacles | Turn away from the nearest obstacle and move away from it. If
the sensors cannot detect any obstacle nearby, then remain still.
Seek Light | Go in the direction of the nearest light. If no light can be seen, remain
still.
Wall Following | If there is no wall in sight, move forwards at full speed. Once
a wall is found, follow it. This behaviour by itself is not very reliable in that
the robot can crash, i.e. become immobilized against a wall. The avoid-obstacles
behaviour can easily help in these situations.
It was chosen to have the primitive behaviours hand-designed and learn only the harder
task of behaviour coordination in the hope that emotions might be helpful in solving









of each Behaviour (Q)
Selected Behaviour (b)
Figure 5.3: Basic controller for behaviour-based control.
Apart from being behaviour-based, this controller is very similar to the previous, but
has a few other dierences that are highlighted next in the context of each of its
modules: the Associative Memory Module and the Behaviour Selection Module.
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Associative Memory Module
This plastic module uses three neural networks to associate the robot feelings with the
current expected value of each of the three robot behaviours. These are three layer
feed-forward neural networks, with the following characteristics:
 9 input units, one for each feeling and a bias2;
 10 hidden units;
 1 output unit that represents the expected outcome of the associated behaviour.
The neural networks initially used were not powerful enough to learn the solution for
the new problem. The number of hidden units had to be increased. Tests showed
that 10 hidden units allowed enough memory capacity without increasing too much
the computation time for each learning iteration3. More important than avoiding too
expensive computation times for the experiments is to avoid slow convergence of the
learning algorithm which was proved previously, in Section 4.3, to have a detrimental
eect on the success of the learning task. Furthermore, it was found that the linear
function on the output activation function had to be replaced by the hyperbolic tangent,
because the rst performed very poorly. This way, both the hidden and output units
have the same activation function. Replacing the output activation function by a
hyperbolic tangent stipulated that the output values learned by the neural networks
be bounded between -1 and 1. To circumvent that problem, the utility values given to
the networks as target values were truncated to t within that interval. This imposed
some compression of the utility values, but no obvious problem was found from this in
the experiments.
Behaviour Selection Module
Taking into account the value attributed to each behaviour by the previous module,
this module makes a straightforward stochastic selection of the behaviour to execute
2 The sensor readings are not necessary anymore because they are implicit in the new feelings.
3 Tests following the procedure used to mimic the hand-crafted behaviour (described in Section 5.6.3)
were made using 5, 6, 8, 10, 15 and 25 units. Best results were obtained for 10 and 15 units with
very small dierences for 8 or more units.
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next based on the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution. For a selection temperature4 T, the












The previous evaluation procedure5 had to be modied to cope with the new task.
The learning period was extended to provide more time for knowledge acquisition to
take place. This resulted in a huge increase in the processing time of the experiences
that was redeemed in part by discarding the separate testing phases and evaluating
the robot while it learned. The distinction made between a learning phase and a
performance testing phase was thus eradicated. New evaluation measures were also
introduced that allow a more thorough interpretation of the results.
Each experiment consisted in having thirty dierent robot trials of three million learn-
ing steps. In reality this duration could be made shorter, because the learning algo-
rithm converges long before the end of these trials. The reason for the long runs was
to make sure that the learning algorithm was stable and that the robot's performance
would not suddenly drop, for instance. This is particularly important in the context
of continuously learning agents. Nevertheless some of the preliminary experiments of
Section 5.3 were made with shorter trials of only twelve hundred thousand steps.
In each trial, a new fully recharged robot with all state values reset was placed at a
randomly selected starting position6. For evaluation purposes, the trial period was
divided into sixty smaller periods of fty thousand steps (or thirty periods of forty
thousand steps, in the case of the shorter trials). For each of these periods the following
statistics were taken:
4 The selection temperature should not be confused with the temperature feeling.
5 Details in Section 4.2.4.
6 Any physical position, with a random orientation, in the environment that does not overlap any
obstacle.
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Emotion | mean of the reinforcement value provided by emotions, a measure of
how positive the robot's emotional state is, which is equivalent to the emotion-
dependent reinforcement measure taken in previous experiments;
Reinforcement | mean of the reinforcement obtained during all the steps which is
equivalent to the previous measure if emotion-dependent reinforcement is used or
to the sensation-dependent reinforcement measure taken in previous experiments
if sensation-dependent reinforcement is used in the experiment;
Event reinforcement | mean of the reinforcement obtained only for the steps at
which the learning controller was triggered;
Energy | mean energy level of the robot;
Distance | mean value of the Euclidean distance d, taken at one hundred steps
intervals, between the opposing points of the rectangular extent that contains all





(xmax   xmin)2 + (ymax   ymin)2
a measure of how much distance was covered by the robot7;
Collisions | percentage of steps where a collision was detected;
Events | percentage of steps where the adaptive controller was triggered.
It should be noticed that while the reinforcement statistic is a good measure of overall
performance, the event reinforcement reects the actual reinforcement received by the
adaptive controller.
In the graphs of the results, an average of the dierent statistics over the several trials
is presented with error bars representing the 95% condence interval8.
7 An iterative step-by-step distance measure would oer little information, because it would equally
result in high values for situations where the robot is energetically moving in a very small region
and situations where the robot quickly covers its entire environment. The hundred step interval
was carefully chosen to capture the dierence implicit in the previous situations and still be small
enough to measure most of the robot's motion.
8 The same as previously, consult Appendix B for details.
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Also reported within this chapter are a few follow-up experiments that consisted of
taking one of the nal robots achieved by a normal experiment trial and testing it for
a further hundred thousand steps. These experiments were done to examine certain
behavioural details of the trained robots which are described during the presentation
of results.
In Appendix D.2, a summary of the dierent settings used in individual experiments
is presented together with the values of the various system parameters.
5.3 Experiments: Control Triggering
5.3.1 Introduction
In a robotic environment, a distinct state can be found at virtually every step. The
perception of the world will always be at least slightly dierent from step to step due
to noise. Nevertheless, making a re-evaluation of a behaviour-based system every step
by performing an evaluation of the previous behaviour and selecting a new behaviour
is not wise. It is both a computational waste and a hindrance to successfully learning
the advantages of each of the behaviours. If the behaviour is evaluated and eventually
replaced every step, then it will not have time to develop to its full potential and
will be reduced to small individual actions that will look almost random. This will
make it dicult for the learning system to make a correct evaluation of the possible
achievements of the behaviours. On the other hand, if the behaviours are left running
for too long, events may occur that will make them inappropriate for the new situation.
The ideal would be to know when a signicant change has occurred in the environment
that makes a re-evaluation necessary.
Using emotions to trigger state transition seems reasonable, because emotions can
provide a global summarised vision of the environment. Any important change in the
environment is liable to be captured by changes in the emotional state.
Emotions are frequently pointed to as a source of interruption of behaviour (Sloman
and Croucher, 1981; Simon, 1967) in the domain of more traditional symbolic Articial
Intelligence architectures. In general, it is considered that behaviour should be inter-
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rupted and eventually replaced whenever a strong emotion is felt. My added claim is
that if the emotional intensity falls, then behaviour should also be changed, because
the crisis that gave rise to the emotion has probably been solved. So state transition
is triggered not only by sudden rises of emotional intensity but also by abrupt drops.
Implicit in this approach is the fact that the emotion model being used is continuous
and so does not provide a clear cut onset or termination of emotions, requiring that


















Figure 5.4: Emotions triggering state transition.
In order to test whether emotions can successfully be used to trigger state transitions
(see Figure 5.4), two controllers were designed:
Event-triggered | Based on the ideas expounded above, a controller was designed
that has state transitions triggered by the detection of signicant changes in the
emotional state. From the robot's point of the view, an event occurs whenever
there is a signicant change in emotional state, as this should reect a relevant
event in the robot-environment interaction.
Interval-triggered | A simple alternative to emotion-dependent event detection
used for comparison. This controller triggers the adaptive controller at regular
intervals. In particular, the inadequacy of establishing a state transition at every
step is shown empirically.
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The development and evaluation of these two controllers is the topic of the following two
subsections. Next, a comparison between the two is made also taking into consideration
the performance of both a competent and a random controller. Finally, experiments
with a further increase in task diculty are reported that make clear the advantages
of emotion-triggered state transition.
5.3.2 Event-triggered controller
To test the hypothesis above, a controller with emotion-dependent event detection was
designed. An event is detected whenever:
 there is a change of dominant emotion, including changes between emotional
states and neutral emotional states (i.e. states with no dominant emotion);
 the current dominant emotion value is statistically dierent from the values
recorded since a state transition was last made, i.e. if the dierence between
the new value and the mean of the previous values exceeds both a small toler-
ance threshold and  times the standard deviation of those previous values, where
 is a constant (details below);
 A maximum limit of 10 000 steps is reached.
If an event occurs, then the adaptive controller is triggered: the previous behaviour is
evaluated and a new behaviour is selected according to the new situation. Otherwise,
the current behaviour is left running.
The calculation of the mean and the standard deviation of the emotion intensity takes
into account all the steps between events. When a new event is detected, the rest-
lessness feeling is reset and the emotional state is re-evaluated. This is the rst state
taken in the calculation of the two statistical variables. In the following steps, these
variables are iteratively updated until an event is detected. It should be noticed that
a new state can only be discriminated statistically after at least two states have been
recorded.
A minimum dierence for value discrimination was required, a tolerance threshold of
0:02, to disregard insignicant variations in intensity value. Otherwise, in situations
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Figure 5.5: Event-triggered controller with dierent values of  and no limit on the
maximum number of steps.
of very low standard deviation, imperceptible variations would be caught by the event
detection mechanism.
The factor  is the key parameter of the event detection mechanism. Although an
appropriate value was easily found, it was considered important to do a more extensive
investigation of the possible values it could take, so several short experiments were done
to test dierent values. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show two iterations of this process.
For values of  below or equal to 2, the maximum limit of steps is actually not required.
It was only for higher values that problems were found. The higher the value the larger
the number of robots that would stop detecting events altogether. The problem is that
if  is set too high then it becomes impossible for the event detection mechanism to
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ξ = 2 (No steps limit)
ξ = 2
ξ = 2.5
Figure 5.6: Event-triggered controller with dierent values of .
discriminate between dierent intensities of the same emotion. In experimental trials
where detection of events had ceased, robots were often found doing a wall-following
trajectory in an advanced state of starvation. In this case, no new emotion was liable
to pop up and the intensities of sadness felt by the robot were not dierent enough to
trigger an event, even if the robot happened to pass by a light. The cycle could only
be broken by forcing an event after a maximum step limit. This limit was chosen high
enough to be the least intrusive possible, while still solving this problem. For instance,
with  set to 2, the robot would rarely reach intervals between events larger than a
thousand steps. In fact, results in Figure 5.6 show that using the maximum step limit
or not with this value of  does not make any signicant dierence.
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It should be clear at this point that triggering events by detection of a signicant change
in the intensity of the dominant emotion is essential for the system. Experiments
showed that, even with a smaller maximum limit of 1000 steps, the system does not
work properly if the only dierence in emotional state taken into consideration is the
change from one dominant emotion to another.
Figure 5.5 shows the results for dierent values of  without the use of a maximum step
limit. The dierent performances are generally good: the robots manage to maintain a
high energy value and a reduced number of collisions. The value of  = 2 was preferred
over the other tested values because it has good performance with many fewer events.
The fact that 2 was the highest value suggested that still higher values should be
tested, which required the introduction of the maximum step limit. Figure 5.6 shows
the results obtained compared with the best obtained previously. The new results
did not show either an improvement in performance or a substantial reduction in the
number of events.
The conclusion reached was that either 2 or 2:5 was an adequate value for  and
therefore the experiments in the next sections use the value 2 by default.
As Figure 5.7 shows, the discrepancy between the mean reinforcement and the event
reinforcement a robot actually receives is quite signicant for the event-triggered con-
troller. The event reinforcement is worse because an event usually signals a situation
where something went wrong and a new behaviour must be tried. To ensure that the
mean reinforcement is not more adequate than the event reinforcement, a new test
was done using as reinforcement the mean reinforcement obtained during the whole
period the robot was executing the previous behaviour. Figure 5.8 demonstrates that
there are no substantial dierences in performance between the use of the two types of
reinforcement. For simplicity event reinforcement will continue to be used.
5.3.3 Interval-triggered controller
As stated before, generating an evaluation and selection of a behaviour in every step is
not fruitful. The initial experiments done with the behaviour-based controller did so
and were an endless source of disappointment. In Figure 5.9, the results obtained are
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Figure 5.7: Event and mean reinforcements of the event-triggered controller ( set to
2:5).















































































Figure 5.8: Event-triggered controller using mean reinforcement ( set to 2:5).
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Figure 5.9: Step-triggered controller with and without learning.
shown and compared with the results for the same step-triggered controller without
learning. Results show that the controller does not learn much: its performance is not
very dierent from that generated by the random selection of behaviours exhibited by
the non-learning controller.
An increase in the time interval between consecutive control iterations is imperative,
but nding the right interval is not trivial and required extensive testing. On the one
hand, small intervals do not allow a proper behaviour evaluation, leading to a poor
overall learning performance. Under these conditions, the robot is unable to maintain
its energy level. On the other hand, if the interval is too large, the number of collisions
increases, because it takes longer for the robot to notice the obstacles it crashes into.
If the interval is increased enough the robot will also become incapable of maintaining
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e   10 steps
  35 steps
  60 steps
110 steps
Figure 5.10: Interval-triggered controller with dierent durations of intervals.
its energy level, because its change of behaviours will not be fast enough to enable
energy acquisition. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 portray two sets of short experiments done
to nd the right interval. In the rst of these gures, the issues discussed above are
particularly patent. In the second gure, the performance of the dierent intervals is
not as diverse, because the space of search has been reduced.
Experiments such as these show how important it is to synchronise the duration of
behaviour execution with the dynamics of the robot-environment interaction and thus
allow compatible time-scales between them. The interval of 35 steps was considered the
best suited, because it nicely accommodates the dierent issues involved, maximising
the trade-o between reduced number of collisions and energy maintainance.
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Figure 5.11: Interval-triggered controller with dierent durations of intervals.
5.3.4 Assessment
Establishing the standards
For a better evaluation of the controllers realised in the previous two subsections, two
other controllers were produced:
Random | This controller simply selects a random behaviour at each step. It was
included in the experiments to give a baseline to the result values, showing how
low the performance of an unsuccessful learning controller can be. This is partic-
ularly relevant for the experiments at hand, where reinforcement tends to drop
naturally with time, making it dicult to evaluate the real achievements made
by the learning systems.
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Hand-crafted |The purpose of designing a controller by hand was to determine how
much reinforcement a reasonably successfully controller would receive. For a fair
comparison with the other controllers, this controller uses the same behaviours
and no extra external or memory information unavailable to the others, but has
to resort to a random number generator to deal with some dicult environmental
situations.
The random controller described above is the non-learning step-triggered controller
examined earlier. When learning is turned o, controllers display random behaviour
selection, because the initial controller's preferences are neutral, i.e. every behaviour
starts o with the same utility value.
Designing the hand-crafted controller was not trivial. It was actually a slow and ardu-
ous cycle of test and redesign. Solving the problems of wandering in the environment
and successfully eating when necessary was quite straightforward. Avoiding obstacles,
on the other hand, was quite tricky and would often lead to fatal deadlock situations,
the main reason being the poor sensory capabilities of the robot which allow it to lose
sight of nearby obstacles very easily.
The hand-crafted controller uses the emotion-dependent event detection, with the rel-
atively low value of 1:5 for the  parameter. In fact, changes in the control triggering
of this controller produce signicant alterations in its performance. Figure 5.12 shows
examples of other settings. When the controller was tested with  = 2 or  = 2:5, its
energy level dropped signicantly. If, on the other hand, the hand-crafted controller
is triggered at every step, the result is eventually a robot trapped in some part of the
environment and incapable of maintaining its energy. An example of such a deadlock
is presented in Figure 5.13. This was obtained for a robot using event triggering with
 set to 2. These robots also suered this kind of crash situation frequently, but would
eventually recover after some thousands of steps.
It is natural that the controller works better with the settings it was designed for in
the rst place. Nevertheless, this pronounced dependence on the triggering mecha-
nism shows once again how important the latter is. Setting the triggering mechanism
correctly can make the dierence between a successful robot or a failed robot.
CHAPTER 5: Behaviour-Based Control 133











































































e Event−triggered (ξ = 1.5)Event−triggered (ξ = 2)
Event−triggered (ξ = 2.5)
Interval−triggered (35 steps)
Step−triggered
Figure 5.12: Hand-crafted controller with dierent triggering mechanisms.
Figure 5.13: Crashed situation of a hand-crafted controller tested with  = 2.
134
Analysis of relative performance
Four identical experiments were done, each using one of the dierent controllers. In
Table 5.2, a summary of the results is given. Looking at the graph curves in Figure
5.14, it can be safely assumed that, for every controller, learning has fully converged
when a robot reaches the middle of its trial. The summary table presents the average
of the values obtained from that point onwards.
Controller Reinforcement Reinforcement Emotion Events Energy Collisions Distance
(Events) (%) (%)
Event-triggered 0:13 0:07 0:19 0:4 0:71 2:8 1:5
Interval-triggered 0:18 0:17 0:22 2:9 0:65 1:5 0:9
Random { {  0:38 100:0 0:02 5:6 0:6
Hand-crafted 0:24  0:07 0:34 6:2 0:83 3:0 1:9
Table 5.2: Summary of results obtained for the controllers employing dierent trigger-
ing mechanisms. The values presented are the mean of all the values obtained in the
last half of the trials.
Looking at the graphs, one can see that the learning controllers do manage to learn their
task. Their performance is much better than that exhibited by the random controller.
It is also noticeable that the successful learning controllers have signicantly worse
reinforcement than the hand-crafted controller. This is directly related to the higher
average energy obtained by the latter. In fact, in terms of obstacle avoidance the
hand-crafted controller performs worse. The lower energy of the learning controllers
is actually not much of a problem, as long as they are able to keep it relatively high
above zero: and this is done with success.
The hand-crafted controller having higher energy only shows that this controller ac-
quires energy more often, which can be at least partially attributed to the higher
number of events it has available. With  set to the relatively low value of 1:5, it has
a more sensitive event detection mechanism that is triggered by smaller variations in
the emotion intensity. In reality, as shown in Figure 5.12, the results obtained with 
set to a larger value are very similar to those of the learning controllers.
There is no signicant dierence in performance between the two learning controllers.
The dierence in terms of event reinforcement does not reveal much apart from the
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of the dierent triggering mechanisms.
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fact that the event-driven controllers are often triggered when something goes wrong.
On the one hand, the event reinforcements of the interval-triggered controller are very
similar to its overall reinforcement, because the events are picked at regular intervals
and independently of their value. On the other hand, the event-driven controllers are
triggered in very specic situations that are often associated with negative evaluations;
typically, circumstances where the current behaviour had to be changed, because it was
not adequate anymore.
The event-triggered controller does not perform better than its interval-triggered coun-
terpart, but manages to have similar learning performance with a much reduced number
of events. This can also be an important issue in real time systems like robots, because
it saves precious computation time.
In fact, the performance of the event-triggered controller converges in a much smaller
number of learning steps than that of the interval-triggered controller. Figure 5.15
demonstrates this point by presenting the performance of the controllers in terms of
the number of events, instead of the number of steps. It is the number of events that
accounts for the number of learning steps because it is only during events that the
robot learns, i.e. it updates the utility values of its behaviours. In order to obtain
these results, two experiments were done: one for each controller. Each experiment
consisted of thirty dierent robot trials of sixty intervals of ve hundred events each.
This actually corresponded to a signicantly dierent number of total steps for each
controller (see Table 5.3), and slightly dierent values for the various trials of the
event-triggered controller.
Controller Total in millions Relative to normal
Event-triggered 6:08  0:06 203%
Interval-triggered 1:05  0:00 35%
Table 5.3: Mean duration of trials in steps and 95% condence interval.
The graphs show that although the event-triggered controller has learned its task after
one tenth of the trial, the interval-triggered is still improving its performance by the
end of the trial. It is clear that the eciency of the learning algorithm is increased by
presenting it with only event-related situations.
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Figure 5.15: Comparing learning speeds of controllers with dierent triggering mech-
anisms in terms of events.
In the case of the event-triggered controller, it is interesting to notice how the number
of events decreases as the agent learns its task. After learning how to prevent certain
problems, like obstacle collisions, the robot is not as interrupted as before.
Analysis of the improvement induced by learning
The question arises of whether the triggering mechanism is not solving the task by itself.
In reality, this is true to some extent. This eect can be observed in Figure 5.16 where
the dierent triggering mechanisms are compared again, but this time with learning
turned o. The task performance of the robot varies signicantly with the dierent
triggering mechanisms, even when the robot's behaviours are selected at random.
While the step-triggered continues to exhibit the worst performance, it's surprising
to notice that it is actually the interval-triggered controller that has the starting ad-
vantage, because its timing is in synchrony with the task. It has an edge in terms
of obstacle avoidance and energy maintainance. The event-triggered controller travels
more, because it is interrupted less frequently, which is its hidden advantage.
138











































































Figure 5.16: Comparing the dierent triggering mechanisms with no learning.
It is also interesting to consider the dierence in performance between the learning
controllers and the equivalent non-learning controllers. Figure 5.17 shows the relative
performance of the learning controllers, taking the respective non-learning experiments
as a base | i.e. the distribution of the non-learning performance was subtracted from
the learning performance (details in Appendix B.1.2). If the learning controllers
are compared in these terms then it is clear that through learning the event-triggered
controller improves its performance much more than the others while the step-triggered
controller is a very poor learner.
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Figure 5.17: Comparing improvement of performance provided by learning with dier-
ent triggering mechanisms.
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Analysis of experiments' design
A closer observation of the robot's nal behaviour brought forward two problems with
the experiments' design:
 The restlessness feeling is intended as an indicator of the progression of the
behaviour at hand. Through the emotion of anger it punishes the robot when
the behaviour it has selected is incapable of moving the robot. Restlessness will
also provide the necessary interruption in the case of emotion-dependent event
detection. The problem is that it is necessary to avoid its saturation. If this
happens, no more interruptions will be detected, because the dominant emotion
of anger will not change. For this reason, the restlessness value must be reset
whenever an event is detected. This is not a very far fetched solution, because
it is natural for the frustration to go away when a new behaviour is selected, at
least until the selected behaviour proves to be inecient as well. However, the
fact that the newly selected behaviour might be the same behaviour that was
showing problems previously makes the solution a bit strange. Nevertheless, this
was necessary for the controller to work eectively.
 The interval-triggered controller managed to exploit being still to save energy,
and thus exhibit local behaviour around a single light. This was not the intended
behaviour at all, and the only reason why the controller can get away with it
follows directly from the rst problem. With the frequent events provided by
the control triggering of this controller, the anger emotion cannot reach in-
tensities high enough to dissuade this kind of solution. Moreover, controllers
that frequently select behaviours benet from an unfair advantage in terms of
reinforcement, because the anger emotion is not able to manifest itself.
5.3.5 Increased task diculty
In order to prevent controllers from exploiting the low usage of the motors to save
energy, two measures were taken9:
9 Details of the parameter changes are in Appendix D.2.
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 The normal environment was replaced by the more demanding environment pic-
tured in Figure 5.1. This is a more corridor-like environment, where it is more
dicult to travel from one light to another by chance.
 The rst measure proved insucient by itself, because the robots can apparently
still manage to maintain high levels of energy if only one light is available. So the
robot energetic needs were increased. Furthermore, the advantage of not moving
was removed by making the value of energy decrease independent of motor usage.
Figure 5.18 shows the results obtained with the changed environment. The interval-
triggered controller behaves worse than the event-triggered, but it is still quite compe-
tent. It still achieves a good level of energy by not moving a lot. This will inuence
its reinforcement, because it will not be rewarded by moving around the environment.
However, it will not lead to punishment due to restlessness, because this feeling is reset
frequently.
In order to further rene the distinction between the two, a new set of experiments
was performed applying both measures discussed above: change in environment and
increase in energy usage. The results shown in Figure 5.19 demonstrate the dierences
between the two controllers in this context. In this case, the advantages of the event-
triggered controller are more evident. In particular, Figure 5.20 shows how the interval-
triggered controller frequently allows its energy to reach dangerous levels while the
event-triggered controller's energy is kept in a sensible range.
5.3.6 Conclusions
It was established during the experiments that triggering the controller at every step
was totally inadequate. Nevertheless, the interval-triggered controller that regularly
triggers the controller at longer intervals of time was found adequate. This controller
has even a starting advantage over the event-triggered controller because it performs
better with random behaviour selection. However, it is also less exible. The fact that
intervals are xed a priori to t the task makes it more task dependent. Furthermore,
nding the right interval for the task can be time-consuming.
The event-triggered controller which triggers control at variable intervals dependent
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Figure 5.18: Comparing the dierent triggering mechanisms in the more demanding
environment.
on the detection of signicant changes in emotional state was the best learner. This
controller has the advantage of both being a more time-ecient learner and being
able to master more dicult tasks. Moreover, it manages to achieve a reinforcement
similar to that of the interval-triggered controller which takes advantage of not being
punished for restlessness. The reset of restlessness that permitted this unfair advantage
was necessary for the event-triggered controller to work. However, other approaches to
emotion-dependent control triggering could avoid this problem by looking into emotion
intensity instead of variation. An example would be to have the frequency of control
triggerings directly proportional to the intensity of the current emotional state.
An alternative to the use of emotion-dependent detection of events would be to look
at all the controller's feelings inputs for statistical novelty instead of looking at the
CHAPTER 5: Behaviour-Based Control 143


















































































Figure 5.19: Comparing the dierent triggering mechanisms in the more demanding
environment and with harder energy requirements.









































Figure 5.20: Energy values for the individual trials of dierent triggering mechanisms.
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emotion value alone. The problem is that this solution is much less clean. Instead
of only one set of statistics, this solution requires several, each one of them with a
very particular behaviour. This will make a uniform test of all them dicult or even
impossible, eventually requiring a separate analysis for each one of the inputs. Another
advantage of using the emotional state is that emotions already take into consideration
what is and what is not important in each situation, and the relative importance of
each individual feature. The fact that they hide away details can even be benecial.
5.4 Experiments: Reinforcement
5.4.1 Emotion-dependent vs. sensation-dependent reinforcement
After the control triggering mechanism had been established it was decided to re-test
the role of emotions as a source of reinforcement (see Figure 5.21). Exactly the same
emotion-dependent reinforcement function was used (see Equation 4.6). At any mo-
ment in time, the reinforcement absolute value is the intensity of the current dominant
emotion or zero if there is no dominant emotion. The signal of the reinforcement value



















Figure 5.21: Emotions determining reinforcement value.
Again an experiment was done to test whether emotion-dependent reinforcement is
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Figure 5.22: Comparing emotion-dependent reinforcement with sensation-dependent
reinforcement.
competitive when compared with a more traditional reinforcement function. With the
new setup for the behaviour-based controller the discrepancies between sensation-
dependent and emotion-dependent reinforcement found in Chapter 4 have faded away.
As shown by Figure 5.22, the emotion-dependent reinforcement is now successful and
its performance is similar to that of sensation-dependent reinforcement. This can be
observed in the emotion graph which is a good indicator of overall performance. The
dierence registered in terms of reinforcement value should not be considered in the
comparative evaluation because dierent reinforcement functions were used for each
experiment. The purpose of this particular graph is only to show the learning curve
of each controller.
Taking into consideration the good results obtained, the emotion-dependent reinforce-
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ment was taken as the default for the rest of the experiments.
5.4.2 Comparison with an undierentiated reinforcement function
The emotion-dependent reinforcement has the characteristic of only depending on one
emotion at a time, if any. The reinforcement information that might be provided by
emotions other than the dominant emotion is ignored. For example, if the robot is sad
and bumps into an obstacle then fear will overcome sadness and only fear will be
taken into consideration for reinforcement. This means that reinforcement information
will mostly ignore the hunger feeling and will be dominated by the pain feeling. To test
whether this is an advantage for the learning controller or not, the dierent motivations
of the agent were joined together in an undierentiated reinforcement function (Rn =
Ru).
The undierentiated function (Ru, dened in Equation 5.3) was obtained from the
emotions' dependencies on the feelings. It consisted in subtracting from the happi-
ness' dependence the other emotions' dependencies and dividing the result by four
to obtain a weight for each feeling. These weights were then used for the weighted
sum of the sensations' values of which consists the undierentiated reinforcement func-
tion. This would be equivalent to adding together the reinforcement values provided
by each emotion and dividing by four, if the hormone system were eliminated as it
was for the sensation-dependent reinforcement (see Figure 4.7). In a normal robot-
environment interaction, this function has less than 0.1% dierence in sign from the
emotion-dependent reinforcement. This means that it rarely punishes the robot in














This undierentiated reinforcement function is not tuned but its poor performance,
shown in Figure 5.23, supports the view that the non-linearities in reinforcement are
important for the system. Nevertheless, it was possible to hand-craft another undier-
entiated reinforcement function (R0u, dened in Equation 5.4), by adjusting the several
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Figure 5.23: Comparing the emotion-dependent reinforcement with an undierentiated
sensation based reinforcement.
weights by trial and error, that managed to perform as well as the emotion-dependent
reinforcement function.
f Hunger Pain Restlessness Temperature Eating Smelling Warmth Proximity





5.4.3 Re-assessment of control triggering mechanisms.
Figure 5.24 and Table 5.4 demonstrate that the results for the dierent triggering
mechanisms when using emotion-dependent reinforcement are consistent with the pre-
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Figure 5.24: Comparing the dierent triggering mechanisms with emotion-dependent
reinforcement.
Controller Emotion Events Energy Collisions Distance
(%) (%)
Event-triggered 0:24 0:5 0:63 0:6 1:0
Interval-triggered 0:21 2:9 0:62 1:7 0:9
Step-triggered  0:34 100:0 0:07 5:9 0:6
Hand-crafted 0:34 6:1 0:83 3:0 1:9
Table 5.4: Summary of results obtained for dierent triggering mechanisms with
emotion-dependent reinforcement. The values presented are the mean of all the values
obtained in the last half of the trials.
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viously obtained results with sensation-dependent reinforcement. The event-triggered
controller still does not perform outstandingly better than the interval-triggered coun-
terpart, but is much more ecient in terms of events. There is now also a slight
dierence in the number of collisions. It is natural that the event-triggered controller
does better in terms of obstacle avoidance, because this controller is triggered to deal
with the obstacles that the robot nds in its way instead of having to wait until the
next triggering point to deal with them. However, previous results, reported in Figure
5.14, did not show a dierence, possibly due to the sensation-dependent reinforcement
function and the emotion-dependent triggering mechanism being out of synchronisa-
tion.
5.5 Experiments: Perception
In this section, the inuence of emotions on perception was briey examined. More
specically, a set of experiments was run to test whether perception being inuenced by
the hormone system or not has an impact on the performance of the robot (see Figure
5.25). Experiments failed to show signicant dierences in performance, which means
that the robot can cope with a biased view of reality but does not demonstrate that



















Figure 5.25: Emotions' inuence on perception.
Figure 5.26 compares the normal experimental results with those obtained by replacing
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Figure 5.26: Emotional and non-emotional perception.
the neural-network inputs by sensations instead of feelings (see Figure 5.3). Although
the graphs suggest that there might be an improvement provided by the emotions'
inuence on perception, such a deduction is not suciently supported by the results
for a denitive conclusion to be drawn. The fact that no signicant dierences were
found might be purely task dependent. However, the selected learning controller is
surely responsible for the results to some extent. The use of neural networks to process
the inputs allows for more abstraction of the input values and to compensate for any
changes in magnitude caused by emotions.
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5.6 Experiments: Assessment of the Emotional Controller
5.6.1 Introduction
The nal emotional controller achieved is presented in Figure 5.27. It has emotional
reinforcement, perception and control triggering. This controller as a whole is the topic


















Figure 5.27: Emotional controller.
In the rst subsection, this controller is compared with its non-emotional counter-
part. Next, a more extensive comparison is made of the emotional controller with the
hand-crafted controller. In particular, an attempt is made to mimic the hand-crafted
controller through the learning controller. The nal subsections examine the inuence
of emotions' persistence and the behaviour selection method on the performance of the
emotional controller.
5.6.2 Relative to a non-emotional controller
Experiments were done to assess the competence of the nal emotional system as a
learning controller when compared to a non-emotional system. Results are shown
in Figures 5.28 and 5.29. Figure 5.28 reports on a set of experiments done under
normal conditions and Figure 5.29 on experiments done under the more demanding
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Figure 5.28: Comparing an emotional with an non-emotional controller.
environment and with harder energy requirements10. The dierences between the two
are particularly clear in more severe conditions, in which case the emotional controller's
performance is much better.
Some other experiments were presented previously that had only one of the mechanisms
replaced at a time by its non-emotional counterpart. Table 5.5 describes the dierences
between the dierent controllers in detail. A summary of the results obtained in normal
experiments for each controller is presented in Table 5.6.
The most signicant dierence between the emotional and non-emotional controllers
is in the number of events which is obviously due to the control triggering mechanism
used. This mechanism is what is really responsible for the advantage of the emotional
10 Details in Section 5.3.5.
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Figure 5.29: Emotional and non-emotional controllers performance in the more de-
manding environment and with harder energy requirements.
Controller Reinforcement Networks Control Figure
Inputs Triggering
Emotional Emotion-dependent Feelings Event-triggered 5.28
Non-emotional triggering Emotion-dependent Feelings Interval-triggered 5.24
Non-emotional reinforcement Sensation-dependent Feelings Event-triggered 5.22
Non-emotional perception Emotion-dependent Sensations Event-triggered 5.26
Non-emotional Sensation-dependent Sensations Interval-triggered 5.28
Table 5.5: Dierent mechanisms used by emotional and non-emotional controllers.
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Controller Emotion Events Energy Collisions Distance
(%) (%)
Emotional 0:24  0:01 0:5 0:0 0:63  0:01 0:6 0:3 1:0 0:2
Non-emotional triggering 0:21  0:02 2:9 0:0 0:62  0:04 1:7 0:1 0:9 0:0
Non-emotional reinforcement 0:22  0:02 0:5 0:0 0:70  0:02 1:6 1:1 1:4 0:1
Non-emotional perception 0:22  0:03 0:5 0:0 0:61  0:03 1:2 0:7 1:0 0:2
Non-emotional 0:21  0:02 2:9 0:0 0:64  0:04 1:4 0:1 0:9 0:0
Table 5.6: Summary of the comparison between emotional and non-emotional con-
trollers. The means of the values and their 95% condence interval obtained in the
last half of the trials are presented.
controller over the non-emotional controller.
The emotional controller also has a slight advantage in terms of obstacle avoidance
when compared with the other controllers, suggesting that the temporal synchrony
between the dierent mechanisms might be a benecial factor. Although the emo-
tional controller suers from intrinsic delays with respect to the robot-environment
interaction due to the emotions' persistence, it is the only one where the learning con-
troller input state or perception, the reinforcement and the triggering mechanism are
in perfect synchronism.
5.6.3 Relative to the hand-crafted controller
The initial hope at the start of the experiments was that the learning controller would
learn to behave similarly to the hand-crafted controller, or at least with the same level
of reinforcement. However, this was not the case according to the results presented in
Figure 5.24 and Table 5.411:
Controller Emotion Events Energy Collisions Distance
(%) (%)
Emotional 0:24 0:01 0:5 0:0 0:63 0:01 0:7 0:4 1:0  0:2
Hand-crafted 0:34 0:01 6:1 1:7 0:83 0:01 3:0 0:8 1:9  0:1
Table 5.7: Comparing the performance of the emotional controller and the hand-crafted
controller. The values presented are the means of the values and their 95% condence
interval of only the last ten test points.
11 In the presentation of these results the emotional controller is referred to as event-triggered controller.
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In this subsection, an analysis is made of the dierences between the two in terms
of both emotional states and behavioural preferences. For this purpose, a follow-up
experiment was done for the emotional controller and another for the hand-crafted
controller that recorded the required information. Next, attempts to replicate the
hand-crafted controller's nal behaviour are described.
Analysis of emotional states
A follow-up experiment was run for the emotional controller and another for the hand-
crafted controller to analyse the dierences in emotional states between the two. Re-
sults are shown in Figure 5.30. Although the distribution of the emotional states of the
hand-crafted controller is quite stable, the same does not happen with the emotional
controller and the results shown should be only taken as an indicative sample. Even
so, some general conclusions can be drawn.
The two graphs represent two distinct distributions of emotion states: during all steps
and during the steps where an event was detected. The dierences between these two
distributions account for the dierences between reinforcement and event reinforcement
found in both controllers12. Although, in general, negative emotional states are not
frequent, they are much more frequent during events. This is particularly noticeable in
the case of the hand-crafted controller which is also the controller that presents more
substantial dierences between the two types of reinforcement. In the case of this
controller, the fear emotion is almost as frequent as the happiness emotion during
events, suggesting that a considerable number of the events consist in the detection
of collisions via the fear emotion. The fact that events are triggered by emotion
states that tend to be more negative explains why reinforcement during events is lower
than average. It is also clear that the excessive number of events of the hand-crafted
controller is partly due to its large number of collisions. In these particular follow-up
experiments the total number of events of the hand-crafted controller was 1512 against
the 470 events of the emotional controller.
The emotional controller is dierent from the hand-crafted controller in that it is happy
less frequently and is often more sad and angry. The occurrence of the negative
12 These dierences in reinforcements were observed in Figures 5.8 and 5.14.
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Figure 5.30: Occurrence of each emotion.
emotions can simply be due to the fact that the learning controller at times will have
to test its policy by exploring behaviours other than the best one. In fact, the controller
needs to be punished in order to know what it should and should not do. Another
reason for the dierences might be that the learning controller is concentrating its
eorts in not bumping, in which it is more successful than the hand-crafted controller,
and that has a detrimental eect on the rest of the problems it has to handle. The
fact that the learning controller is happy less often is probably due to not being so
persistent in the wall-following behaviour and therefore not having the temperature
high so often.
The dierences between the two suggest that the emotional controller's behaviour is
temporally and spatially more local. The lack of a global picture of its interaction
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Figure 5.31: Occurrence of each behaviour.
with the environment will make it concentrate its eorts on more immediate problems,
namely, by solving the obstacle avoidance problem particularly well, and eating when
it is already sad or trying another behaviour after anger has manifested itself.
Analysis of behaviour preferences
In the follow-up experiment of the emotional controller and the hand-crafted controller
the behaviour selections were also recorded. The distribution of the selection and actual
execution steps of each one of the behaviours is shown in Figure 5.31.
The dierences between the distributions of each graph show that the wall following
behaviour tends to be performed for long periods of time with no interruption. The
other two behaviours are more likely to cause events, namely by quickly achieving their
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purposes.
The dierences between the two controllers show, as was suspected before, that the
emotional controller does not wall-follow as much as the hand-crafted controller and
that the emotional controller will select the seek-light behaviour much more often.
Attending to the fact that the emotional controller's energy level is lower (see Table
5.7), the emotional controller is probably having diculties acquiring energy eciently.
Learning the hand-crafted behaviour
In the previous sections, the dierences between the emotional controller and the hand-
crafted behaviour have been highlighted. In this section, several attempts at trying to
transfer the knowledge of the hand-crafted behaviour into the learning controller are
described. Dierent methods were tested to try to mimic the hand-crafted behaviour
by the learning controller, but none with much success.
The rst attempt consisted of having the networks learn during the normal robot
simulation while the hand-crafted controller was controlling the robot. A more sophis-
ticated attempt required saving all the details of a hundred thousand step experiment
using the hand-crafted controller and then repeatedly going over the recorded expe-
riences to learn them with the emotional controller. Randomising the order of these
hundred thousand single experiences actually helped the neural networks a bit, but
the results for all these methods were consistently unsatisfactory. The main problem
with these methods is that the learning controller does not have a chance to learn the
results of bad behaviour. The answer to this problem was to slightly punish the non-
selected behaviours apart from attributing the received reinforcement to the selected
behaviour. This procedure assumes that the hand-crafted controller has selected the
right behaviour and the others are inappropriate for that particular situation. Even so
the learning algorithm was lacking a wider range of experiences. The intrinsic random
nature of the emotional controller, even when it is not learning, will always allow the
controller to step into situations that are outside the normal range of the hand-crafted
behaviour.
So a radically dierent approach was taken that consisted of directly training the neural
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networks with random inputs taken from a uniformly distributed input space. Each
experiment consisted of 5 million steps separated by tests done at intervals of a hundred
thousand steps. At each step a random neural network input vector is determined.
Then the behaviour selected by the hand-designed controller for this input vector is
determined. The networks are trained with a target value of 5 or -5 depending on
whether their associated behaviour is the one selected or one of the others. During
each test a hundred thousand dierent random input vectors are selected. For each
input vector the hand-crafted behaviour selection is determined and compared with
behaviour whose neural network has the highest value for that particular input vector.
The error is the percentage of behaviour mismatches. The results for 5 dierent trials
are presented in Figure 5.32.
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Figure 5.32: Neural networks error when knowledge is directly transfered to them from
the hand-crafted controller.
It should be noticed that a deterministic procedure such as the one of selecting the
network with the highest value will never reach a zero error value, because the hand-
crafted controller is not totally deterministic itself. In fact, when the hand-crafted
controller is evaluated against itself it returns an error of about 2:7%, also shown in
the gure. The neural networks' error is not much more, with a mean of 3:1% in the last
10 tests. The error starts o quite low, only 7:3%, because the algorithm for selecting
the better-ranked behaviour gives preference to the avoid-obstacles behaviour, i.e. this
behaviour is selected when all the networks' outputs are the same value as it is at
the start of the learning13. This reduces the starting error because the avoid-obstacles
13 This problem was never corrected because as soon as the neural-networks start learning it disappears.
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behaviour is also by far the most frequent choice of the hand-crafted controller in a
uniform distribution of the input state.
It was found that a uniform distribution of the input space is very dierent from the
distribution of the input space experienced by the robot. Namely, the distribution of
the behaviours selected by the hand-designed control procedure is very dierent from
the one obtained in normal robot simulation. For a uniform distribution the percentage
of selection of the avoid-obstacles behaviour is much increased and much higher than
that of any other behaviour, including the wall-following behaviour which is reduced
drastically. So it is possible that the networks are being over-trained with situations
that will never even be found by the robot. It is also possible that the behaviours
suggested by the hand-crafted controller outside its normal range of execution are not
the most appropriate.
After these networks had been set up they were put to the test, by using them in the
emotional controller in a normal simulation experiment. Two experiments are reported
in Figure 5.33, one with learning and one without. The results for the hand-crafted
controller are also given in the gure for comparison. Both experiments use a  value
of 1:5, which is the most adequate value for the hand-crafted controller14.
From the non-learning controller's performances we can observe that the networks'
previous experience was not very helpful. The non-learning controller's performance
soon starts to diverge from the normal hand-crafted controller and it will continue to
deteriorate right through to the end of the experiment. The randomness introduced by
the emotional controller can easily take it away from the normal scenarios dealt with
by the hand-crafted controller. Once out of its domain of expertise, it is natural that
its performance deteriorates.
The learning controller overall performance, measured by emotion value, also diverges
away from that of the hand-crafted controller, but will converge to a level in between
the hand-crafted performance and the normal performance of an emotional controller
without pre-trained neural networks. See Table 5.8 for a short summary of the
performance of the three.
14 The results for  valued 2 and 2:5 are shown in Appendix D.4.
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Figure 5.33: Emotional controller starting o with customised neural networks. The
performance of the hand-crafted controller, i.e. the target, is also shown.
Controller Emotion Events Energy Collisions Distance
(%) (%)
Emotional normal 0:24  0:01 0:5 0:0 0:63  0:01 0:7  0:4 1:0 0:2
pre-trained 0:28  0:01 0:8 0:1 0:70  0:03 0:3  0:2 1:0 0:1
Hand-crafted 0:34  0:01 6:1 1:7 0:83  0:01 3:0  0:8 1:9 0:1
Table 5.8: Comparing the performance of the normal emotional controller and the one
with pre-trained neural networks. The values presented are the means of the values
and their 95% condence interval of only the last ten test points.
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One of the main reasons for the poor results obtained is the fragility of the hand-
crafted controller. The limitations of the hand-crafted controller have been discussed
previously during its presentation in Section 5.3.4 where it is shown how the perfor-
mance of this controller is strongly dependent on the event triggering mechanism in
use. The development of this controller was an arduous process that even required
engineering the environment to discard hazardous environmental locations. However,
the results also point to deciencies in the capacity of the emotional controller to learn
to perform the task just as the hand-crafted controller does. It is possible that the
behaviour-selection procedure used by the hand-crafted controller is not representable
by the neural-network architecture used by the emotional controller.
5.6.4 Temporal persistence of emotions
For the action-based controller, the most severe drawback of the emotion system was
the temporal persistence of emotions introduced by the hormone system. This suggests
that the hormone system might also strongly inuence the performance of the present
controller.
The parameter most responsible for emotional persistence is the hormones' decay rate.
In this subsection, its inuence on the emotional controller is examined.
Figure 5.34 shows how the hormones' decay rate inuences the emotional response. The
values of decay rates examined in the gure are actually the ones used in the robot
experiments shown in Figure 5.35. Although these parameters change the emotional
response signicantly, their inuence in the emotional controller's performance is not
noticeable.
All experiments of this subsection were done in the more demanding environment and
with harder energy requirements15. This way the controllers are all tested in the most
adverse circumstances available, allowing the dierences between them to be more
easily noticed.
In reality, the emotional controller is quite robust to changes in the temporal char-
acteristics of the emotional system. Even if the hormone system is totally removed,
15 Consult Section 5.3.5, for details.
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Figure 5.34: Emotional temporal response with dierent hormone decay rates. The
default value for this parameter in previous experiments has been 0:996.














































































Figure 5.35: Emotional controller with dierent values for the hormone decay rate.
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Figure 5.36: Emotional controller with and without hormones.
taking away all the emotions' persistence, the emotional controller's performance is
not aected. Figure 5.36 demonstrates this point.
5.6.5 Exploration strategy in behaviour selection
In reinforcement learning there is a fundamental trade-o between exploration and
exploitation of the policies learned. On the one hand, too much exploitation can lead
to sub-optimal policies. On the other hand, the agent must exploit its knowledge at
some point.
In the present controller, the relatively simple approach of Boltzmann exploration
was taken. Another reasonable ad-hoc strategy that is widely used in reinforcement
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learning is p-probability exploration16. It consists of selecting an action at random
with a probability p and otherwise taking the action with the best expected reward.
This strategy has the advantage of being simpler, but unfortunately is inappropriate
for the present controller as we shall see below.
The main disadvantage of this strategy is that it does not take into consideration what
is known about the expected rewards of each behaviour during exploration. So it will
equally select between behaviours that have proven to be promising in the past and
others that are clearly hopeless.
The Boltzmann exploration allows the agent to explore more when the behaviours are
similarly ranked and exploit more when one of the behaviours appears to be much more
appropriate than the others. Furthermore, as the controller explores its environment
and gathers knowledge about it, its preferences will grow stronger and the exploitation
will increase. This eect can be observed in Figure 5.37 where an account was made
of the number of times the controller did not select the best ranked behaviour in the
course of a normal experiment.











Figure 5.37: Record of how often the emotional controller does not select the best
behaviour.
Another interesting advantage of the Boltzmann exploration strategy is that it does
not implicitly assume the existence of a single optimal behaviour at each point. This
is particularly advantageous in the case of the robot's specic task which demanded
that the hand-crafted controller itself use a random generator for behaviour selection.
16 Designated the -greedy strategy by Sutton and Barto (1998).
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  1% random selection
Figure 5.38: Dierent exploration strategies.
This was found necessary for specic environmental situations which would otherwise
lead to dead-locks.
The experimental results in Figures 5.38 and 5.39 conrm the inadequacy of the p-
probability exploration. In the rst instance, experiments were done for two values of p:
10% which is the value most often used in the literature and 1% which is more similar
to the level of exploration provided by the default Boltzmann exploration strategy.
When compared with an experiment using the Boltzmann strategy, the simpler scheme
performs worse. The 1% exploration is particularly ineective, probably because it does
not allow for enough policy exploration. The use of a more demanding environment
and harsher energy requirements made the poor performance of the 10% exploration
particularly evident (see Figure 5.39).
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Figure 5.39: Dierent exploration strategies in the more demanding environment and
with harder energy requirements.
The exploration vs. exploitation issue is particularly relevant in systems that are sup-
posed to learn all the time, i.e. without an articial division between a learning phase
and an execution phase. In this case, the agent has to make the best of its knowledge to
know how and when to explore, because it will not have available a separate execution
phase where the randomness of its choices can be eliminated in favour of exploitation.
The exploitation should increase as the agent learns about its environment. Some re-
searchers will decrease the temperature value in the case of the Boltzmann exploration
or the p in the p-probability exploration to achieve this eect. The problem with this
is that it assumes that the environment conditions will not change and that the agent
will learn all it needs in a certain pre-dened amount of time. In the absence of a more
sophisticated exploration strategy, the decrease of the exploration as a side-eect of
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the Boltzmann exploration strategy seems more natural and preferable for autonomous
agents' learning.
5.7 Conclusions
Experiments showed that emotions can be used as an attention mechanism at dierent
levels of a reinforcement learning task:
 making more evident the relevant aspects of the environment, i.e. those directly
related with the current emotional state, by inuencing the robot current state
through the hormones;
 providing a straightforward reinforcement function which works like a powerful
attention mechanism in a reinforcement learning task by attributing value to the
dierent environmental situations;
 determining the occurrence of the signicant changes in the environment that
should trigger state transition, by looking at sudden changes in the emotional
system state.
These were three dierent mechanisms that worked well experimentally. Each one of
them had dierent levels of performance when compared with alternative methods.
No signicant dierences were found in using emotion-dependent perception, i.e. mak-
ing the emotionally relevant aspects of the environment more salient, or not. This re-
sult might be task dependent but is certainly controller dependent because the learning
controller used can easily ignore the dierences in magnitude of the input values in-
troduced by emotions by compensating for them with changes in the neural-network's
weights. A proper assessment of this emotion role would benet from the employment
of a controller equipped with proper mechanisms of attention for input processing,
i.e. a controller where dierent weights could be given to the analysis of the dierent
inputs.
It was found that emotion-dependent reinforcement is adequate for behaviour-based
control and that the non-linearities of this reinforcement function have an active role
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in its success.
The behaviour-based controller provides more appropriate time scales than action-
based control for the use of emotion-dependent reinforcement. The dierence between
behaviour-based and action-based control is not only restricted to temporal duration.
The behaviours themselves are by nature distinct from simple actions. They are not de-
ned by constant motor values, but rather by a simple reactive \goal" that determines
the motor values at each step as a function of the agent's current perception. This
allows them enough versatility to run for longer durations of time which is their main
advantage for use with emotions. The persistence of emotions over time in natural
systems also suggests that they should be related to a higher level of decision-making
which does not rely on simple primitive actions but on complex action patterns more
suitably expressed at a behavioural level.
The emotion-dependent event detector was very successful. It allowed drastic cuts in
the frequency of triggering of the learning controller while maintaining overall per-
formance. This can be particularly advantageous in the case of very time-consuming
learning controllers, where each triggering of the controller can result in a signicant
loss of precious real time. These results were obtained with both sensation-dependent
reinforcement and emotion-dependent reinforcement.
A later analysis of the distribution of the emotional states of the emotional controller
in general and in the particular situations where events were detected, showed that the
robot control is triggered more often in adverse situations. This has adaptive value, be-
cause it arouses the agent's attention to the need to change behaviour when the current
behaviour becomes inappropriate. Furthermore, behaviours that have some immediate
goal like avoid-obstacles and seek-light tend to have shorter durations because they are
terminated the moment their goal is reached.
After each of these mechanisms was evaluated on its own, the emotional controller as
a whole was also evaluated.
This controller proved to be more successful than an equivalent non-emotional con-
troller where the emotional mechanisms were replaced by their non-emotional counter-
parts. The triggering mechanism was strongly responsible for the dierence in perfor-
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mance between the two, but the joint use of all three mechanisms also seems to provide
an advantage.
Nevertheless, the nal emotional controller exhibits a performance that falls short of
the one achieved by a hand-crafted controller. Despite all the eorts to reproduce the
hand-crafted behaviour with the emotional controller this was not accomplished. The
conclusion reached was that the hand-crafted controller behaviour was very fragile and
could not be achieved by the particular learning architecture used. The permanent
element of randomness present in this architecture would move the robot to scenarios
where the competence of that behaviour would quickly deteriorate.
Finally, the emotional controller was found to be robust to dierent degrees of emotion




The work reported in this dissertation consisted in bringing emotions to the eld of
autonomous robots following an animat approach. In opposition to more traditional
approaches, the emotional agent deals with a continuous and non-symbolic environment
and has to adapt to its environment through learning. Emotions were mostly used to
help it in its learning task by providing the domain-dependent mechanisms necessary
to fulll key reinforcement-learning components.
To test the feasibility of the approach a body of experimental work was carried out
in a realistic simulated robot which tested the integration of several emotion functions
in a reinforcement learning framework. Experiments compared these functions with
other more traditional reinforcement-learning approaches while always looking after
the several problems posed by robot autonomy.
This work required the development of an emotional model adequate for the animat
approach. The model was designed to cope with a non-discrete world and to be suitable
for integration in a simple, but complete, robot control architecture. In fact, the
emotion system itself was found useful for the temporal segmentation of the world.
The developed and empirically tested emotion model has the characteristic property of
directly inuencing the perception of the agent through a hormone system. This allows
emotions to colour the agent's perception by focusing its attention on the features of the
environment that are most congruent with the agent's dominant emotion. Furthermore,
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this hormone system also endows the system with persistence of emotions through the
near future and avoids sudden swings of emotional state. Modelling the persistence
of emotions uncovered diculties in the use of emotions as reinforcement that were
hidden away by the fact that most existing emotion models do not incorporate inertia.
The persistence of emotions modelled in the experiments introduced some restrictions
in the eective use of emotions in robot control. Experiments showed such an emotion
system can be used much more successfully in the context of behaviour-based control
than action-based control. In particular, the role usually attributed to emotions of
providing an evaluation of the state of the world was particularly unsuccessful in a
action-based controller. The time-scales involved in the execution of a behaviour proved
to be more appropriate for emotion-dependent reinforcement than the smaller time-
scales associated with the execution of single primitive actions. In fact, the behaviour-
based controller was quite robust to variable degrees of emotion persistence. Therefore,
results seem to point to the intuition that emotion-level information is more relevant
to higher level control, such as behaviour-based, than to lower level control, such as
based on primitive actions.
This introduction is only a brief summary of the achievements of the work carried out
for this thesis. The next sections provide a more detailed discussion of the dierent
issues involved in this work both in terms of autonomy and emotions. This is followed
by the presentation of some suggestions for future work. The use of emotions oered a
new perspective over autonomous learning which grounds the nal conclusions drawn
in this dissertation.
6.2 Issues in Autonomous Learning Robots Research
6.2.1 Design guidelines
In Section 2.2.8, a few guidelines were established for the design of autonomous robots.
These guidelines were followed to some extent in the design of the autonomous learning
robot presented in this dissertation:
Perception | Unfortunately the selected robot simulator did not provide the robot
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with very rich sensory input, yet attempts were made to endow the agent with
some attention mechanisms;
Movement |The movement required in the behaviour-based control experiments in-
volved both moving around in the environment and interacting with food sources,
but although the global robot behaviour had some degree of complexity the num-
ber of available actions, or sources of dierent movements, at any one time was
relatively small;
Homeostatic Goals | The agent was given several homeostatic goals in the deni-
tion of its task: maintain energy level, move around, avoid obstacles;
Reactions and Learning | the selected learning architecture permits fast reactions
while providing the means for the robot to adapt to its environment;
Navigation | the robot has limited navigation capabilities but still manages to travel
from light to light in order to obtain food.
Taking into consideration the state of the art in robot technology and autonomy, the
developed robot exhibits a fair amount of autonomy. However, the simplicity of its
controller and its limited capacity to learn complex behaviour constrain its autonomy.
In particular, the network-based architecture has a tendency to forget important but
rare experiences easily and shows diculties in correctly dierentiating dierent expe-
riences. Furthermore, if the agent is changed to a dierent environment it will be able
to adapt to it but, in the process of learning, it will forget what it had learned specic
to the previous environment.
6.2.2 Design problems
The learning architecture selected has a few disadvantages in terms of autonomy
achievement that have been pointed out previously in Section 2.5.2, yet those were
not subject to investigation. An exception was made for the examination of the explo-
ration strategy of the learning architecture, which proved to have an important role in
the success of the robot. The limitations of the simpler p-probability exploration or
-greedy strategy were demonstrated in Section 5.6.5.
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Most of the problems identied in the development of the autonomous learning robot
were related with the learning controller's open specications detailed in Section 2.5.3,
which were central to the topic of this thesis: emotions interacting with control. These
problems, which were often responsible for robot learning failures are discussed next
in terms of those specications.
Reinforcement function
As expected, the learning algorithm was very sensitive to the reinforcement function.
Employing emotion-dependent reinforcement was not straightforward. The lack of
synchrony between reinforcement and local goal achievement proved fatal in the domain
of the action-based controller. The reinforcement delay was not properly handled by the
learning algorithm probably because this was unable to eectively propagate rewards
across long sequences of actions.
This hypothesis was conrmed by the experiments with behaviour-based control. The
decomposition into behaviours permitted an increase of the number of physical steps
between learning iterations which allowed a reduction in the reinforcement delay in
terms of number of learning iterations and enabled an eective propagation of rewards
and punishments.
The emotion-dependent reinforcement function designed has the characteristic of only
taking at most one emotion into consideration at each time step and ignoring the
reinforcement information provided by all the non-dominant emotions. This introduced
non-linearities in the reinforcement function procedure that not only did not impair
the performance of the learning algorithm, but were actually used advantageously.
Action set
One interesting point that was uncovered by the experiments was that providing the
agent with a complete action set, in the sense that it can reach every state of its
environment, might not be enough. In Section 4.3.4 it was shown that the use of
a slightly dierent complete action set can result in a signicant drop in learning
performance. In this particular case the existence of a single action, moving backwards
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with a twist, that permitted the robot to ward o obstacles, proved to be important.
This was probably due to a question of hidden space: once the robot has simply backed
o an obstacle and its sensors do not register it anymore, the robot can easily select
a forward movement that will lead it to the same obstacle. The problem is that the
robot has no available memory to inform it that the obstacle is there and that other
actions should be taken.
The behaviour complexity achieved by the learning algorithm through the use of an
action set composed of primitive actions is limited. It is clear that it is necessary to
have some kind of hierarchical solution if complex behaviour is intended. The simplied
solution found for the experiments was to add competence to the action set by replacing
the primitive actions by behaviours. This is a very rigid solution that by itself does not
provide much in terms of added complexity. Solutions that enable the robot to learn
its own hierarchy of behaviours allowing it to organise by itself its task in sub-problems
to solve, like the reinforcement-learning system proposed by Digney (1998), are much
more exible and are probably the correct route to robot autonomy. Unfortunately
the solution proposed is still at a rudimentary stage and is not yet applicable to robot
domains.
Input state
The particular algorithm used was quite robust in terms of sensory input. The inuence
of emotions on the state input was largely ignored by the system.
It was thought that the short term memory provided by this emotional inuence might
be helpful to solve the hidden state problem for obstacle avoidance but apparently
this was not the case. However, the concordance in delay between sensory input and
reinforcement seemed to help slightly.
State transition
Although not much importance is usually given to this issue and people usually resort to
domain-specic solutions that articially constrain the learning algorithm, the system
proved to be particularly sensitive to the denition of state transition used.
176
The simplest solution of dening a state transition at each step proved particularly dis-
astrous for the behaviour-based controller. Furthermore, if intervals were used instead,
the performance of controller was strongly dependent on the interval size. Neverthe-
less, the failure of a step-triggered controller can be partly task dependent, because
this agent has to persist in its action to travel from one light to another.
The proposed solution based on the detection of signicant changes in the input state
was quite successful. Unlike other work in the eld, the detection of changes in the
input state was dependent on the robot's dominant emotion and therefore intrinsically
related with its reinforcement.
Meta-control variables' values
There were no problems in nding suitable values for the two major learning param-
eters of the learning algorithm: back-propagation learning rate and action selection
temperature. Nevertheless, it seems inadequate having to tune these parameters a pri-
ori, i.e. there should not be a need to run preliminary experiments to explore dierent
values for these parameters. Furthermore, the robot would certainly benet from being
able to change them on-line. The autonomous learning of complex behaviour probably
requires that the agent is able to determine when it needs new skills and when it should
simply use the skills it has and avoid forgetting them by over-learning.
6.2.3 Evaluation methods
Test procedure
To avoid the problems concerning evaluation discussed in the reinforcement-learning
review (Section 2.4.2), the controllers reported in this document were evaluated in
dierent trials and using dierent evaluation mechanisms.
Other issues concerning the evaluation of autonomous learning agents were raised fur-
ther along the dissertation.
The main one was whether the agents should or should not be allowed to learn during
the testing phase. As autonomous learning agents, they should not have a distinctive
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performance phase with learning turned o, but be able to learn throughout their
lifetime. Learning can cease if the agent itself so determines, but that should not be
an external decision. This suggests that learning should not be externally turned o
for tests. However, a more through evaluation of a certain learning stage may demand
that the controller be evaluated in dierent situations while still in that stage, i.e. with
no learning in between. Moreover, if the robot is continually learning it is dicult to
evaluate whether the learning controller is actually acquiring long term knowledge or
just temporally learning to solve the immediate problems it is faced with. On the other
hand, this last ability can be considered an advantage of the continuous learning agent
that should be taken into account in the evaluation; and instead be taken as one more
reason for not turning learning o.
Experiments revealed that either testing method resulted in similar evaluations for the
present controller. This demonstrated that the agent is actually taking advantage of
long term knowledge and that it is able to maintain its performance while learning.
This last point is important for a learning agent that does not have the advantage of
having its exploratory learning mechanisms turned o for the execution of its task.
This characteristic of autonomous learning agents also raises the important point of
learning stability. These agents should be subject to long tests so that possible stability
problems of the learning algorithm can be detected.
In the particular task chosen for the experiments, the performance criteria are such
that the performance of the agent suers a deterioration in time if the agent does not
successfully learn its task. This is typical of a survival task where the non-observance of
a certain number of subsistence behaviours can lead to a decrease in the welfare of the
agent. In these cases, the performance may not be required to reach a maximum value
but to be maintained at an adequate level during the agent's lifetime. This means that
a proper evaluation of the learning algorithm requires a comparison of its performance
with other non-learning algorithms and eventually taking the non-learning counterpart
as a base in the presentation of the results. Only this way can the learning abilities of
the agent be properly tested.
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Unsuccessful experiments
Usually people tend to write only about successful experiments, but unsuccessful ex-
periments can also provide valuable knowledge. It is important to report on innovative
designs that are bound to be useful, but is also important to point out their limita-
tions and capacity to adapt to dierent circumstances. In particular, it is important
to mention which were the most crucial design issues so that others can avoid the
trouble of rediscovering them through failures. This was the philosophy followed in
this dissertation and the reason why a considerable part of the presented results were
negative.
Simulation vs. real world
The experimental work reported in these dissertation was done in a simulated robot
instead of in a real robot. There were a few reasons for this choice:
 longer experiments are possible;
 the evaluation of dierent control strategies is less time-consuming;
 much more data can be extracted from the experiments for analysis of the results;
 experiments can be reproduced, making it possible to answer particular questions
that were not contemplated in the rst instance of the experiment;
 environment and task can be easily modied;
 there is more freedom in the agent design, for instance sensors that are readily
available for the physical robot can be easily provided to the simulated robot.
These are all signicant advantages particularly for research that is still in its early
stages. Even so many robotic researchers tend to consider robot simulation unwor-
thy. The reason for this is the simplications that are necessarily introduced in robot
simulation, which can introduce unrealistic simplications of the robot-environment in-
teraction that can both hinder the development of simpler solutions and oer solutions
grounded on specious abstractions.
CHAPTER 6: Concluding Discussion 179
Sometimes robot controllers are faced with control problems in simulation that disap-
pear once the controller is changed to the real world. For instance, real world noise can
help to take the robot out of what in simulation are unsolvable dead-lock situations
(e.g., Mahadevan and Connell, 1992). Although the Khepera simulator used in the
experimental work modelled noise to some extent, it would also often produce this kind
of problem. Modelling noise in simulation is important to avoid this problem and can
even be benecial to the robot training (Meeden et al., 1993).
Furthermore, modelling realistic physics with some accuracy is extremely dicult
(Webb, 1994). This means that if the control strategy is strongly dependent on the
physics of the robot-environment interaction then the use of a real robot is probably a
more practical solution.
A typical example of the dangers of robot simulation in producing incorrect control
solutions is the temptation of using reinforcement, or even behaviour, dependent on
information that is normally not accessible to the real robot | in particular, the
simulation of sensory data that cannot be obtained with robotic technology. In the
work reported in this dissertation special care was taken to avoid falling into such
traps. All the data available to the robot controller is based on sensory data available
to real Kheperas apart from detection of battery level and rough movement detection
not available in the robot simulator. These and other sensory information not ready
available to the robot were found necessary in order to add some complexity to the
agent's emotional system. Nevertheless, all this sensory information can be easily
acquired by a real robot.
Nowadays, a few robot simulators, like for example the Khepera simulator used, are
being made available avoiding the need for each researcher to develop their own. Apart
from saving eort, these also allow the use of the same platform by dierent researchers
making their results more easily comparable. As real robots' software programming
tools become increasingly sophisticated, it would be worthwhile for the manufacturers
to consider the inclusion of a simulator of the robot as well.
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6.3 Emotions in Autonomous Robots
Emotions play an important motivational role in natural systems, directing their atten-
tion to what is relevant for their survival. They do so in multiple ways by inuencing
dierent basic cognition mechanisms such as attention, memory, learning and reason-
ing.
In autonomous robots, emotions can play a similar role, lling in the lack in motiva-
tional mechanisms of traditional architectures. In the current research, this approach
was taken within a reinforcement-learning architecture. An emotional system was used
as a unied construct to solve separate problems that implicitly demanded some sort
of attention mechanism. The emotional system is particularly appropriate for this
purpose because it attributes relevance to the dierent experiences of the agent in the
context of its internal motivations.
The existence of an explicit global appraisal system proved helpful in providing an inte-
grated solution for dierent mechanisms such as reinforcement, behaviour interruption,
modulation of the learning rate and the tradeo between exploration and exploitation
through the variation of the selection temperature.
The dierent mechanisms were tested under two dierent control strategies, one based
on actions and one based on behaviours.
Emotions were found more useful in systems with behaviour level complexity, in par-
ticular the use of emotion-dependent reinforcement in an action-based controller was
found inadequate although it was adequate for behaviour-based control.
In the experiments with the behaviour-based controller, behaviour interruption was
used as an alternative to the modulation of learning parameters used in the action-
based controller. In fact, these are two alternative ways to inuence the learning
process that serve common goals. On the one hand, the interruption of behaviour
at particular points is actually determining when the agent should learn, which is
equivalent to setting the learning rate to a non-zero value only at these points. On the
other hand, the frequency of behaviour interruption directly inuences the number of
dierent behaviours the agent tries out, which also happens if the selection temperature
CHAPTER 6: Concluding Discussion 181
is raised.
Furthermore, the developed emotion model also inuences the robot's perception. This
was devised as one more mechanism of attention that would make salient the features
of the environment that were related to the current emotional state. Unfortunately,
this mechanism was not demonstrably useful for the controllers here, which performed
as well with or without this mechanism.
The robot emotions themselves were very simplied and not very realistic when com-
pared with human-like emotions. It was considered more important to have emotions
t for purpose.
6.4 Future Work
The work reported in this dissertation focuses mostly on the dierent roles emotions
can have in autonomous robots. For this reason, the learning architecture used leaves
much room for improvement in terms of autonomy. In fact, this architecture has not
even been particularly tuned for performance. The use of evolutionary techniques
would probably be helpful for the rening of the architecture by selecting the design
options and parameters most t for the robot adaptation.
However, following the same line of reasoning as before, the suggestions that are given
below for future research are also directed towards the strengthening of the interaction
between emotions and control.
6.4.1 Emotions and their inuence on control
First of all, the emotion model itself could be improved. Some deciencies have al-
ready been pointed out during its presentation that could be corrected. For example,
the emotion dependency on feelings is rather simplied. The model can certainly be
extended to take into consideration temporal relations and more complex functional
dependencies.
Another simplication of the current work was to associate each emotion with a single
problem when in reality emotions are much more multi-coloured and complex, suggest-
182
ing that they should be associated with groups of related problems instead.
Furthermore, from all the dierent roles associated with emotions that were discussed
in Chapter 3 only a few were explored and even those with only limited success.
One of the solutions that was particularly poor in this work was the inuence of
emotion on perception. In fact, the learning architecture used was quite limiting.
The only form of attention possible in perception was changing the perceptual values
themselves, and those changes were actually compensated for by the architecture's
neural networks. To properly solve this problem the learning architecture itself would
have to be changed to another one which was equipped or liable to be equipped with
mechanisms of attention at the level of perception. An example of such an architecture
is a case-based architecture (Kolodner, 1993) where variable weights could be given to
the dierent perceptions in the selection of the most similar case.
One of the most interesting roles of emotions that was not explored was their inuence
on memory. This is an extension that could be easily made to the system by associating
each emotion with dierent memory mechanisms, more specically with dierent neural
networks to compute the utility values of each action. This way the robot could be
made to only remember the experiences that were associated with emotional states
similar to the current one. This would probably be an advantage, because it would
produce a categorisation of the memorised events according to the type of problem.
In fact the recall of only the directly relevant facts is one of the benets provided
by emotions to reasoning. For example, in the solution provided by Ventura et al.
(1998) emotions are actually considered an alternative method of classication that
provide extra eciency by selecting only the relevant cases at each decision point.
Another alternative for memory dependent reasoning proposed by El-Nasr et al. (1998)
used mood dependent recall with non-deterministic Q-learning. In this solution, when
the agent is choosing an action, it gives more weight to positive outcomes if it is
in a happy state, and conversely more weight to negative outcomes if it is in a sad
state. Unfortunately, this algorithm required a table to save the reinforcement-learning
utility values and an implementation of the algorithm with neural networks is not
straightforward.
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Emotions are also usually associated with action tendencies which can be important
for making fast decisions. Dierent emotions endow the agent with dierent domains
of actions, specifying which actions or behaviour are more appropriate for the dierent
emotional states. For example, the emotion of fear is usually associated with eeing
or freezing and anger with ghting. This was one of the aspects of emotions that was
totally overlooked by the current work where the emphasis was given to the freedom
of action choice. Nevertheless, there are clear advantages to equipping the robot with
a set of fast responses for emergency situations.
Another issue associated with fast responses is the physiological arousal of the body
by emotions. This is a clear advantage to biological systems, but its transposition to
articial systems is not very straightforward. However, a simple solution can consist
of having the robot's motor response dependent on the emotional state.
Finally all the emotions' inuence on social interaction, which was omitted in the
current work, can be a great source of future development.
6.4.2 Emotions development
A very important aspect of emotions that has been left out for the moment is the
development of more sophisticated emotions. Humans have innate emotions that are
experienced early in life (Primary emotions) and emotions that are built on the previ-
ous (Secondary emotions) by pairing experiences with emotional responses (Damasio,
1994).
The emotions model that was implemented did not support the development of the
emotions through learning during the agent lifetime. The agent depends only on its
primary emotions for survival. However, the system could be extended to contemplate
the emergence of secondary emotions. These could for instance result from the as-
sociations between stimuli, or feelings in the case of the current model, and existing
emotions. The development of new and more complex emotions on the top of the pri-
mary ones is a more dicult issue and a subject of research. This can be based on the
exploration of temporal relations between the existing emotion (e.g., relief) and consist
of the categorisation of recurrent patterns of emotion activation. In the case of social
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agents, the new emotions can also consist of the categorisation of recurrent emotional
experiences associated with certain individuals (e.g., love and hate) or characteristic
experiences of social interaction (e.g., jealousy).
In the current model, the initial hand-designed associations between feelings and basic
emotions constitute the robot's initial frame of reference. These associations should
be maintained by the robot and new ones should be developed on top based on the
robot's experiences. This added feature can provide an element of change in the value
system that will, hopefully, increase its autonomy.
The fact that emotions are used as reinforcement means that if the emotion system has
the ability to develop during the agent lifetime then the agent will have a dynamical
and incremental value system that is also learned by the agent. In the adaptation of
an agent to its environment, value systems, although needed and useful, will always
work as a limitation on what the robot can learn. If the value system is very broad, the
learning task will be very slow, very dicult or even impossible. On the other hand, if
the value system is very specic, the learning will be very limited. A solution to this
problem that might help in scaling-up learning architectures is to have a dynamical and
incremental value system that is also learned by the system. Several researchers (Ver-
schure et al., 1995; Cariani, 1992a) have suggested in the past the on-line development
of the value system for higher adaptation to the environment.
For the introduction of new emotions, the triggering mechanism as it is might be
inadequate. The introduction of an emotion of surprise might be necessary to allow
the agent to take notice and learn about features of its environment that have not been
caught by its emotional system, because they have never been experienced before.
It is fundamental for the correct functioning of the control system that this is triggered
whenever something that might be relevant happens. For example, it was crucial for
the correct execution of its task that the presence of lights, its food source, inuenced
the robot's emotional state, which they do through the feeling of warmth. For the
same reasons, it is important that the controller can also be triggered by a sense of
novelty.
Surprise has been proposed previously to drive learning (e.g., Moat and Frijda, 1995).
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Similarly, the detection of a failure in predicting the environment has been used to drive
learning but under the denomination of curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991). Together with
interest, excitement and boredom these are probably the most used emotions in robot
applications where emotions inuence learning.
In the long run, the triggering mechanism will end up beneting from the introduction
of new emotions in a straightforward way. As the new emotion associations are created
they will inuence the robot's emotional state which in turn will result in the detection
by the triggering mechanisms of events related to the new associations.
This will not only happen with the control triggering mechanism but with all the other
mechanisms that are based on emotions | one of the advantages of having a unied
solution.
6.5 Conclusions
The experimental test of the developed emotional mechanisms against more traditional
approaches to the realization of dierent reinforcement-learning problematic compo-
nents demonstrated that emotions were a competent alternative. In the specic case of
the detection of state transition, emotions were actually a more successful alternative
in terms of the agent's learning performance.
The use of emotions as an abstraction has the advantage of allowing dierent compo-
nents of reinforcement learning to be brought together under the same construct. This
was found helpful for two reasons:
 the synchrony and coherence between the dierent components achieved by this
unied solution represented a slight enhancement of the agent's performance;
 the design of the dierent components was simplied to the design of a single
construct, the robot's emotions;
Furthermore, the use of emotions provided a new perspective over these dierent task-
dependent components of a reinforcement-learning framework. This resulted in the
introduction of innovative mechanisms that were tested in the robot experiments. The
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most important innovations being in terms of the reinforcement function and the spec-
ication of state transition:
 a multi-dimensional reinforcement function that takes into consideration the dif-
ferent problems faced by the robot with variable degrees of attention dependent
on the robot's current priorities;
 a simplied denition of state transition based on detection of signicant events
captured by variation in the reinforcement function value.
The emotional system selects between dierent reinforcement functions according to
the context of the world, i.e. it might choose to ignore other problems that exist
when faced with a more important one. For example, the reinforcement function
might not punish the robot for its collision with an obstacle and instead reinforce it
for successfully extracting energy from a light. The attribution by the reinforcement
function of variable degrees of attention to each of the dierent problems might be
taken to be a source of confusion for the learning process. However, experiments
showed that instead of confusing the learning process, this was actually advantageous
and that the learning algorithm was exploiting the non-linearities of the reinforcement
function.
The presented event detection mechanism also prots from the novel structure of the
reinforcement function. Apart from providing an absolute reinforcement value that
varies with the robot's situation, the developed reinforcement function based on emo-
tion also dierentiates and prioritises the dierent problems faced by the robot. This
added information allows the detection of events when there is a dierence in type of
dominant problem and not just in problem degree.
Emotions have a vital motivational role in natural cognition. They have the power
to drive and inuence a great variety of basic cognition mechanisms. As such they
served as inspiration for the current research in the development of innovative mech-
anisms in an articial robot, but many of the important features of emotions were
left unexplored and can be considered for possible extensions of this research. The
eld of emotional agents has promising research directions and should be regarded as
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The system parameters used in the emotions model's functions are the following:
Cef = Value of the emotion-feeling dependency between emotion e and feeling f






These parameters can take values within [0; 1) apart from Cef and Be which can take
values within ( 1; 1).
 1 < Cef ; Be < 1 (A.1)
0  Ch; Itha ; Iths ; up; down < 1 (A.2)
It is also assumed that the sensations (Sfn) have been normalised to the range [0; 1].
Furthermore, to prevent the system from saturating by the feedback of values through
the hormone system, it was found necessary to make extra restrictions to the system
parameters. In practice, it must be guaranteed that if no stimulus is available then the
hormone values will decrease.
If Sfn = 0 then jHfn+1 j < jHfn j (A.3)
The following restrictions allow to guarantee this. The sum of the positive coupling
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coecients associated with an emotion (C+e ) or with a feeling (C
+
f
) should be limited
in the following way:































Be if Be > 0
0 otherwise
(A.7)
Care should also be taken to have Cef high enough to guarantee the emotions to be
active when necessary and to enable them to take high values.
Consult the appendices concerning experimental details to know which parameter val-
ues were used. The emotions' bias (Be) and dependencies on feelings (Cef ) used in
the dierent control strategies are specied in the main text while the implementa-





B.1 Error Bar Calculation
B.1.1 Single experiment
The error bars displayed on the graphs assume a normal distribution of the raw values
and are based on the following calculations. The mean and the standard deviation of
the means obtained for each one of the runs was calculated.
So supposing that x1; x2    xn are the means obtained for each of the n runs at a
particular testing point, the following standard formulae show how the mean () and












(xi   )2 (B.2)
The error bars are based on the condence interval of 1 q, where q = 5%. Their value
is .  is calculated as shown in the following equation.










B.1.2 Dierence between two experiments
In some cases, it is interesting to show the dierence between two experiments, instead
of each one of them by themselves. This is only done for experiments of the same size.
In these cases, the mean and standard deviation of the nal displayed results are calcu-
lated from the individual mean and standard deviation of each of the two experiments.
So consider that, through the calculations specied above, the mean and standard de-
viation obtained are r and r for one of the experiments, and b and b for the other.
Supposing that the latter is taken to be the base experiment and that the distributions
of the data are independent from experiment to experiment, the mean and standard
deviation of the dierence between the two are:








Once again, the error bars shown in the graphs are , where  is the same function





Energy level and sensation intensities are values bounded between zero and one.
The robot is initialised with maximum energy level. To lose all its energy, the robot
takes EnergyAutoStopSteps iteration steps if it is stopped, and EnergyAutoRunSteps
if it is moving at full speed. The decrease in energy level is proportional to the
total motor activity (i.e. the sum of the absolute values of both left and right motor
values). EnergyRechargSteps is the number of steps necessary to recover all its energy
if the robot receives maximum light on its sensors. The energy will increase only if
the sum of the values of the robot's front light sensors is high enough (i.e. 60% of
its maximum value). If that condition is met, then the increase in energy is directly
proportional to the light received by these sensors. The previous descriptions of the
processes of increase and decrease of energy level assume independent processes, i.e.
each description considers that the energy value is only modied by the process being
described. In reality, the eects of both processes in the energy level are calculated
separately and subsequently added.
Hunger is one minus the energy level.
The Eating sensation is non-zero and directly proportional to the light perceived if
the light received by the robot's front sensors is considered high enough to increase
its energy level. If the energy level is very high (> 0:95) the Eating sensation is in
addition multiplied by one minus the energy level, i.e. the Hunger sensation.
If the robot is bumping then the Pain is proportional to the number of distance sensors
with high values (over 1020), otherwise it is zero. The pain value starts at 1=3 and
increases by 1=6 for each high-valued distance sensor until it reaches its maximum
value. This means that the Pain sensation does not dierentiate between 3 or more
high-valued sensors.
If the robot travels a good distance (Manhattan distance higher than 1), its Restless-
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ness will decrease; otherwise it increases. The parameter BoredomRaiseSteps is the
number of steps the robot has to be totally stopped to reach its maximum restlessness
value. While the increase in restlessness is inversely proportional to BoredomRaiseSteps,
the decrease is inversely proportional to the parameter BoredomLowerSteps. The
change in restlessness intensity is directly proportional to one minus the Manhattan
distance (i.e. the sum of the absolute values of the distances covered in x and in y),
which lies between  4 and 1.
If the total motor activity is above the TempRaiseTh threshold then the Temperature
will rise. If the value is low (i.e., motor activity < TempLowerTh), then the temperature
will decrease. Basically, the robot will lose temperature with all actions in its action
set except for the fast-forward action. When motors are at full power (motor activity
= 20), the robot takes TempRaiseSteps steps to go from no temperature to maximum
temperature. It will take TempLowerSteps to lower its temperature back to zero with
the motors o. The temperature increase is directly proportional to the total motor
activity and the decrease is directly proportional to one minus the rescaled total motor
activity (rescaled to lie between 0 and 1).





















Table C.1: Parameter values used in the experiments.
C.3 Actions
The set of discrete actions used in the experiments is dened by the motor values shown
in Table C.2. The second set of action used in the experiments reported in Section
4.3.4 is dened by the same motor values, except for the backwards movement.
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Actions Motor power
Right motor Left motor
Slow forward 3 3
Turn left 5 2
Turn right 2 5
Fast forward 8 8
Stop 0 0
Backwards -1 (-3) -5 (-3)
Table C.2: Values of the robot's motors for each action. The values in brackets are the
modied values for the second set of actions.
C.4 Program Environment and Performance
The program developed, sim, is an extension of the X-windows simulator by Olivier
Michel (Michel, 1996). The original code was in C, but the extensions were done in
C++. Some extensions were made to the original code in order to allow it to run in
the background with no graphical output.
The sim program takes about ve hours to run an experiment with one hundred and
twenty thousand learning steps and sixty-one two thousand step evaluation tests (e.g.
the experiment reported in Figure 4.8). The execution time reported was obtained
for a Sun SparcStation 4 at 125 MHz with sim running in the background with low
priority while other programs were running on the same machine.
C.5 Earlier Experiments
The experiments reported in this dissertation are the end result of many other exper-
iments that provided insights for the gradual improvement of the system.
Much of the improvement consisted in having a more adequate adaptive controller
whether by changing the networks used or the learning algorithms. Others introduced
changes in the emotional system with the purpose of achieving a more stable sys-
tem able to provide a reinforcement function more adequate for learning interesting
behaviour.
This involved re-design of the basic emotions, by changing the existing relations be-
tween feelings and emotions, changing many of the system functions and even redening
the feelings. Although the magnitudes of the reinforcements received and the nal be-
haviours learned by this early system where quite dierent, the conclusions that were
derived are consistent with the ones reported in the main text.
Some of the dierences of one of these earlier systems when compared with the nal
version follow.
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The functions used by the earlier emotion system which are dierent are:
8f 2 F ;8n 2 N; Hfn+1 = Hfn + (1  ) tanh(dAfn) (C.1)
 = HormAlpha (C.2)
d = HormDeclive (C.3)
The Temperature and Pain sensations and the energy level were calculated in a sightly
dierent fashion. The main dierences being:
 the temperature would only decrease if the action taken was the stop action;
 even if the robot was not bumping, pain could be non-zero if distance sensors
with high values existed;
 the light sensor used for increasing the energy level was the middle right light
sensor. This selection was made in the assumption that a slightly oset sensor
should provide a more dicult task. However, this was not case.
In addition, the turning actions of the action set were associated with the following
motor values:
Actions Motor power
Right motor Left motor
Turn left 7 3
Turn right 3 7
Furthermore, the system parameters had the values shown in Tables C.3 and C.4.
Hunger Pain Restlessness Temperature Eating Bias
Happiness -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.7 0.15
Sadness 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Fear -0.4 0.6 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0
Anger 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0
Table C.3: The emotions' dependencies on feelings for earlier experiments.
Finally, the robot's environment was simpler (see Figure C.1). In the more recent
version, lights had to be surrounded by bricks to avoid having the robot getting stuck
on the lights. This would happen quite frequently, especially with the new setup. As a
result, experiments would often have to be invalidated, because the robot was caught in
one of these situations where it would become helpless with no action available capable




















Table C.4: Parameter values used in the earlier experiments.
of getting it out of its stuck position. It was found that the robot would \jump" into
such positions because the simulator only veries intersection with obstacles for the
nal position of the step movement, and not for all the intermediate positions. This
way, the robot can arrive at invalid positions that should normally not be reachable.
When this happens, in order to get back to a valid position, the robot might have to
execute the exact inverse action that led to the invalid position in the rst place and
might be unable to free itself only because of a question of speed of the motors.





D.1 Sensations and Food Sources Specication
As stated in the main text, the acquisition of new energy can only be made at specic
intervals of time, and the sensors used for this purpose are now the two rear light
sensors instead of the two front ones. To specify the implications of the robot's harder
task for its sensations, this task will be described in detail next.
Each light in the robot's environment is a food source. A food source contains several
food items, varying between 0 and MaxFoodItems, that are decreased by one every
time it releases energy. Food items are continuously being produced, unless the limit
of food items per food source, i.e. MaxFoodItems, is reached. A new food item is
created after a random number of steps varying between 1 and MaxNewFoodSteps,
unless production is stopped. In the latter case, a food item has to be used up rst. If
the robot collides with the associated light, then a food item is released in the form of
available energy to the robot and therefore used up. This energy will only be available
for MaxFoodAvailableSteps steps. Only during this interval of time can the robot
acquire energy by receiving light in its rear sensors. The food items are actually only
released when the robot state changes from not bumping to bumping. So after having
received a food item, to have a new one, the robot has to back out and hit the light
again. This avoids all the food items being released in one go when the robot keeps in
collision with the light for a few steps.
For simplication of the implementation, it is not necessary that the robot actually
collide with the light or the bricks around it. The robot has only to collide with some
wall within a pre-specied square area around the light. Around each light, there is
such an area. These areas are represented in Figure D.1 by the smaller and lighter
areas around the lights. This gure also shows the larger areas, represented by a less
bright colour, where the robot can smell and eventually eat the food provided by the
light.
The other modications introduced to previously existing sensations are:
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Figure D.1: Dierent regions for energy acquisition.
 Temperature | The temperature's variation thresholds were lowered because
the actions employed by the behaviours tend to be smaller than the primitive
actions previously used.
 Restlessness | Is calculated just the same way as before, but is reset to value
zero, together with the associated hormone, whenever the controller selects a
behaviour.
Three new sensations were introduced. These, like the original sensations, also have
values bounded between zero and one.
 Smell | is only active if there is food available and its intensity is directly
proportional to the number of time steps it will still be available. It has the
maximum value of one when the food is made available.
 Warmth | is the normalised value of the light sensor that is receiving most
light at the moment; the highest the the intensity of the light received in that
sensor, the higher the value of warmth.
 Proximity | is the normalised value of the distance sensor with the highest
value. Reects the proximity of the nearest obstacle.
The parameter values used by the behaviour-based controller in the calculation of the
sensations and food availability are given in Section D.2.
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D.2 System Parameters
Figure Experiment Reinforcement Environment Parameters
5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 Short Sensation { {
5.9 { Sensation { {
5.10, 5.11 Short Sensation { {
5.12 { N. A. { {
5.14 { Sensation { {
5.15 Event-driven Sensation { {
5.16, 5.17 { Sensation { {
5.18 { Sensation Demanding {
5.19, 5.20 { Sensation Demanding Energy
5.22, 5.23 { N. A. { {
5.24 { Emotion { {
5.26 { Emotion { {
5.28 { N. A. { {
5.29 { N. A. Demanding Energy
5.30, 5.31 Follow-up Emotion { {
5.33, D.2, D.3 { Emotion { {
5.35 { Emotion Demanding Energy + Hormone decay
5.36 { Emotion Demanding Energy + No hormones
5.38 { Emotion { {
5.39 { Emotion Demanding Energy
Table D.1: Experimental procedure for individual experiments.
Interpretation of Table D.1:
Figure | Indicates the gures where the experimental results are shown. The list of
gures provides a brief description of the experiments themselves.
Experiment | The dierence between short experiments and normal experiments
lies in the number of steps per trial, see Section 5.2.4 for details. Some of the
experiments are actually follow-ups on other experiments, showing particular
details of the behaviour of a controller after learning has converged.
Reinforcement | Species whether sensation-dependent or emotion-dependent re-
inforcement was used during the experiments.
Environment | The dierent available environments, the default and the demand-
ing, are pictured in Figures 5.2 and 5.1, respectively.
Parameters | The default parameters are the ones on Table D.2, the modications






































Table D.4: Modied parameters for no inuence from hormone system.
Emotions Parameters
HormAlphaDn 0.99, 0.998, 0.999
Table D.5: Modied parameter values for hormone decay rate.
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D.3 Behaviours
For an accurate description of the behaviours, their pseudo-code is given next starting




AllSensors  f 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 g;
LeftSensors  f 0, 1, 2 g;
RightSensors  f 3, 4, 5 g;
RearSensors  f 6, 7 g;
RightOrientTo  [ 8, 8, 10, 8, 2, -4, -10, -10 ];
LeftOrientTo  [ -4, 2, 8, 10, 8, 8, 10, 10 ];
RightWall.Th  [ 5, 5, 5, 5, 100, 800, 5, 5 ];
RightWall.left  [ -1, -1, -1, 5, 8, 8, 0, 0 ];
RightWall.leftSum  100  P j RightWall.left[8 i 2 AllSensors] j
RightWall.right  [ 1, 1, 1, -5, -2, -2, 0, 0 ];
RightWall.rightSum  100  P j RightWall.right[8 i 2 AllSensors] j
LeftWall.th  [ 800, 100, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 ];
LeftWall.left  [ -2, -2, -5, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 ];
LeftWall.leftSum  100  P j LeftWall.left[8 i 2 AllSensors] j
LeftWall.right  [ 8, 8, 5, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0 ];
LeftWall.rightSum  100  P j LeftWall.right[8 i 2 AllSensors] j
function BoundMotorValue(x)
return max( -10, min( 10, x));
end






For i 2 AllSensors do
leftMotor  leftMotor + reex.left[i]  (reex.th[i] - proximity[i]);
rightMotor  rightMotor + reex.right[i]  (reex.th[i] - proximity[i]);
leftMotor  BoundMotorValue((leftMotor / reex.leftSum) + 1 );
rightMotor  BoundMotorValue((rightMotor / reex.rightSum) + 1);
end
Behaviour Avoid Obstacles
For i 2 AllSensors do
proximity[i]  Value registered by distance sensor i;
end
imax  i : proximity[i]  proximity[8 j 2 AllSensors];
if (imax =2 RearSensors) or
(j proximity[6] - proximity[7] j > MediumProximityValue) do





leftMotor  (proximity[7] - max(proximity[8 i 2 RightSensors])) / 51;
rightMotor  (proximity[6] - max(proximity[8 i 2 LeftSensors])) / 51;
end
Behaviour Seek Light
For i 2 AllSensors do
value[i]  Value registered by light sensor i;
light[i]  450 - value[i];
end
if max(light[8 i 2 AllSensors]) < 0 do





adjust  2  max(light[8 i 2 AllSensors]);
leftMotor  BoundMotorValue((light  LeftOrientTo)/adjust);
rightMotor  BoundMotorValue((light  RightOrientTo)/adjust);
end
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Behaviour Wall Following
For i 2 AllSensors do
proximity[i]  Value registered by distance sensor i;
end
imax  i : proximity[i]  proximity[8 j 2 AllSensors];
if (max(proximity[imax]) < SmallProximityValue) or imax 2 RearSensors do






if wall = none do











leftMotor  BoundMotorValue(6  leftMotor);
rightMotor  BoundMotorValue(6  rightMotor);
end
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D.4 Additional Experimental Results














































































Figure D.2: Emotional controller starting o with customised neural networks. Repe-
tition of learning experiment in Figure 5.33 testing dierent  values.
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Figure D.3: Emotional controller with no learning and starting o with customised
neural networks. Repetition of non-learning experiment in Figure 5.33 testing dierent
 values.
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D.5 Program Environment and Performance
The new controller demanded further modications to the Khepera simulator, apart
from those already done for the action-based controller. As discussed previously, some-
times the robot would end up in crash situations where all its available actions were
useless to move it away. With the new controller the problems with robot crash situa-
tions increased dramatically, making it necessary to change the Test Collision routine
of the simulator. Minor changes to the routine were sucient to make it much more ro-
bust and avoid crashing problems altogether. As a side eect, the overall performance
of the robots, not taking into account the crashed robots, also improved slightly.
The new controller is more complex and takes more steps to run. This resulted in a
signicant increase in the computing time of each experiment. Now a normal experi-
ment, as described in Section 5.2.4 and usually corresponding to one of the curves of
the results graphs, takes about ten hours processing time on a Sun Ultra 5 workstation.
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